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Introduction
This introductory chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, a survey
of various parts of the literature is given to make the reader familiar with
the terminology and methodology used and the type of questions asked in this
thesis, and to indicate the current state of knowledge in the research
field(s) of this thesis. In particular, it reviews the recent contributions to
the theoretical and empirical literatures on investment decisions and the
connection between investment and financial decisions. After this survey, the
second part of this chapter outlines the contents of this thesis and provides
some motivation for the research described in this thesis.
1.1 The Neoclassical Theory of Investment
7.7.7
Investments are an important link between the present and the future. As
real counterpart of savings in the economy, they enable households and the
government to smooth their consumption patterns over time. At the same time
investments are needed to replace old capital, because it is broken-down or
has become obsolete. Furthermore firms invest to enlarge the production
capacity or to produce better or totally different products.
A considerable part of all capital goods is owned by firms that try to
maximize their profits or the wealth of the shareholders. In pursuit of this
objective, their demand for capital is generally determined by their
expectations concerning sales and prices of outputs and inputs '.
Hereafter we use the term investment for fixed business investment. Thus
other categories like inventories or residential investment are left aside in
the discussion. These categories are subjects that are usually studied
If the so-called substitution matrix is diagonal only the real cost of
capital is of importance.separately.
As mentioned above, investments are affected by several factors. For
instance, the technology of the firm as well as the features of and
developments in the markets in which the firm operates influence the
investments. The intertemporal character of investment decisions can be
attributed to the sort of goods that are purchased. For example, it does not
only take years to build a chemical plant, but such an investment project
involves the production capacity for several years due to indivisibilities.
Furthermore, quick adjustments of the capital stock can be costly when
increased demand for capital raises its price as would be the case in a
monopsonistic market. The sources and the structure of adjustment costs will
be discussed at another place in this chapter. Just like it often is
impossible to enlarge the production capacity of the firm immediately, once
the decision to expand is made, it cannot easily, i.e. costlessly, be
reversed. In many cases capital expenditures should be considered as sunk
costs, for instance in the case where the value of the plant moves up and down
with the prices of the product as in the microprocessor industry. All these
factors, sometimes in combination with uncertainty and the fact that investors
are risk-averse, influence the investment decision.
When an investment project is big, the firm's internal funds may not be
adequate to finance it. Then the firm can consider to acquire funds
externally. For a number of reasons, that will be expounded elsewhere in this
chapter, the gap between the cost of internal funds and the cost of external
finance can become so large that projects are canceled, that would have been
carried out if there would have been enough internal funds to finance them.
In the sequel of this section we will outline the neoclassical theory of
investment. In particular, we will discuss models where the dynamical
properties are treated explicitly rather than being superimposed, namely the
so-called Euler equation model and Q model of investment. In this class of
models the dynamical properties are part of the optimization problem and the
parameters are identified by an assumption with respect to the way in which
expectations are formed.
The motivation for reviewing only this part of the literature is twofold:
it represents the more recent developments in the academic research on
investment and the analysis in each chapter of this thesis is based on such
models.Ch. 1 INTRODUCTION
7.7.2 7nvesfmerc/ Mode/i /rom /Ae yorgertsonian Era
For the sake of completeness we will devote a few sentences to models
with implicit dynamics. Starting point of such a model is a (static) model for
the optimal capital stock, that is assumed to depend on relative prices — the
so-called Jorgensonian user cost of capital — , quantities, e.g. sales, and
shocks. (Net) investment is determined by a distributed lag of the optimal
stock of capital. The theory does not tell us much about the shape of the
distributed lag function. This practice was only justified by pointing to the
existence of delivery or gestation lags. Furthermore expectations were either
static or were formed by extrapolation. Only under static expectations, the
consistency of the theoretical model was tenable, while this assumption is
clearly at odds with the forward looking character of investment decisions. In
the original version of the neoclassical model output was even assumed to be
exogenous to the firm. This cannot be reconciled with the fact that a profit
maximizing entrepeneur chooses output and inputs simultaneously. As the
distributed lag functions consisted of a combination of technological and
expectational parameters, the Lucas critique applied to the so-called implicit
models, namely that the expectation parameters that are sensitive to changes
in policy, e.g. the investment tax credit, cannot be identified separately.
This critique was one of the main reasons for the development of models with
explicit dynamics.
7.7.5 /nveswie/if Modc/i foK«/ on 7rt/mewipora/
The protagonists of this school, Hansen and Sargent (1980a, 1980b),
incorporated the dynamic aspects of the investment decision in the objective
function of the firm but used, for the sake of tractability, ad hoc
(linear-quadratic) specifications for the technology including adjustment
costs. In such a framework, it was possible to determine a closed form
solution of the Euler equations (first-order conditions), that can be shown to
satisfy the so-called transversality condition. Epstein and Yatchew (1985)
show that both the technology and the way expectations are formed can be
identified from a system that includes the factor demand (Euler) equations as
well as the production function. It is needless to say that, when only the
Euler equations are estimated, one does not have to restrict thespecifications to those within the linear-quadratic class.
For expositional reasons, it is useful to derive a benchmark investment
model from an intertemporal optimization problem. We present the derivation of
a rather general model, that describes the behavior of a firm that has three
potential sources of funds to finance its activities : retained earnings, debt
and equity. Due to imperfections in the capital market, the costs of these
sources of funds are not equal; there is a so-called financial hierarchy where
retained earnings are a cheaper source of funds than the issue of shares. The
costs of debt financing depend on its scale. Later on, we will discuss the
reasons for/causes of the cost differences between the sources of funds. For
the moment, we just assume the existence of the financial hierarchy.
The firm is assumed to maximize the present value of a stream of
dividends, that is the value of the firm, subject to technological and
financial restrictions. To keep matters easy, we assume that both output and
input markets are characterized by perfect competition, that is prices are
beyond the control of the firm. The firm is endowed with a production
technology Y = F(N ,K ) where Y is output, N is labor and K is (physical)
capital at the end of period t. Note that capital purchased today becomes
productive next period. Let I denote gross investment of the firm. In
addition to the delivery (or gestation) lag, the firm also faces adjustments
cost of capital AC(I ,K ). This function is positive (outside of the origin)
and convex in I . Thus the larger the adjustments of the stock of capital, the
higher the marginal costs. The dividends obey the following equality
D = (1-T)( p [F - AC ] - p*N • r B } + AB - p'l + V*(l-E ) (1.1)
where T is the corporate tax rate, r is the nominal rate of interest paid on
corporate bonds, p is the product price, p' is wage, p is the price of
capital goods, B is debt, E is a lemon's premium and V are new share
issues. Capital is accumulated according to the well-known transition equation
K^ = 1^ + (1-8*) K^ | (1.2)
Dividends are not allowed to be negative and share repurchases are forbidden
D > 0 V* > 0 (1.3)Ch. 1 INTRODUCTION 5
We abstract from taxes other than the corporate tax for notational
convenience. The firm discounts the dividends using the (after-tax) required
rate of return p. Summarizing, the firm faces the following optimization
problem, where expectations depend on information until period t
V. 1'B, 1> = t t-1 1-1 , g MAX £ J S(l+p)-'-'» f(D- V")
,V",N ,D ,1 , ' 1 . = , I ' '
i t i i t *• B B )
1+1, 1+2,..., '
+ d D - b [B -B ] + v V* - X [K - I -(1-5*)K ] (1.4)
sssss ss sss s • 1
.- AC ] - pjN • r,.,B,.,| + AB,- p^+ vJl-3.) - D.]
In the literature there are several approaches to modeling the fact that
high leverage is costly. First, following Hall (1991) or Bond and Meghir
(1994), one could add a term to the profit function that depends on leverage
and other factors that entail (agency) costs like firm size. Alternatively, an
upperbound B could be imposed on debt, as Whited (1992) did. Such a bound can
be interpreted as the debt capacity of the firm, that depends for instance on
the composition of the mix of assets of the firm, e.g. the share of R&D. We
have added such a constraint to the model. Then the shadow price corresponding
to such a constraint can be modeled as a function of explanatory variables in
the spirit of MaCurdy (1981). d , b , v and X and u. are Kuhn-Tucker and
SS5 SS
Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the in- and equality constrains respec-




i * i i
t
aACD : 1+d =ii , dD =0 (1.5d)
t i *t i '
B_ : b_- n^+ n^[(l-x)r^ + 1 Kl+P) = 0 M*,^,] = 0 (1.5e)
V* : -1 + v + Ji (1-S ) = 0 v V'^ = 0 (1.50
i Transversality Condition
lim £ [(l+p)"'p [F -AC ] - p' IK =0 (1.6)
t ^ *l+s K.l+s K.l+s *t+s-ll 1+s-l
No Ponzi Game Condition
lim E^ [(l+p)"*B 1 = 0 (1.7)
Equation (1.5b) equates the marginal costs of investment to the present value
of the marginal reveneus of investment net of adjustment costs, A. . This
relation between the marginal adjustment costs and X , which is also referred
to as (Tobin's) marginal Q, was first demonstrated by Mussa (1977) in a
deterministic context. Hayashi (1982) has shown for a deterministic model in
continuous time that under perfect competition this non-observable shadowprice
of capital equals the ratio of the market value of the firm over the
replacement value of its capital stock — the average Q — if and only if the
technology is homogenous of degree one ". Note that Hayashi (1982) did not
take financing considerations into account in his analysis. This relationship
between marginal Q and average Q can also be demonstrated in a stochastic
context \ See also Abel (1983), Hayashi and Inoue (1991) and Galeotti and
Schiantarelli (1991). The latter authors generalize the Q model of investment
by allowing for monopolistic competition and non constant returns to scale as
The value of the firm should be adjusted for a term that equals the present
value of future tax deductions attributable to past investments.
* To this end, multiply equations 1.5a-1.5c with the corresponding variables,
add them up and make use of the fact that the technology is linear homogenous
to obtain A^ ^ ^ V^- Z^ where Z^ = I " (1+r)""""[AB -(l-T)i ^B ].Ch. 1 INTRODUCTION 7
well as more than one quasi-fixed input.
Some authors have been worried about the assumption of homogeneous
capital, which is maintained in the naive applications of the Q theory, where
all kinds of capital are simply added up. Chirinko (1993b) relates an average
Q measure to a combination of investment ratios, where the coefficients are
ratios of adjustment coefficients. Hayashi and Inoue (1991) introduce a
capital aggregator defined on a vector of various types of capital. This
aggregator allows them to break the firm's optimization problem into two
stages. First they determine the optimal path of the scalar capital aggregate
over time. Next they solve the static problem of partitioning the aggregate
into individual capital stocks in order to minimize the cost.
An important difference between the Q theoretical approach and the Euler
equation approach, is that the former is based on efficiency of the stock
market while the success of the latter crucially depends on the specification
of the production function. As both approaches start from the same
optimization problem, they can be viewed as complementary.
In the previous part we already mentioned that one source of dynamics in
capital demand is the fact that adjustments of the capital stock are costly.
This notion dates back to the work on investment by Eisner and Strotz (1963).
In the early literature on investment that relied on the existence of
adjustment costs a simple convex quadratic function lie <X(AK ) was usually
adopted. Another quadratic specification for adjustment costs which is
often used in the derivation of the Q model is cc(I /K - P)*K . Note that the
latter function has the attractive property of being linear homogeneous, which
rules out size effects on capital demand. While these specifications are very
convenient from a mathematical point of view, their economic theoretical
appeal is open to much skepticism. Rothschild (1971) argues that
indivisibilities and transfer of information are aspects of actions that are
part of the adjustment proces. Both give rise to essentially fixed adjustment
cost. For instance it requires at least one teacher to train one worker how to
operate a new machine. Presumably this teacher can also train five workers at
the same time. Abel and Eberly (1994) incorporate fixed adjustment cost inter
alia in a Q model of investment. Recently Caballero and Engel (1994) presented
a model for investment that is obtained by aggregating over many firms with
possibly different fixed adjustment cost schedules.1.2 Financial Decisions of the Firm
Part of this thesis deals with the interrelationship between financial
and investment decisions by firms. The aim of this section is to give a more
general background on this subject for the readers of the respective chapters.
Specific parts of the literature that are directly relevant for the research,
motivation and reasoning, are discussed in the chapters themselves. As our
thesis tries to fill gaps in the empirical literature as where it stands
today, we will also give an overview of the recent developments. In doing so
we will follow Main Street and indicate the potholes . As will become clear,
part of Main Street could have been named "Q" Avenue, but at the end of the
street we will turn to some research based on Euler equations. Before we walk
down the road, we will first discuss the theoretical literature of the capital
structure. The focus of that sub-section will be on those parts of the
literature that have some bearing on investment decisions.
7.2.7 Capi'/a/ SfrMC/ure 7/i«wie.s
Assuming a perfect capital market and a given investment policy,
Modigliani and Miller (1958), MM for short, proved their famous
Proposition 1
The market value of the firm is independent of its capital structure, and is
given by capitalizing its expected return at the rate appropriate to its
risk class.
or phrased differently: if there are two firms in the same risk class, the
debt-equity ratio of any particular firm is indeterminate.
The MM proposition I follows from the value-additivity principle, which is
based on a subset of the assumptions underlying their original proof. For
instance, in contrast to the proof given by MM which is based on an arbitrage
argument, it does not require the existence of two firms with identical
streams of cash flows (up to a scale factor).
MM (1963) give a generalization of proposition I for the case with taxes.
Then the value of the firm equals the value of an all-equity firm plus the
present value of tax shields that arise from interest deductions on allCh. 1 INTRODUCTION 9
present and future debt. Thus the manager of the firm has an incentive to
maximize the use of debt.
An important corollary to the first MM proposition is that investment and
financing decisions are not interrelated.
The MM theorem holds under a long list of assumptions that define the
notion of a perfect capital market. Most of them are more or less unrealistic.
However the importance of the MM article lies in the fact that it identifies
the sources of market imperfections which will affect the choice of the
capital structure and thereby the value of the firm.
Before we discuss the assumptions we make three remarks. While the
leverage of the firm is indeterminate (or infinite) according to the first MM
proposition, this is not necessarily true for the debt-equity ratio of the
whole economy. Miller (1977) proposed a model for an economy with taxes, where
the ratio is determined by the corporate tax rate and the wealth of investors
in various tax brackets. Second, as was recognized by DeAngelo and Masulis
(1980), firms with high losses cannot deduct their interest expenses to the
full extent and may therefore have less debt. Third in Miller and Modigliani
(1961) it is shown that, in a perfect capital market with no taxes, dividend
policy, defined as the trade-off between retaining earnings and paying out
dividends (issuing shares), does not matter given the investment and borrowing
policies of the firm. Taken together MM have given conditions for separability
of financial and real (investment) decisions. We now turn to their (perfect
market) assumptions :
I Complete and Efficient Markets
1) All types of securities are available in the market, so the
firm cannot create a new type of security.
2) Salability of tax losses.
3) Corporate insiders and outsiders have the same information and
the information is acquirable at zero cost
(symmetric information, i.e. no signaling opportunities)
4) Capital markets are frictionless.
5) Efficient markets (no arbitrage opportunities).
6) Equal access: investors and firms can borrow, lend and issue
claims on the same terms.10
II Holding the cash flow constant (no growth options)
1) Neutral personal taxes.
2) Managers always maximize shareholders' wealth (i.e. no agency costs).
3) No bankruptcy costs (another source of agency costs).
Note that the MM result is conditional on the stream of cash flows of the
firm. This, of course, is not a property of perfect capital markets.
By studying the consequences of relaxing one or more of the assumptions listed
above one obtains a better understanding of capital structure. Harris and
Raviv (1991) provide an excellent survey of the theory of the capital
structure. Apart from taxes they classify the determinants of the capital
structure into four categories. The determinants are the desire to **
- ameliorate conflicts among various groups with interests in the firm,
including managers, (principal-agent approach)
- convey private information and mitigate adverse selection effects,
(asymmetric information approach)
- influence the nature of products or competition in the product/input market
- affect the outcome of corporate control contests.
We will briefly summarize the seminal papers in the first two categories. The
third category, which in principle is interesting since we are also studying
investment in R&D, is in statu nascendi and has not much to tell us sofar.
Most corporate finance theories that have implications for investment in R&D
and take its special characteristics into account, belong to the first two
categories.
With regard to the first group, Jensen and Meckling (1976) distinguish
two types of conflicts of interest: first conflicts between equityholders and
managers and second conflicts between bondholders and shareholders. When
managers hold only a small fraction of the shares, the price managers pay for
consuming perquisites like luxurious offices and reducing effort is low. If
the firm is levered up, a larger portion of the equity will represent the
investment of the manager in the firm. As a result, managers will refrain from
* Quoted from Harris and Raviv.Ch. 1 INTRODUCTION 11
squandering cash flow. Moreover, Grossman and Hart (1982) argue that if
bankruptcy is costly for managers, they will work harder in a highly leveraged
firm. The optimal leverage corresponds to a balance between the benefits of
debt and the costs of debt, such as monitoring and bankruptcy costs. High
leverage may also create an incentive for the owner/manager to "go for broke,"
that is to engage in activities with a very high payoff with a low
probability. If such a project turns out to be a failure, the debtholders bear
the costs. However this behavior is likely to be anticipated by the creditors
and eventually the shareholders bear the cost by receiving less when issuing
debt. Myers (1977) points out another disadvantage of debt which is the
mirrorimage of the conflict just mentioned. When firms are close to bank-
ruptcy, equityholders may have no incentive at all to invest in a positive net
present value project, because the proceeds are captured mainly by creditors.
In Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990), managers are assumed to overinvest,
that is they invest all available funds even if the projects are not positive
NPV. Then debt may serve to reduce so-called free cash flows in the interest
of the shareholders. According to Stulz, interest payments may become a burden
by absorbing/exhausting funds needed for profitable investment projects. In an
extreme case the inflexible debt contract can lead to liquidation. The cost of
debt is higher to the extent that assets are more firm-specific. For this
reason, Williamson (1988) argues that for example R&D intensive firms should
have a lower debt-equity ratio.
The second important branch in the capital structure theory builds on the
notion that insiders, like the manager, have information that outsiders do not
have and that the transfer of this information is costly. This could for
instance be information about investment opportunities. It is tempting for
managers to exaggerate the quality of a project when verification of the true
characteristics is costly, when this would reduce the cost of external funds.
However the cost of these funds depends on the expectation of the quality of
the project given the (limited) information of the outsider, that is on the
average quality of projects. Therefore when the information asymmetry is not
(partly) abolished, some good projects will not be undertaken as the funds
will be too expensive. The manager can solve this problem by providing a
credible signal about the quality of the firm. In Leland and Pyle (1977) the
manager is assumed to be risk-averse. As he owns part of the firm, the manager
benefits from increases in the value of the shares. By levering up, the stake12
of the manager in the firm increases (cf. Jensen and Meckling). On the other
hand the welfare of the manager increases less/decreases more to the extent
that the quality of the firm is lower. Thus managers of high quality firms can
signal this by allowing more debt in the capital structure, which will result
in an increase of the value of the shares. In Ross' (1977) model the manager's
reputation is harmed, if the firm goes bankrupt. Managers of high quality
firms can signal this by issuing more debt. Investors will associate high
leverage with high quality, since lower quality firms will not choose such a
capital structure because they have higher expected bankruptcy costs.
According to Myers and Majluf (1984) the extent to which firms
underinvest depends on their marginal source of funds. For example when a
project with positive NPV can be financed by issuing riskless debt, which is
not subject to undervaluation, it will be undertaken as the shareholders
receive all the profits of this project. On the other hand, the decision to
invest could be negative if the firm could only issue (risky) equity, which is
likely to be undervalued under asymmetric information. It follows that firms
have a preference order for sources of finance. Thus according to this line of
reasoning, which Myers (1984) dubbed the "pecking order" theory of financing,
new investments will preferably be financed internally, then with low-risk
debt and as a last resort with equity. Note that this is a dynamic theory that
tries to explain changes in the capital structure rather than a static theory
that gives the optimal levels of debt and equity. Secondly, while Jensen and
Stulz stress the possibility of overinvestment, Myers and Majluf point to the
possibility of underinvestment. Third in addition to asymmetic information
problems, bankruptcy risk and transaction costs, there are other factors that
explain why internal finance is cheaper than external finance. Auerbach (1979)
shows that taxes create a wedge between the marginal costs of internal finance
and new shares. Finally we note that asymmetric information problems not only
raise the cost of external finance but can result in credit rationing, see
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). For a discussion of the literature on the effect of
agency cost on the availability of external funds we refer to chapter 4.
Numerous articles have appeared, since the papers that were outlined
above appeared. Only a few articles lead to opposite conclusions. For
instance, Jensen predicts a positive correlation between leverage and free
cash flow. On the other hand Myers and Majluf expect a negative correlation.
There is an empirical literature that has tested many predictions ofCh. 1 INTRODUCTION 13
these theoretical papers. With respect to the conflicting result mentioned
above, the evidence supports the Myers and Majluf paper. But Korajczyk et al.
(1990) find that leverage decreases in the two year period before an equity
issue. This finding casts some doubt on the pecking order theory.
Important questions remain. Do we really need a capital structure to
signal or to discipline managers? Why do we not use a standard incentive
scheme? Hart (1991) argues why the capital structure may be a better tool to
control managerial behavior, than a compensation scheme.
Finally a literature has emerged in recent years that tries to answer the
more fundamental question why securities have the characteristics that they
have. Harris and Raviv (1990) review this literature. Important early papers
are Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985).
1.3 The Empirical Literature on the Relation between Investment
Decisions and the Firm's Financial Policy
There are several theories that arrive at a link between investment and
the availability of cheap funds. Many empirical papers — mostly American —
have investigated whether the inclusion of financial variables would improve
the fit of investment models.
At the end of the fifties, when Modigliani and Miller proved their famous
proposition that financial and investment decisions are not interrelated,
Meyer and Kuh (1957) investigated the empirical relation between internal
liquidity and investment. They found that liquidity, which was measured by
profits and depreciation expenses, is of importance for explaining the
investment behavior of all firms, particularly of small firms. Furthermore,
the sensitivity of investment to liquidity was found to vary with the stage of
the business cycle and the growth-trend of the industry: in a recession
liquidity influences investment to a large extent. However in the long run
capacity considerations dominate the demand for capital.
As early as in 1939 Tinbergen used profits as an explanatory variable for
investment. His results showed that this variable performs well. However
according to Grunfeld (1960) profit is a surrogate variable, which tends to be
strongly correlated with the main forces that cause changes in investment. He
argues that the market value of the firm in conjunction with an estimate of
the replacement value of the physical assets of the firm reflect better the14
expectations upon which investment decisions are based. Unlike earlier
studies, his article presents empirical evidence that shows that the interest
rate affects investment.
A vast majority of the studies on investment that appeared in the sixties
and seventies was based on the assumption of a representative firm but reached
different conclusions with regard to the importance of internal finance for
explaining investment behavior. One of the exceptions was Eisner (1978), who
corroborated the result of Meyer and Kuh that investment of smaller firms is
more sensitive to profits than larger firms.
Poterba and Summers (1983) formally derive and test a Q model of
investment, that pays attention to cost differences between internal and
equity finance due to differences in tax treatment. A drawback of their
analysis is their assumption that the debt-capital ratio is given to the firm.
Hayashi (1985) presents a model in which financial and investment decisions
are simultaneously determined. Assuming that the equity value of the firm
depends on debt only through the debt-capital ratio and working within the
standard linear homogeneous framework, he arrives at a financial hierarchy
with three regimes. In the first regime, which is characterized by dividend
payments, marginal investment is partially financed by retentions, while in
the third regime new shares are the marginal source of funds. In all regimes
debt finance is a constant fraction of incremental investment. In the second
regime, where debt is the marginal source of financing, a relation between
investment and some Q fails to exists, while in the other regimes the
relations derived in Poterba and Summers still hold. In Chirinko (1987) the
debt level is determined by the firm and enters the optimization problem of
the firm through a term that captures agency and transaction costs. He shows
that average Q signals investment opportunies both in physical and financial
assets and therefore debt should be included in a Q model of investment.
Bond and Meghir (1994) stress that the financial regime that is relevant
to the firm, is endogenous as it depends on the volume of profits, and changes
over time.
In their important paper Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), FHP for
short, split their sample of firms according to their dividend-income
(pay-out) ratio, and estimated two important investment models — the Q model
and the sales accelerator — after adding cash-flow to capture the liquidity
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that firms with a high pay-out ratio are less likely to be liquidity
constrained and, as a consequence, their investment should be less sensitive
to cash flow. Their findings supported this idea. However their approach gave
rise to critique concerning a number of issues. First if the marginal Q is not
correctly measured by average Q, cash flow may act as a proxy for expectations
concerning profitability. This could explain why even investment of firms with
a high dividend pay-out ratio reacts to fluctuations in cash flow. Second,
according to the liquidity theory, investment depends on the Jtoc/fc of internal
funds (retained earnings) rather than the cash y7cw. Third the variable on
which the classification was based was measured by using within-sample
information. Again when the pay-out ratio is correlated with profit
expectations, this changes the interpretation of the results.
In the spirit of FHP, Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) investigated how the
parameters of Q and cash flow vary across firms with variables that measure
the severity of asymmetric information problems, the height of agency costs
and the height of transaction costs. They conclude that the first category of
market imperfections is the prime source of the existence of a financial
hierarchy.
Abel and Blanchard (1986) investigated whether the poor performance of
the Q model of investment (when using aggregate data) was due to
mismeasurement of marginal Q, which is usually replaced by average Q. To this
end they constructed a series for marginal Q using a VAR approach. Their
regression results resembled the results that are based on average Q, in that
marginal Q significantly explains investment but also yields large, serially
correlated residuals. Furthermore output and profit significantly improved the
fit of the model when added.
Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1990) posed the question whether managers
should let their investment decisions depend on the stock market valuation of
the firm, even if it does not reflect its fundamental value. They list a
number of reasons why managers should follow either the stock market's or
their own (fundamental) assessment of the value of the firm, which is likely
to be based on better information. What firms actually do is an empirical
question, which they have tried to answer by investigating the sensitivity of
investment to both valuations following two approaches. First they factorized
Q as a 'fundamental Q' times the ratio of the stock market value over the
fundamental value, and used a number of alternative proxies for fundamentals.16
Second they examined the performance of the Q model in periods around stock
market crashes when fundamentals and stock market valuation were likely to
differ a lot. They argued that if fundamentals determine investment, then the
relation between market value and investment should be weaker during this
period. They find some evidence that fundamentals rather than the quoted price
of the firm, matter for investment.
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1991) also attribute the failure of the
traditional Q model to deviations of the stock market value from the
fundamentals which are thought to be the true forces explaining investment.
They apply the methodology of Abel and Blanchard to firm level panel data in
order to test the Q model of investment. By employing a recently developed
method for estimating VARs with panel data, they were able to construct
marginal fundamental Q's of firms, which accommodate for unobserved
heterogeneity. Furthermore, in contrast to the work of most predecessors,
their parameters had a structural interpretation. Unlike Abel and Blanchard,
Gilchrist and Himmelberg find support for the Q model when Q is measured by
their fundamental Q. Furthermore Tobin's Q and the fundamental Q are only
weakly correlated which seems to be due to failure of market rationality. Not
surprisingly perhaps, Tobin's Q performs worse than fundamental Q as
explanatory variable for investment and yields an unreasonable high adjustment
cost parameter.
Using the same type of framework Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1993) turn to
the question whether investment is (excessively) sensitive to cashflow because
it is the cheapest source of funds in a financial hierarchy or because of its
ability to predict future profitability of the firm. They point out that
finding different values for the coefficients of cash flow in a Q model for
different categories of funds can well be reconciled with the latter
explanation of the role of cash flow : for example, changes in cash flow will
lead to a very different revision of profit expectations at small, high growth
firms than at older firms. As a consequence, they consider the evidence of
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen as inconclusive at this score. Notwithstanding
this critique on FHP, their structural interpretation of the evidence for the
(reduced form) coefficients of cashflow and the assumption of a delivery lag
of 1 year, allow Gilchrist and Himmelberg to reach the same conclusion as FHP
did, namely that investment is excessively sensitive to cash flow because it
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Chirinko and Schaller (1993) investigate whether the stock market is
efficient, and, if not, whether the financial and investment policies of the
firm are affected by bubbles — the supposed sources of the inefficiency — by
estimating the Euler and the Q equation in a simultaneous equations model and
testing different hypotheses which take the form of orthogonality conditions.
They exploit the fact that the Euler equation and the Q model hold under
different conditions and as a consequence they can yield different pieces of
information. The acceptance of the Euler model and the rejection of the Q
model (by the MESH test due to Eichenbaum « a/. (1988)) indicates that the
stock markets are inefficient, but also that firms rely on their own
expectations when taking investment decisions and do not take advantage of
overvaluation of their shares.
The fact that firms endogenously switch financial regimes was fully
recognized by (Torres, Hajivassiliou and Ioannides (1993). They modeled the
qualitative aspects of investment and financing and dividend decisions by
means of a dynamic limited dependent variables model, which was subsequently
estimated on the basis of firm data controlling for individual heterogeneity
with a general stochastic structure for unobservables. The discreteness of the
investment decision was justified by the plausible concavity of adjustment
costs, which leads to 'all or nothing behavior'. In this paper the financing
decisions are modeled both as univariate and as multivariate discrete events.
The latter framework allows for interdependence among the financing decisions.
The models, that included firm fundamentals and lagged values as explanatory
variables, performed well and reveal high persistence in the firms'
qualitative decisions. Furthermore heterogeneity was found to be important.
Gross (1994) also takes a 'high tech' approach to the modeling and
estimation of the investment and financing behavior of firms that are possibly
liquidity constrained. Starting from a structural theoretical model that is
reminiscent of the buffer stock consumption literature, he derives optimal
investment, retained earnings, borrowing and dividend policies as function of
the internal financial assets. These functions are nonparametrically estimated
to capture the nonlinearities that are predicted by the theory. For instance,
as is known from the agency costs literature, when the firms have few internal
resources and face the possibility of bankruptcy , they can become either
extremely risk-averse to stay in business or risk-loving because they go for
broke. The evidence indicates that the firm's capital depends on the financial18
resources in the nonlinear way that was predicted by the theory. Furthermore
the investment of firms that borrow is less sensitive to internal funds and
highly leveraged firms behave as risk-lovers.
Hall (1992) identifies the liquidity effect of cashflow by instrumenting
with lags two and three of the endogenous variables (measured once a year).
Since demand shocks are not forecastable, no relationship should be found
between cashflow and investment under this interpretation of cash flow
fluctuations unless firms react very slowly to demand shocks. Applying this
methodology she finds that there are liquidity effects on both ordinary
investment and R&D expenditures. Furthermore, like Long and Malitz (1985), she
finds that leverage and the level of R&D investment are strongly negatively
correlated across firms and moreover that this cannot be explained by tax
considerations, i.e. the fact that both R&D and interest expenses can be
deducted against taxable income and can substitute for each other. However
this negative correlation could be due to the intangibility of R&D.
While the approach in the former paper was non-structural, in another
paper by Hall (1991) a set of Euler equations is derived from a firm value
maximization problem subject to financial constraints, for a firm that
invests in ordinary capital and R&D. These first order conditions depend on
ratios of the shadow prices of the flow of funds constraints in subsequent
years. Next the sample was split according to the (presumed) values of these
ratios and the equations were estimated on the basis of the subsamples. The
results she obtains are fragile and instable and at several points
inconsistent with the predictions of the model. As one of the potential
causes, she mentions that information that is needed to assign observations to
subsamples is contaminated by noise due to measurement errors. Furthermore she
identified the regime (assesses the value of the ratio of the shadow values)
by looking at the observed dividend payments or share issues. However dividend
policy not only depends on cash availability in the short run but could also
be driven by the desire to signal information to outside investors. As
negative changes could be interpreted as a bad signal about the perspectives
of the firm, which would lead to higher costs of external finance, firms are
very reluctant to cut dividends when their liquidity is temporarily low.
Therefore some other indicator of liquidity like, for instance, working
capital, which also displays more variability, may be more instrumental for
splitting the sample. When the sample was split according to information on
share issues, the results were somewhat better than when dividends were used.Ch. 1 INTRODUCTION 19
7J.7
For several reasons which are mentioned in chapter 4, R&D is thought to
be especially sensitive to the availability of internal finance. The older
empiricial literature that tests this hypothesis, which was already
entertained by Schumpeter (1942), is summarized in Kamien and Schwartz (1982).
However the studies cited in that book hardly found any evidence in favor of
this thought, which however is widely believed to be true. Recent research on
this topic includes Hall (1991,1992, the main findings have already been
mentioned above) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994). The latter ran
regressions of R&D expenditures on cashflow paying much attention to
econometric issues. They argue that due to high adjustment costs, R&D is not
responsive to the transitory component of cashflows. Employing several
strategies to estimate the elasticity of R&D with respect to the permanent
component, they find a value of 0.67 for their sample of small high-tech
firms.
1.4 The Motivation and Outline of this Thesis
7.4.7 Motivation o/ tite
The common theme of the chapters in this thesis is the modeling of
investment decisions. One chapter (chapter 3) presents a theoretical analysis
of the solution of an important investment model, whereas the other chapters
report on empirical research on investment in both physical capital and R&D.
Although each chapter is self-contained, the empirical chapters are
interrelated in that they essentially try to answer two questions using
American firm data from five industries that form the so-called scientific
sector within the manufacturing sector :
first can we explain the behavior of the investment processes satisfactorily
by carefully modeling the technological aspects that are inherent in these
processes — this is the focus of chapter 2 — and second can we improve the
explanatory power of investment models by paying attention to financial
The industries are at the two digit level using the Standard Industrial
Classification codes.20
considerations and conditions, such as the cost of external funds or the
presence of liquidity constraints? The latter question motivated the research
carried out in chapters 4 and 5.
In the empirical literature, most studies have found that 'output
variables' are more important for explaining investment than 'price
variables', see e.g. Shapiro (1986b). Mismeasurement of the latter is often
mentioned as one of the culprits. An important price variable that has often
been left out from the investment equations is cost of funds.
Capital market imperfections can interfere with investment decisions in
various ways. In chapter 4, the financial accelerator theory is tested, which
explains how agency costs acce/erafe the a<i/u.y/men/ processor of the capital
stocks. In chapter 5, versions of the Euler equation model and the Q model are
estimated that feature liquidity constraints and an upward sloping supply
curve of funds. This approach stresses the effects of capital market
imperfections on the vo/«/?ie of investment spending. The treatment of the
liquidity constraints in the empirical literature has not been very
satisfactory, or successful for that matter, on the whole. The emphasis in
this chapter is therefore on deriving new implications of the models, that
might help to gauge the importance of liquidity constraints in explaining
ordinary investment and R&D.
The mechanisms investigated in chapter 5 have a lasting effect on the
volume of investment, whereas the financial accelerator mechanism merely
affects the timing of investment. Nevertheless, the latter mechanism could be
an important factor in explaining business cycles.
The consideration of R&D is motivated by a number of reasons. First R&D
is not just a type of capital, but it has some important characteristics that
distinguish it from other types of capital: it is both an input to the
production process and a source of monopoly power. As an input it leads to
process innovations, which reduce the costs of production, and to quality
improvements of the products or even to new (varieties of) products. This
helps the firm to gain or retain monopoly power.
Second, as stressed by Schumpeter (1942), especially R&D intensive firms
depend upon internal finance for investment. He argued that innovation is
therefore greater in monopolistic industries than in competitive industries,
because firms in those industries can appropriate the profits generated by its
own innovations to a larger extent. Moreover, Arrow (1962) recognized thatCh. 1 INTRODUCTION 21
firms have an incentive not to reveal information on R&D projects, to ensure
maximal appropriability of their innovations. This fact causes asymmetric
information problems between entrepeneurs and investors to last. Thus unlike
physical capital, R&D is actually both an explanatory variable and a variable
to be explained in a study of factor demand subject to financial constraints.
In order to estimate the models and test implications of various theories
in an adequate manner, the properties of the actual data will be investigated
and econometric issues will be dealt with. We will now give a brief outline of
the contents of the chapters in this thesis.
7.4.2
Chapter 2 is concerned with the estimation of dynamic factor demand
relations for R&D, physical capital and employment. They are derived from an
intertemporal cash-flow optimization problem that incorporates a general
description of the production technology and adjustment processes. Both are
approximated by second order polynomials. Furthermore allowance is made for
gestation lags in the building processes of knowledge and physical capital
and for interrelation between the inputs and changes in the inputs all of
which are assumed to be quasi-fixed.
The heterogeneity of the firm data is accounted for by modeling the
technology and adjustment parameters as a function of firm size and factor
intensities.
Identification of the parameters relies on the assumption that the
managers/owners of the firm have rational expections with respect to the
driving processes of factor demand like prices.
The model is estimated in two stages: first estimates of the parameters
of the Euler equations (f.o.c.) are obtained by applying the Generalized
Method of Moments. Next the restrictions between these parameters and the
structural parameters that are implied by the model, are exploited by the
minimum distance method to yield estimates of the latter. This procedure
allows for the possibility to select those restrictions that provide the most
reliable information on the structural parameters one is interested in and
will result in more robust estimates in general.
In this thesis knowledge capital is used as a synonym of the stock of R&D.22
To carry out the first step of the estimation procedure, moment
conditions have to be specified. Attention is paid to the consequences of
ordinary, well-known problems such as the presence of individual effects and
measurement errors, when formulating the moment conditions. Furthermore, in
order to select conditions that produce relatively precise estimates, the time
series properties of the stocks of the inputs will be investigated. It will
turn out that, apart from the well-known problem of heterogeneity, the near
random walk behavior of the input series is responsible for the weak
identification of parameters of interest. This is perhaps the most important
message of this chapter, that one should be aware of when studying
productivity issues or factor demand with firm level data.
We test various hypotheses concerning the character of the adjustment
cost, like separability from levels, symmetry and convexity and the order of
the gestation lags. The test results indicate that strong separability of the
adjustment costs cannot be rejected and furthermore that joint convexity of
the adjustment cost function of the three factors of production is not
tenable. At the end of chapter 2 the distribution of the components of the
adjustment costs of the firms in the sample is calculated.
Chapter 3 can be considered as a companion to chapter 2. In this chapter
the symmetric Linear Rational Expectations Model of Kollintzas (1985) is
generalized by allowing for time-to-build. The properties of the solution
space are investigated. By using a decomposition of the matrix lag polynomial
of the Euler-Lagrange conditions that encompasses that for the Kollintzas
model, it is shown that the extended model admits a unique stable solution.
The stability condition provided by Kollintzas turns out to be valid for this
model too. It translates into an equivalent condition on the revision
processes which together with other conditions on the revision processes
provided by Gourieroux et al. completely restict the revision processes. The
latter conditions ensure the equivalence of the Euler-Lagrange conditions and
the reduced form in terms of realizations and revision processes. At the end
of the chapter a procedure is suggested to obtain a closed form solution or
when the driving processes are too complicated a semi closed form solution.
The asymmetric model is also considered.
In chapter 4 we investigate whether the adjustment behavior of firms is
related to financial factors. The financial accelerator theory purports that
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R&D-intensive or highly leveraged firms, adjust their stocks of knowledge and
physical capital at a quicker pace than the average firm to save on interest
payments and/or to reduce the probability of bankruptcy. The theory is tested
using two models. For both R&D and physical capital a version of a simple
partial adjustment model is estimated, where the speed of adjustment is
modeled as a function of firm size, leverage and R&D intensity. In addition
Euler equations are estimated after splitting the sample on the basis of
leverage. For both types of models we have also allowed for asymmetry in
(adjustment) behavior between booms and recessions since the implications of
the financial accelerator theory are likely to manifest themselves more
sharply during recessions. The structural model underlying the Euler equations
includes a Cobb Douglas knowledge production function, that is more consistent
with the persistence of changes in knowledge capital. The results can be
summarized as follows:
First, we found that the speed of adjustment of physical capital is
higher for smaller firms. Second, the adjustment speed of the stock of
physical capital does not depend on the firm's leverage nor on its R&D
intensity. Third, when we imposed symmetry of behavior across the business
cycle, we found that both the level and the adjustment speed of R&D are higher
for smaller firms and firms with a lower debt-assets ratio. However, these
effects of firm size and leverage on R&D disappeared once we allowed for
asymmetry. Finally, stability tests of the estimates across stages of the
business cycle indicated that the adjustment speeds of both R&D and physical
capital are higher in a period of economic contraction. However this finding
is not related to factors that affect the height of agency costs. The higher
adjustment speed of smaller firms is therefore interpreted as a reflection of
their flexibility.
Chapter 5 centres on estimating the effects of liquidity constraints on
the accumulation of capital. As we have seen in sub-section 1.1.3, the Euler
equation model and the Q type model, that allow for the presence of liquidity
constraints, contain unobservable shadow values of funds, that cannot be
ignored at the estimation stage. Our solution to this problem was to exploit
another Euler equation that corresponds to working capital and to add an
assumption to the model concerning the behavior of the shadow value of working
capital. This approach resulted in a relationship between the unobervable
shadow values of funds and working capital. We argue that this variable is24
likely to measure the (change in) the liquidity position of the firm more
accurately than other variables that have been used in the past by others.
We also show that a proper test of capital market imperfections within a
Q theoretic framework concerns the constancy of the coefficient of Q across
financial regimes, rather than the significance of the coefficients of
liquidity measures, such as cash flow or sales. The latter approach is ad hoc
and raises questions about the interpretation of the effect of cash flow
(sales) on investment.
To test for the constancy of the coefficient of Q across financial
regimes, we estimated an endogenous switching regression model, where the sign
of the change in working capital determines the regime. The main problem we
encountered here was to specify a model that predicts the change in working
capital well. Therefore we also estimated models assuming that we can predict
the regimes perfectly.
The empirical evidence on the effects of working capital on investment is
in agreement with the theory but rather weak. More significant results were
obtained with respect to the supply curve of funds. In all models debt had a
depressing effect on investment. We interpret this finding as follows: the
higher the debt-assets ratio, the higher the (agency) cost of financing R&D
expenditures and investment.
Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings of this thesis and compares them
with the results of other studies. It also discusses some fundamental problems
related to the measurement of the stock of R&D and to the estimation methods
and testing procedures that are employed in this thesis. Although these
problems are not the focus of this thesis we mention them because they affect
the results that are reported or the way they should be interpreted.Chapter 2
Time-to-build and Time-to-innovate in a Model of
Interrelated Factor Demand with
Adjustment Costs
2.1 Introduction
In the past decade several studies have appeared that treated R&D efforts
as an input that contributes to the productivity of the firm, e.g. Griliches
and Mairesse (1983, 1984), Nadiri and Bitros (1980), Mairesse and Siu (1984)
and Bernstein and Nadiri (1988). The last three papers recognized the
quasi-fixity of both physical capital and knowledge capital (R&D) but ignored
the presence of gestation lags. In the model investigated by Hall and Hayashi
(1988) on the other hand, time-to-build plays a crucial role but adjustment
costs are not explicitly considered as an explanation of the dynamics
displayed by the capital stock series '. In this chapter a model is presented
that takes both features into account. The factor demand relations, which
include labor demand, follow from maximization of the present value of the
stream of cash flows under uncertainty. We adopt a quadratic polynomial
approximation to the production technology. Furthermore we assume a quadratic
adjustment cost function and allow for interrelations between the inputs . It
can be shown that this model admits a unique stable solution (see chapter 3).
For the empirical investigations and statistical inference we have relied
on panel data pertaining to firms in industries that belong to the U.S.
scientific sector. As is well-known the use of aggregate data for
representative agent models can lead to spurious (or misleading) results, e.g.
see Wolfson (1993) and Gordon (1992) in particular on the aggregation problem
with respect to adjustment cost specifications. Epstein and Denny (1983)
Their accumulation rule for knowledge capital, which could be interpreted as
a knowledge production function, has some properties that are characteristic
of an adjustment cost mechanism.
We will refer to this model as the basic model.26
derive and empirically reject restrictions on a quadratic value function that
permit aggregation across firms.
Because of the tremendous amount of heterogeneity in panels of firm data,
modeling the differences between firms in a proper way is at least as
important as describing the dynamics of the series. Therefore we respecify the
basic model. Since much of the heterogeneity is related to the fact that the
factor intensities vary over the firms, we let the adjustment costs function
depend on relative changes of the inputs of the firm and on the firmsize.
Expressions are derived and next substituted for the parameters of the
production function assuming that it approximates a Cobb-Douglas technology.
These formulae provide a link between the parameters and some sources of
heterogeneity, such as the elasticities. Because we are mainly interested in
the parameters of the adjustment cost function, the elasticities are replaced
by linear functions of the cost shares thereby referring to the first-order
conditions in the stationary situation. Locally the more flexible model that
we obtain in this way resembles the basic model and therefore we believe that
the stability property will carry over.
Since it is not feasible to derive a closed-form solution (CFS) for the
flexible model, the Euler equations are estimated directly applying the
generalized method of moments (GMM). In the second stage, the structural
parameters are estimated using the method of asymptotic least squares (ALS)
which minimizes the distance between the estimates of the unrestricted Euler
equation parameters and functions of the (over-)identified structural
parameters.
Palm er a/. (1993) considered a model that is related to our basic model
but assumed absense of interrelations. Using aggregate data they obtain
estimates of the parameters that determine the building scheme. Since we lack
accurate information on the tax status of firms, we were not able to calculate
prices at the firm level. Therefore we will not endeavor the estimation of
these time-to-build parameters. However, like Wolf son (1993), we can still
identify the (maximum of the) gestation lags by testing the validity of the
instruments. Furthermore the chosen estimation technique allows us to deal
with econometric difficulties, such as measurement errors, in a
straightforward manner. Finally, we do not have to make arbitrary assumptions
regarding the distribution of the shocks and the errors as we would have to
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It turns out that exploring the time-series properties of series of
factor demands is indispensable for the purpose of selecting moment conditions
that yield precise estimates. We found that R&D capital, physical capital and
labor follow an AR(3)-process with a unit-root. The first differenced series
of R&D capital is near a random walk, while the differenced series of the
other inputs exhibit moderate autoregressive behavior. If we would have
followed common practice for estimating dynamic equations with panel data and
first differenced all equations , the parameter estimates would have been
very imprecise. Therefore we resort to the approach suggested by Arellano and
Bover (1990) that is based on using differenced series as instruments.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 the entrepeneur's
optimization problem is formulated. Next factor demand equations are derived
that allow for the heterogeneity of the firms. Section 3 examines the
statistical properties of the data and describes the estimation strategy. The
empirical results are discussed in section 4. Furthermore we present summary
statistics on the dynamics of factor demand. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 The factor demand model
In this section the decision rules of the entrepeneur are derived for
setting the levels of both physical capital K and knowledge capital G and of
employment N. These rules follow from maximization of the expected discounted
present value of the cash flows over the future. Adjustments of the levels of
the production factors are considered costly. Futhermore it is assumed that
there is a lag between the decision to invest and the moment the new capital
becomes productive. That is, time is needed to build new capital, to develop
new products or to acquire knowledge. In forming expectations the
entrepreneurs are assumed to be rational. The information set that will be
exploited includes at least current and past information about the state of
the firm, i.e. the size of the stocks of both kinds of capital and the number
of people employed, about factor prices and output prices and the latest news
about technological opportunities. Real factor costs, that is factor prices
deflated by the producer's price of output, are not influenced by the
Since the adjustment cost specification depends on first differences, the
series are sometimes differenced twice.28
decisions of the firm. The production technology exhibits the usual
characteristics — (aY /aX ) > 0, where X' = [G , K , N ] and Y denotes real
output, a Y /aX is a negative (semi-)definite matrix — and is locally
approximated by a quadratic function *
Y = (n + a)'X - - X'AX (2.1)
It t 2 t
where (i is a vector of exogenous technology shocks, a is a vector of
constants and A is a symmetric matrix. For the adjustment costs we adopt the
specification in Kollintzas (1985)
AC (G ,K ,N ,AG ,AK ,AN ) = X'DAX + - AX' BAX (2.2)
I I t t t+l t + 1 l + l l t+l 2 t+1 l+l
where B is a positive definite symmetric matrix and D is a general matrix.
When D = 0 the adjustment costs of a firm are external and strongly separable
from the levels of the inputs, and convex. Note that labor is also a
quasi-fixed factor.
According to Pakes and Schankerman (1978) R&D depreciates like physical
capital : for both types of capital a linear depreciation scheme is specified
G^ = (1-8°) G_ |+ s^ 0 < 8° < 1 (2.3a)
K^ = (1-8*) K^+ s^ 0 < 8* < 1 (2.3b)
s and s are the gross changes in period t of effective R&D and physical
capital, respectively. They result from investment projects that were started
0 and 0 periods ago respectively. The capital is built according to fixed
G K
plans. It is assumed that capital under construction does not depreciate. The
Leaving out the subscript i referring to firm i, for the time being.
|i =(M3i-0 ^KI-0 *NI)'. The technology shocks affect the quality of the in-
I G K
puts and should not be interpreted as indicators of the quality of the
management. Therefore the timing of the shocks coincides with the last
opportunity to change the corresponding stocks and to adopt thereby the latest
technological innovations. 0 and 0 are the orders of the gestation lags that
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investment process for both kinds of capital is framed in the following
equations




and I.*, v* = 1
where s ^ is the total size of current investment projects of type F which
are j periods from completion. The \|/.'s reflect the scheme of the building
process and are the same for all investments. At the j-th stage from delivery
\|/.x 100 % of the total costs involved are invested in a project. The total
J p
amount of funds invested in period t, I , is spent on projects of different
age. Variable costs are given by
VC = p° 1° + p* I* + p* N (2.5)
where [p° p* p" ]' is the vector of real factor prices at time t. The variable
cost function can be formulated in terms of the stock variables. Note that
s *" = s ^ . Combining (2.3), (2.4a) and (2.4b) yields
j.i I.i+j- I
Fe | G,K
where 4^ = - (1 -8^) uA
From substitution of (2.6) in (2.5) it follows that
VC = p° [ I °*V G ] + p* [ I "*'*" K ] + p" N (2.7)
i ^i •• j=o j i+j-H *i "- j=o j t + j-H ^t i ^ '30
The firm's objective function is
PV, = lim £ 1^ V [Y^ - VC^ - AC J. 0<Y<1 (2.8)
H °
where y is the real discount factor and £() = £( | Q^) the expectation
operator conditional on information until time t . The entrepeneur maximizes
PV with respect to the decision variables N ^, G g +,,^ *S+9 +h ' ^ ~
0,1,2 " °*
An optimal plan necessarily satisfies the first-order conditions of this
problem : the Euler-Lagrange equations [ELC]
In Kollintzas (1985) conditions are discussed that guarantee a unique, stable
solution when the model is symmetric, that is when D = D' . Kollintzas (1986)
deals with the nonsymmetric case .
There is a number of features of these equations that should be noted.
The factor demand relations allow for many different kinds of behavior. In
particular recursive interrelations, which are said to exist when past stocks
of one factor of production affect the current marginal product and/or
marginal adjustment costs of another factor of production, are brought about
by B or D nondiagonal. Interesting comparative dynamics properties are implied
by such interrelations '. When D*D' the model can account for asymmetric
adjustment costs due to net changes in the quasi-fixed factor stocks. In this
case endogenous cycling can occur. Asymmetry can also show up in the
information that is used for decisions on the inputs. That is the entrepeneur
' y = 1, T* = 0 and 6 =0.
0 1 N
See Kollintzas (1985), especially Corollary 2. Putting the model above with
0 =0 and 0 -0 in the format of his article, R = -D , Q = -A and S = -B. If the
G K
stability condition is satisfied, the model has a unique solution.
* In chapter 3 it is shown that stability implies uniqueness of the solution
not only in the case where 9 =0 and 9 =0 but generally also when there is
time-to-build. G K
' See Cassing and Kollintzas (1991) for a discussion and references.Ch. 2 A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTERRELATED FACTOR DEMAND 31
decides on the size of the stock G on the basis of the information available
at time t-8 , which does not include the values of K and N , but the
G t t
entrepreneur knows the sizes of G and K when he determines N .
In chapter 3 a procedure is proposed to obtain a (semi) closed form
solution for the model above with D = D' . In that case the adjustment
parameters are equal to those in the flexible accelerator form that
corresponds to the model that assumes absense of the gestation lags as well.
The reason for this is the fact that the characteristic polynomial of the
model with time-to-build encompasses the one associated with the model that
only accounts for adjustment costs. Since this also holds true when allowance
is made for asymmetric (D * D') behavior, the matrix of adjustment parameters
for the model above can more easily be obtained by neglecting the time-to-
build feature and working along the lines of Cassing and Kollintzas (1991) '".
By introducing the stock of R&D capital in the model the technological
evolution of the firm has been modeled explicitly. The total R&D lag 8
consists of the time devoted to applied research and specification (the
gestation lag in a narrower sense) and the time involved in manufacturing and
marketing start-up (the application lag). Wagner (1968) provides information
on both lags. For the first lag he presents a number somewhat higher than one
(year). During this period it will become clear whether a project is success-
ful. If so, the second stage takes off. Since the success will generally also
induce ordinary investment, this stage of the innovation process is expected
to be closely connected to the building of physical capital. The average
application lag calculated by Wagner is one year for nondurables and one and a
half year for durables. Mayer (1960) provides survey results on the gestation
lag for physical capital. He found that there was a lag of somewhat more than
two years involved in building plants and of about two quarters in the
construction of equipment. Since the latter forms the larger part of the
'° Let A = B - D and T = A • ^ B D D' . Then £(A) = AX*- H. • y 'A' is
the characteristic polynomial for the model without time-to-build. Further let
K = diag(K ,...,K ) where K is the Jordan block corresponding to eigenvalue
A,. ( I£(A. )| = 0 ) and let M = [M M ] where M is a matrix with
(generalized) eigenvectors of £(A) corresponding to A.- . Then T = I - MKM" is
the matrix of adjustment parameters in a flexible accelerator representation
of the solution.32
capital stock it seems reasonable to assume an average gestation lag for
physical capital of approximately one year. The model can rationalize
cointegration between the production factors, especially between both kinds of
capital.
The model that was derived above is not sufficiently flexible for
estimation purposes. In order to cope with the heterogeneity among firms both
the production function and the adjustment cost function will be generalized.
For the first function this will be done by substituting expressions for the
parameters that are derived under the hypothesis that a Cobb-Douglas
technology is approximated. Thus if actually
a a a
Y = a G °'K **N "' (2.10)
i I 0 i I i I i t
holds, it follows that the coefficients in the second order Taylor
approximation (2.1) around (Y ,X ) satisfy
(2.11a)
a = - ,, ii-a (a -8 ) F,H = G,K,N 5 = 1 if F = H (2.11b)
FHi X X Fi Hi FH' FH
Fi 0 HiO
= 0 if F * H
As long as the technology does not exhibit increasing returns to scale, that
is when a + a + a < 1 holds, the expressions in (2.10) are consistent with
G K N
the convexity of A. These formulae identify the sources of the heterogeneity
in the parameters of (2.1). From several studies, e.g. see Pakes and
Schankerman (1984) and Mairesse and Griliches (1990), it is known that factor
intensities and elasticities can differ widely among firms. Since
maximization of the value of the firm implies that in the stationary state the
factor elasticities equal the cost shares, the a 's are expected to be
correlated with the corresponding variables in the Euler equations. Then the
use of a random effects estimator would lead to erroneous results. If interest
is primarily focused on the parameters of the adjustment cost function, the
equalities mentioned above can be used to get rid of the production function
parameters. Alternatively one can employ a fixed effect estimator. To avoid a
burdensome computation problem we will choose the first approach Because theCh. 2 A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTERRELATED FACTOR DEMAND 33
model is essentially a disequilibrium model it seems appropriate lo appeal to
a more loose relationship between the elasticities and the cost shares
«F,= V VI 7^ " * = <*.K.N - (2.12)
iO
Substituting these formulae leads at most to 3 regressors associated with the
diagonal parameters a and to 4 regressors associated with the other a 's.
A specification for the adjustment costs that is expected to accommodate
to the heterogeneity is one in relative changes
AC (AG ,AK ,AN ,G ,K ,N ,Y ,G ,K ,N ) = (2.13)
,r ii + l it+1 il+l it it il iO iO iO i CT ^ '
r AX
r x 1 r G K N v
, it il it it
where = , ,
I X I I G K N I
*• iO •* *• iO iO iO -"
This function is homogeneous of degree one in all the variables it depends
on, whereas according to (2.2) there are increasing costs to scale as far as
they are related to the adjustment process. Firm data can be thought of as the
result of aggregating plant data. As Gordon (1992) points out, by employing a
specification that is linear homogeneous, the use of firm data will not yield
(downward) biased estimates of the adjustment cost parameters due to
aggregation. Since the paths of the solutions to both models are locally
similar, specification (2.13) can be replaced by (2.2) in order to study the
local stability properties of the model.
For F = G,K, # includes the factor (r-rt+5^), where r is the nominal
interest rate and 7t is the inflation rate.
The nought refers to a base period.
This specification is related to that in (2.2) : B is replaced by B = [b 1.
i FH t
with b = 6 Y /X X . Likewise for D.
FHi FH iO FiO HiO
This property should be considered from a cross-section perspective.34
2.3 Data and estimation strategy
The data we used to estimate the factor demands are taken from the
Manufacturing Sector Master File panel which is assembled by Hall (1990a). The
panel is mainly based on Compustat data. The firms in our sample are from five
industries in the so-called scientific sector: Chemicals excluding drugs (SIC
28 \ 283), Drugs (283), Office and Computing Machines (SIC 357), Electric and
Electronic equipment (SIC 36) and Instruments and Related Products (SIC 38).
As might be expected these industries have the highest R&D intensities. The
largest data set we use in this study covers the period 1959-1987. Because
most firms did not exist the whole period the design of our samples is
unbalanced. Firms that experienced major changes were eliminated from the
panel. The data sets were limited further by requiring that a significant part
of the firm's resources is spent on R&D. Information on producer prices and
for the construction of wages was obtained at the 3-4 digit SIC industry
level. The deflators for fixed investment also pertain to the industry level
but the R&D deflator was obtained at the most aggregate level. The
construction of the variables and the trimming of the dataset are described in
more detail in Appendix 2.B. A table with descriptive statistics has been
relegated to Appendix 2.B too.
Absence of time-to-innovate is an assumption that is implicit in the way
the R&D capital stock series is constructed. This is conflicting with our
model. Assuming 0 =2 and a uniform investment scheme (V|/.=0.33, i=l,2,3) and
noting that the variability in R&D stock series is rather low, G in the model
can be proxied by the lagged value of the constructed series in the data base.
The measurement of physical capital is hampered by a similar problem: only the
book value at the end of the (fiscal) year is observed which includes expendi-
tures for capital goods that are still unfinished. If the gestation lag is one
year, the stock of physical capital that can be used for production is assumed
to equal the (properly deflated) lagged net book value adjusted for inflation.
It is not feasible to derive a closed form solution for the Euler
equations that are associated with the specifications of the production
function and the adjustment cost function that take the heterogeneity among
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the GMM estimator. The parameters of the Euler equations ' are first order
strongly identifiable so this estimator is strongly consistent ". Application
of the asymptotic least squares estimation method which exploits the nonlinear
and cross equation restrictions between these parameters and the structural
parameters yields estimates for the latter.
For the choice of the instruments or more generally the moment conditions
if one brings in the possibility to transform the equations before estimating
them, it is important to consider the properties of the data. The issue of
heterogeneity has already been raised. Even after the respecification some
permanent effects could still be left in the errors of the equations.
Measurement error is another well-known problem with the type of data used in
this study. However permanent mismeasurement of the stocks of the multiplica-
tive variety, i.e. the scale of the stocks, is less of a problem since our
analysis is relative to some recent state of the firm.
Knowledge of the time series properties can also be instrumental for
selecting suitable moment conditions. These properties have been investigated
in the case of all factors of production. Univariate autoregressive schemes
were fitted to the series employing an IV estimator. The enormous differences
in firmsize would bias results towards finding a unit root. Therefore the
series were scaled by sales or the first observation of the stock of the
input. The latter procedure is preferred since R&D intensities still differ
substantially among firms. To avoid inconsistency of the estimates due to
fixed effects in the form of individual intercepts, the regression equations
were differenced. Second and higher lags of the series (also scaled) were used
as instruments. If there were no fixed effect but a unit root, differencing
would remove that root. Therefore results should be interpreted carefully. The
main results are summarized in table 1. (When sales was used for scaling the
observations similar results were obtained). All three series can be described
well by an AR(3)-proces. Furthermore R&D seems to have at least one unit root.
To investigate the presence of a unit root in more depth, we also pursued an
alternative approach.
Formally these parameters are called structural parameters too. But this
terminology is preferably used for the parameters in the model, such as the
adjustment cost function parameters b
FH
16 For a definition of first order strongly identifiable see Broze, Gourieroux
and Szafarz (1991b).36
Breitung and Meyer (1991) constructed a test on unit roots in a panel
data context allowing for fixed effects under the alternative. The idea is to
deal with the individual effects by subtracting the first observation from the
series for every firm in the panel. Table 2 contains the estimation results
obtained for these equations. They confirm the existence of the unit root in
the series of R&D capital. For labor and physical capital the unit root
hypothesis could not be rejected either. Estimation of the AR models in levels
with first differences as instruments also produces the unit roots for all
series and a second unit root for R&D. That is AG (almost) follows a random
walk. The correlation between the first differences of physical capital and
the lagged first differences is moderate. The same is true for labor.
Our results for the time series properties of the stock of R&D are
consistent with the fact that the stock has been constructed using the rule
G = (1-8°)G + R with 8°= 0.15 and the finding of Hall, Griliches and
Hausman (1986) that logR follows an AR process of a low order with a (close
to) unit root.
Because the R&D capital series are almost second-order integrated, taking
first-differences of the Euler equations before estimating them leads
inevitably to low correlation between some of the RHS-variables, namely those
related to the adjustment costs, and the instruments and as a consequence
imprecise estimates can be expected.
Table I






























all variables are scaled by y.
1973-1987, #Obs. 1533, #Firms 193





























Ay. : long-differences of y., i.e. y. y.
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•^ it-1 'it-2 "it-3
all variables are scaled by sales
1973-1987, # Obs. 1533, # Firms 193
standard errors are shown in parentheses
Since the R&D intensity of firms does not vary as much over time as the
intensities of the other inputs and because of the presence of gestation lags,
that prevent the use of low lags of some of the endogenous variables as in-
struments, the problem will be most severe when estimating the R&D equation.
Alternatively in order to avoid inconsistency as a result of neglecting
heterogeneity in the intercept one can use instruments that are functions of
the first differences of the variables (see Arellano and Bover (1990)). The
correlation between such instruments and the regressors will be much higher in
the case of the R&D equation.
Apart from measurement error and the individual effect, the error term of
the equations includes forecast errors and a technology shock, which is by
assumption white noise. Depending on whether the technology shocks are con-
temporaneously correlated or not, the error terms can be modeled as MA(6 +1)
or MA(8 ) " where 0 equals the duration of the time-to-build of the inputs '*.
We identify the orders of the gestation lags of the capital stocks empirically
by testing the validity of instruments of decreasing order of the lags.
The error term contains a MA(1) process if there is no gestation lag.
1 O
In Appendix 2.A, we show how the orders of the moving average processes,
that are implied by the model assumptions, have been determined.38
The considerations above motivate the estimation of the R&D Euler
equation in levels and both other equations in first differences making use of
the instruments listed in Appendix 2.C. In order to obtain optimal GMM
estimates Hansen (1982) has shown that the weighting matrix has to be replaced
by a consistent estimator of the inverse of the covariance of the sample
moments which appear in the conditions that are the keystone of this
estimation strategy. Since the error term of the R&D equation contains a
permanent individual effect we assume autocorrelation of maximum order when
computing the weighting matrix. The order of the autocorrelation varies with
the number of observations for the individuals due to the fact that the panel
is unbalanced. In this case it can be shown that the weighting matrix is
positive definite " *°.
In general, when the simple covariance estimator is not positive
definite, neglecting null restrictions on the autocorrelations of the errors,
implied by the theoretical model, when computing an estimate of the covariance
matrix by assuming autocorrelations of maximum order, seems a good alternative
to the Newey and West method. The resulting estimator has the advantage that
its consistency depends only on the number of individuals in the panel.
For different choices of the point of approximation (indexed with the
nought) we obtain different models. When we choose last period (t-1) as the
base period the number of regressors per equation is three less than for any
other choice. For the general case the restrictions between the structural
parameters we are interested in and the Euler equation parameters can be found
" The simple covariance matrix is a consistent estimator but in general not
necessarily positive definite. Using such an estimator may be troublesome. In
the time series literature several alternatives to this estimator have been
proposed that do not suffer from the defect mentioned above, e.g. see Newey
and West (1987). They suggest to use a Bartlett kernel to smooth the
autocovariances. But in general the conditions for consistency are not
fulfilled in an (unbalanced) panel context, where the number of waves is
typically low.
For this purpose it is convenient to stack the systems of equations for
different periods. In this framework one individual contributes one vector
observation, which also contains zeros when the individual did not exist all
the time. The proposed estimator of the covariance matrix is obtained by
allowing for correlation between all sample moments corresponding to the
system that results from stacking. Observe that this estimator is the sum of
many rank 1 matrices that are equal to a vector (corresponding to one
observation) multiplied by its transpose. Generally when the number of
individuals exceeds the number of moment conditions, the covariance matrix
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in Appendix 2.D " . When t-1 is chosen as the point of approximation the first
four restrictions associated with £ till £ should be added up. Apart from
the time preference parameter y, which can always be identified, the
structural parameters can only be identified by adding a restriction on, for
instance, one of the diagonal elements of B-D . When we approximate the
technology in the neighborhood of the last data point (t-1) the structural
parameters are exactly identified. But in the general case the structural
parameters are overidentified, which opens up the possibility to test the
model by performing a (Generalized) Wald test. In the case that last period is
the base period one can still test whether the time preference parameter
assumes a reasonable value. Furthermore one can test whether the estimates
satisfy theoretical conditions such as B is positive definite symmetric.
2.4 Empirical results
All results reported in this section pertain to the 1967-1986 period.
Furthermore last year (t-1) is taken as point of approximation in the model.
As prices and wages are the driving forces in the Euler equations, it is
important to measure them as accurately as possible. Therefore we have used
information from the productivity database from NBER, which contains series at
the four digit SIC industry level of aggregation. However for many industries
no satisfactory information was available and this lead to the exclusion of
quite a number of firms from our panel (about 58% ).
Before we can present the estimation results, we have to assess the
length of the time-to-build periods of R&D and physical. This boils down to
testing the validity of the instruments used and the significance of the lags
of the prices. As mentioned in the last section, when the technology shocks
are contemporaneously correlated, the order of the MA process in the error
term increases by one. From knowledge of the highest significant lag of the
We have only included those obtained for the Euler equation of R&D. The
other restrictions can be obtained by exploiting that the model is symmetrical
in the inputs.
" Define f =b -d F < H (assuming G < K < N) and g =(1-Y)d - Y# * .
FH FH FH *• ° ' °FH ^ " FH ' Fl HI
After substituting these parameters for the b 's and the d 's it is easily
FH FH
seen that given y the RHS of the restrictions are homogeneous of degree zero.40
price and information on the order of the MA process we can infer the order of
the gestation lags and whether the technical shocks are correlated. Table 3
displays the Sargan test statistics on the validity of the moment conditions
for different Euler equations (f.o.c.'s associated with different factors of



























period: 1967-1986, 104 firms, 802 observations
optimal HAC weighting has been used
TC means technical shocks are correlated, n.c.
stands for not computed, d.o.f. between parentheses
First of all the test results indicate that at least for one choice of the
orders of the gestation lag the model is adequately specified. Furthermore
they suggest a time-to-build period of two years for R&D and at most one year
for physical capital. These results are in line with the information on this
matter given by Mayer and Wagner. Notice that the values of the test
statistics for the model without correlation of technical shocks are well
below the critical values. By looking at differences of test statistics, which
are Sargan difference tests, we can test the presence of correlation among the
technical shocks in isolation. However we still cannot reject the absence of
correlation.
Under the null hypothesis of valid instruments the test statistic is
asymptotically distributed as a x statistic with d.o.f. equal to the number
of instruments minus the number of estimated parameters. Time dummies were
included in the equations that were estimated to cope with aggregate shocks.Table IV GMM Estimates of Euler Equations




































































Period: 1967-1986, 802 observations, 104 firms, unbalanced design. HAC standard errors between parentheses.
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period: 1967-1986, 104 firms, 802 observations
f( ) are overidentifying restrictions, b -d = 1
m%^(A,B) is a mixed x" distribution of a test
statistic for A ineq. and B equality constraints
under H^, see Kodde & Palm (1986) for details
Since the models with 0 =2 and 9 =1 are not rejected, we continue our
analysis with the system corresponding to these gestation lags. The null
restrictions on the # 's that hold in the long run equilibrium were imposed
in order to reduce the number of instruments necessary for estimation *\ The
GMM parameter estimates of the Euler equations are shown in table 4. These
reduced form estimates will be evaluated in the light of their implications
for the values of the parameters of the structural model. According to the
structural models the Euler equation parameters are equal to ratios with the
Apart from prices the instruments are lags of the endogenous regressors. As
the relevance of additional lags is expected to decline, i.e. the partial
correlation between instruments and regressors decreases, biases in the
estimates of the parameters due to random sample fluctuations arise/increase
when adding lags to the set of instruments (see Shea (1993)). The restrictions
were also imposed when calculating the test statistics presented in table 3.Ch. 2 A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTERRELATED FACTOR DEMAND 43
difference of the own adjustment cost parameters (b -d ) in the denominator.
If these differences are large as compared to the other parameters, the Euler
equation parameters should be small. •"•• * «• ;W- •
Before we compute the ALS estimates that are implied by the Euler
equation estimates and their covariance, tests are performed to select the
most parsimonious model that describes the main features of the data in a
satisfactory way. The results are given in table 5. The overidentifying
restrictions that correspond to the most general model that allows for
nonseparability and asymmetry among the factor demands, easily pass the test.
However the joint hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions hold as
well as one of the conditions for global stability, namely B is positive de-
finite symmetric, fails to pass the distance test described in Kodde and Palm























period: 1967-1986, 104 firms, 802 observations
standard errors between parentheses, b was fixed
%_ is the generalized Wald lest, x (9)=21.66
GW 0.99
generalized Wald test (table 6) and an ordinary Wald test (table 5) for
overidentifying restrictions, which are asymptotically equivalent, yield a
p-value of ±0.02. A joint test of equality (overidentifying) restrictions and
inequality restrictions (on the eigenvalues of B) leads to rejection of the
model at a 1% level of significance. Notwithstanding these test outcomes it is
worthwhile to look at the estimates obtained for the simple model. They may be
helpful in finding the reasons for rejection of the structural model.
The values of the test-statistics are not invariant with respect to the
normalization chosen. However the qualititative results did not change when we
assumed that another parameter was known.44
The estimates that exploit the largest subset of the identifying
restrictions given in appendix 2.D are shown in table 6 . For the discount
factor, that can be identified in any case, a reasonable estimate of 0.921 was
obtained. However the own adjustment cost parameter of labor is negative
although not significantly so. The results in tables 5 and 6 suggest that the
adjustment costs function is misspecified with respect to labor. Hamermesh
(1993) argues that both gross and net adjustment costs of labor are important.
Furthermore in a study by Hamermesh (1989) at the plant level a lumpy
adjustment cost specification fits the data better than a quadratic function .
Others included the length of the workweek as well as the number of employees
in their specification of the adjustment cost function.
Table VII













period: 1967-1986, 104 firms, 802 observations
dard errors between parenthese
is the generalized Wald test,
standard errors between parentheses, b ,y fixed
Since we lack information needed for investigating these possibilities, we
will continue the analysis abstracting from the precise adjustment cost
specification for labor.
The adjustment behavior of both types of capital can still be studied in
a limited information framework provided that the cross terms that involve
labor are specified correctly. Reestimation of the model exploring only the
* Recall that after reparameterizing the identifying restrictions between the
Euler equation parameters and the structural parameters are homogenous of
degree zero in the latter (apart from the discount factor). Therefore one of
the parameters had to be fixed. We assume b to be given as we can find
KK
estimates for this parameter in the literature. For other choices of the
identification rule different estimates of the standard errors are obtained.Ch. 2 A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTERRELATED FACTOR DEMAND 45
restrictions that do not involve parameters from the labor equation renders a
value for y slightly above 1. After y was fixed at 0.94, the results in table
7 were obtained. The estimates for b ,b are now less precisely determined.
Using the estimates of the parameters in the upperleft block of B we can
calculate the distribution of the adjustment costs under the assumption AN=0.
The level of the structural parameters has been chosen to yield an average of
adjustment costs for physical capital comparable to that found by Pindyck and
Rotemberg (1983) and Shapiro (1986a). This approach is justified by the fact
that the cross-adjustments cost terms that pertain to adjustments of physical
capital are economically minor. Table 8 displays the distribution and the
sources of adjustment costs.
Table VIII
Relative Adjustment costs |AN=0
mean 10% median 90%
Total 0.0179 0.0008 0.0058 0.0381
R&D 0.0082 0.0002 0.0019 0.0147
Capital 0.0088 0.0006 0.0019 0.0199
• Adjustment cost as fraction of output
period: 1967-1986, 104 firms, 802 observations
The distributions of own adjustment costs of physical capital and R&D are very
similar: although b is three times as large as b . the variance of R&D
capital is about one third the variance of physical capital
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have estimated demand equations for labor, physical
capital and R&D that were derived from a stochastic dynamic linear quadratic
programming problem. The gestation lags for both types of capital were
identified by testing the validity of endogenous instruments. When gestation
Compare the standard deviations of AG/G and AK/K in appendix 2.B.46
lags were taken into account, the lags of the inputs remained significant.
However, joint hypothesis of convex adjustment costs for all three inputs and
rational expectations is rejected. Apart form the possible reasons mentioned
above, this could be due to the normalizations used when estimating the Euler
equations with GMM. It is well-known from the empirical results obtained for
linear-quadratic inventory models that the signs of estimates of important
parameters depend strongly on the normalization used. Another possibility, of
course, is that the rational expectations hypothesis does not hold.
To avoid biases in the estimates, we have paid attention to problems such
as heterogeneity and the time series properties of the inputs. Although we
have chosen the moment conditions under the requirement that the (a priori)
expected (partial) correlation between instruments and regressors will be
maximal, the precision of the ALS estimates was rather low in spite of the
large number of observations. As an additional explanation, we notice that
this can be expected to the extent that random variation in the slope
parameters is present. Nevertheless most of the structural parameter estimates
are on the verge of being significant.
As we have seen most of the identifying restrictions between the Euler
equation parameters and the structural parameters are homogeneous of degree
zero in the latter. In principle the relationship between the coefficients of
the user cost of the inputs and some structural parameters could be exploited
for the identification of absolute levels of those parameters. However to
obtain reasonable estimates, it is essential to have accurate information on
input prices, in particular the tax situation of the firm. Since we lacked
this information we had to rely on estimates of the relative adjustment costs
of physical capital from another study.
To enhance the realism (and explanatory power) of the model and to
improve the conditions for identification of the parameters we could relax the
assumption of infinitely elastic supply of funds at a certain opportunity
rate. In practice the supply curve of funds is upward sloping for reasons as
bankruptcy costs, monitoring costs, lemons premia etc. .Ch. 2 A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTERRELATED FACTOR DEMAND 47
Appendix 2.A: The orders of the MA component of the error terms and valid
instruments.
In this appendix we explain how the orders of the MA processes in the error
terms of the estimating equations are determined. We will do this by
considering four simplified versions of our model but of increasing
complexity. The error terms in these models will exhibit the essential
characteristics of the error terms of our model.
Model 1: one (endogenous) production factor y without a gestation lag
A simple Euler equation (first order condition) for y would be
where the 5's are reduced form parameters, £ denotes expectation conditional
on the set £2 which contains information till time I. (j. is a technology shock
with £ (i = 0, that is observed by the manager of the firm but not oberved by
the econometrician, and e is a prediction error. More generally, we define a
revision E' = £ y • £y . Substituting (A.2) in (A.I) gives
y =8y+8y +u-e° (A.3)
^t+i r i 2'i-i *i i+i
Since £(n e°) * 0, the error term in (A.3), |i - £° < could be modeled as a
MA(1) process w + y w . Therefore (or because £((i y ) * 0) only y and
higher lags of y are valid instruments.
Model 2: one factor of production y with a gestation lag of order 8
Replacing expectations by realizations and revisions and neglecting parameters
in the error terms, we obtain48 •;•,:,: •':«"( „.,<<-.••
Since E(n^ge®g) * 0 but E^Q ,0*,^? ,9>) = 0 ^ i > 0, the error term ,.^?. ,.9.
in (A.5) follows a MA(1) process. Note that since y ^ e
lags of y of higher order are valid instruments.
Model 3: two factors of production y^, y^
gestation lag of order 8; the technology shocks (i , (i are uncorrelated
Model 3: two factors of production y^, y^; the first is built with a
Replacing expectations by realizations and revisions and neglecting parameters
in the error terms, yields
v =8v +8y +8y +8y +8y + (A.7)
'l.l+l ll'l.l I2'l.l-1 20^2.1+1 !l'2.l 22'2.t-l ^
a e e.i e.2
v,.e-v,*,.e-£ *2.,*..i-z =2.,.i-^ e;.,.,.i
i =0 i =0 1=0
and y Q are orthogonal to the revisions by definition, the error term could
be modeled as a MA(8) process, y is still a valid instrument because it
is also uncorrelated with revisions with respect to the second input (remember
y e Q „ ). The lowest lags of y and y that can serve as instruments
Model 4: two factors of production y , y ; the first is built with a
^ ^ It 2t
gestation lag of order 9; the technology shocks |i , (i^ are correlated
We have the same equations as (A.6) and (A.7), but from £(|i g(i^ „) * 0
and £(n «y Q) * 0, it follows that £((i «y Q) * 0 and
£(e° QH Q) * 0. Thus the error term follows a MA(0+1) process. The lowest
lags of y and y that can serve as instruments are y and y Q .
General remark: since Y (output) depends on inputs that have no gestation
lags, the same lags of Y are valid instruments as those lags of such an
input that can be used as instruments.Ch. 2 A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTERRELATED FACTOR DEMAND 49
Appendix 2.B: Data sources and construction of variables
p Value of shipments deflator from BEA and BLS (3-4 digit level SIC,
see BG)
p° Deflator for R&D capital constructed as the weighted average of an
index of hourly labor compensation and the implicit price deflator
in the non-financial corporate sector. (U.S. Dept. of Labor) Only
one series for the whole manufacturing sector (1 digit level SIC,
see also Hall (1990a)).
p** = p*7p x 100 : real costs of investments in knowledge capital.
p* price deflator for new fixed investment (3-4 digit SIC, see BG)
p" = p^/p : real costs of investments in physical capital.
p*" Hourly wage rate calculated on the basis of information from Annual
Survey of Manufactures from Census Bureau (4 digit SIC, see BG).
p" = p"/p x 100 : real wage.
G The stock of R&D capital, constructed from the history of R&D
investment using a perpetual inventory model with declining balance
depreciation. See also Hall (1990a). G is the RSTOCK series taken
from the MSMF** panel deflated by p°.
K The inflation adjusted net capital stock. K is the NPLANT series
taken from MSMF deflated by p .
N Labor force calculated as N = L x H x 0.01 where
L is the number of employees in the firm : EMPLY taken from MSMF
H is weekly hours of work in the industry (ASM, 4 digit SIC, see BG)
Y Output calculated as Y = S + AInv where
S is net sales : SALES taken from MSMF
AInv is the change in the value of the firm's inventories adjusted
for the effects of inflation : (A)ADJINV taken from MSMF.
* : For a description of the productivity database from NBER see Bartelsman
and Gray (1994), abbreviated as BG.
















R&D Net Investment-Capital ratio
Net Investment-Capital ratio




















• : trimming has been done on the basis of the nominal series.
Effects trimming :
Raw data set without missing values for G, K, N, Y : 1570 firms in the
manufacturing sector; after trimming : 757 firms left; with 286 firms in the
scientific sector in the 1959-1987 period; with 193 firms in the 1973-1987
period. After merging with the productivity database 104 firms in the
1959-1%1 period -were left wiih at least 9 consecutive observations.
Sample design scientific sector 1973-1987 : 193 firms, 1533 observations
Year 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
# Firms 42 46 83 126 133 131127 124 120111110 103 98 96 83
SIC 28 283 357 36 38
# Obs 538 139 29 598 229Ch. 2 A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTERRELATED FACTOR DEMAND 51
Characteristics of trimmed sample of
193 firms in scientific sector 1973-1987
(1533 observations unbalanced)



















































• : the labor series has been rescaled such that the median equals
the median of the labor compensation series in Hall (1990a).
Variance Decomposition of Factor Demand












































• : the labor series has been rescaled such that the median equals
the median of the labor compensation series in Hall (1990a).
Appendix 2.C: List of Instruments for R&D equation *
A(K p° p" /Y )
^ t*i- IM - I i- r
G,.
,p
i - 1 *i -2
and time dummies
: all instruments (except prices and dummies) should be lagged 9 +1 periods
in the case of the R&D equation when the technology shocks are correlated.
Mutatis mutandis for the instruments used for the other Euler equations. These
instruments however are in levels, that is the A operation is not applied.Ch. 2 A DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTERRELATED FACTOR DEMAND 53
Appendix 2.D:
Restrictions used in ALS between the parameters in the Euler equation
for R&D and the structural parameters
Regressor Restriction
Y (b -d )
' *• GG OG'
(1-Y) d, + Y^
5° 2« with a = - d r3
.. ,, , v GK Gl Kl
y (b -d )
GG GG





b - Yd + Ya
GK 'KG ' GK
b__d__)
GG GG
Similar restrictions can be derived between the parameters of the other two
Euler equations and the structural parameters.54
PChapter 3
The Solution of the Linear Rational Expectations Model
with Gestation Lags
3.1 Introduction
The realism and explanatory power of competitive equilibrium business
cycle models have been enhanced by the introduction of the assumption of
time-to-build in investment by Kydland and Prescott (1982). By its rigidity,
this feature is capable of explaining the dynamics of factor demand and
productivity above and beyond the part accounted for by adjustment cost
specifications alone. Ioannides and Taub (1992) investigated the dynamic
behavior of a deterministic continuous-time version of the Kydland and
Prescott time-to-build model. In this chapter we analyse an extension of the
discrete-time model of Kollintzas (1985) that allows for gestation lags.
In the eighties a number of articles have appeared that discuss the
formulation, solution and estimation of models that belong to the class of
Linear Rational Expectations (LRE) models. In an important contribution to
this literature, Kollintzas (1985) proposes a solution method for multivariate
LRE models that satisfy a symmetry condition. The Rational Multivariate
Flexible Accelerator model is a well known example that fits in this
framework. The solution method is based on the simultaneous diagonalization of
the matrices of the lag polynomial of the Euler-Lagrange condition (ELC) and
the application of the generalized Wiener-Kolmogorov prediction formulae.
Fulfilment of the stability condition that is derived in that paper, is
necessary and sufficient for the existence and uniqueness of the solution. In
the same year Epstein and Yatchew (1985) introduced a simplified estimation
procedure for some of these models. This procedure was extended to cope with
more general models by Madan and Prucha (1989). However all these models have
in common that they are (systems of) second order difference equations.
In this chapter recent developments in the literature are exploited to
solve the symmetric LRE with gestation lags. Generally this feature of the
model leads to a matrix lag polynomial of a higher order. Following Broze,56
Gourie"roux and Szafarz (1991), the ELC's are restated as a reduced form in
terms of realizations and revision processes. A convenient decomposition of
the matrix lag polynomial is given that is at the root of the derivation of
restrictions on the revision processes which restore the equivalence of both
representations of the first order conditions to the LRE. Its usefulness also
stems from the fact that it includes the matrix lag polynomial of the LRE
without time-to-build and thereby allows us to show that the stability
condition given in Kollintzas (1985) is also sufficient for the existence and
uniqueness of the solution of this more general model. That is after adding
the restrictions on the revision processes, that are implied by demanding
stability , to the other restrictions, all revision processes can be written
as a function of the exogenous processes. After the formulae of the revision
processes expressed as a function of the exogenous processes have been
substituted in the reduced form, the "stability" restrictions on the revision
processes warrant the existence of a factorization of the matrix lag
polynomial of the exogenous part of this form that includes a factor with the
nonstable roots, such that they can cancel out. A lemma provides a procedure
to obtain the formulae of the matrices of the factorization. In this way we
are able to derive a closed form solution (CFS) of the LRE. The CFS is
amenable to the procedures of Prucha and Madan (1989).
The chapter is organized as follows: in the next section the model is
stated and the first-order conditions, the so called Euler-Lagrange equations
(ELC), are derived. The third section contains the main results. Section 4
concludes.
3.2 The Model
In this section the symmetric linear rational expctations model with
gestation lags is described.
Consider a representative economic agent who maximizes the expected
discounted stream of cashflows given technological constraints and information
on the economic environment. As far as the entrepreneur is concerned, the
economic environment consists of product and factor markets. He is a price
taker in both markets. Following Kollintzas (1985) the technology is
characterized by
£(x ,Ax ,n ) = a'x + n'x - VEx - x'HAx - -Ax' GAx (2.1)
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where x = (x| x^ ... x^ )' is a (F x 1) vector comprising the F stocks of
production factors x , f = 1,...,F. The x 's are decided upon at equidistant,
discrete points in time. The (F x F) constant matrices E, G and H are sym-
metric, E is positive (semi-)definite and G is positive definite (PDS);
furthermore is positive (semi-) definite and G - H is nonsingular ;
a is a (F x 1) vector of constants, while Li is a stochastic vector of techno-
logy shocks. The entrepreneur chooses a contingency plan that maximizes
lim £^y'[ g(x_,Ax^,^) . I pV ] (2.2)
T-» oo | = 0 f = 1
subject to an initial condition and transversality conditions. The i' ,
f=l,...,F, are the gross changes of the stocks, e.g. gross investments, and p
are the corresponding real factor prices, that is factor prices deflated by
the product price, y is the real discount factor. The expectations are formed
rationally. This entails that the subjective laws of motion match their
objective equal and all information available is used.
It takes time to build new productive goods. Usually for the building of
a plant, around two years is needed. When the decisions on the size of the
stocks are observed twice in that period, or even more frequently, the
standard laws of motion used for capital stock are inappropriate. Kydland and
Prescott (1982) suggested a model that pays attention to the building time
aspect of investment.
Let s' be the total size of an investment project of type f, j periods
from completion, j=O,...,0 , where 0 is the gestation lag. Then the building
process for inputs of type f can be formalized as
' = ( 1 - 8') x' + s' (2.3a)
^ ' i Ot + 1
x ( 1 8) x + s
1 + 1 ^ ' i O.t + 1
s! = s' j = 0,...,6-1 (2.3b)
j. i + i J + I .t f
where 5^ is the depreciation rate of inputs of type f. Furthermore let \y be
the share of the resources spent on investment projects that are finished in j
periods. Total investment of type f in period t equals
6 6
I' = I ' vV with I ' v/ = 1 (2.3c)
l j=0 ^j jl j=0 ^jFrom combining (2.3a) to (2.3c) it follows that
where the *P'"s depend on the vy''s and 8' . After substituting this expression
for 1^ in (2.2), f=l,...,F, the first order conditions (ELC) for the stocks
can be derived
(2.5)
where A is generic notation for the f-th row of matrix A.
Because of the gestation lags, at time t final decisions are made concerning
x' n , x* « ,..., x^ Q . When the factor of production is not quasi-fixed,
i+o t+o i+o
e.g. materials, the last term is just minus the current price -p .
3.3 The Existence, Uniqueness and Closed Form Representation
of the Solution. ;




with v — fx rt x x V
1 '* 2 '* F
J =9-9+1 and assuming 9 >
.-o' V'
(3.1)
> 9 > 0
(3.2)
= d + U(L)w '
' A more general ARIMA model for u can be handled as we will see at the endCh. 3 THB SOLUTION OF THE LRE MODEL WITH GESTATION LAOS 59
where U(L) = U + U L'+ ... + ILL , w is a white noise process and d is
01 x t ^ t
the deterministic part of u .
I.^A.^- (3.3)
In the definition of the A 's we use the definitions
C = [c.J, D = [d.J (FxF) with
A. = [ a. ] (FxF), -J < i < J have nonzero elements
Introducing the vectors of revision processes £•* = £ (y .) - £ (y ) j =
0,...,9 , which are martingale differences, we obtain by replacing the
expectations in (3.1) with realizations and revisions and after shifting the
system J periods back in time (see Appendix 3.A)
n(L)y,= i;:;i,^,A.L'-J*V-u^ (3.4)
The effective (not multiplied by zero) revision processes in (3.4) are e°,
6-8 0-0 '
E ,...,E ,...,£ ,...,e ' where the subscript now indicates a production
factor. Thus we have (0 +1)F - X 9. revision processes '. They are subject to
i = 1
constraints as we will show in the sequel.
of this section, but for the moment we restrict the discussion to the MA
representation of order T, for the sake of clarity.
Matrices with the same subscripts should be added up.
Hereafter the subscript of the revision processes will refer to a production
factor or indicate time.62
The dimension of the set of solutions that satisfy (3.1) depends on the number
of free revision processes. The number of effective (univariate) martingale
F
differences in (3.4) equals (8+l)F - 16 . After imposing the constraints in
i = 1
(3.9), there are only F free revision processes left as we will prove now.
Lemma 2
The restrictions in (3.10) reduce the number of free revision processes in
(3.4) by 8|F -19.'.
i = 1
Proof
The proof of lemma 2 consists of three steps. First we will demonstrate that
the restrictions of lemma 1 do not involve revision processes different from
F
those mentioned just below (3.4). Next we show that (1-0 )F + X 9
i = I
restrictions are redundant. Finally we look at a system which includes the
effective restrictions. To carry out the first step, we will concentrate on
the restriction which corresponds to taking expectations with respect to
1} and 12 and taking differences afterwards, since this restriction
contains the revision processes with the most distant horizons and we could
expect new revision processes to show up here, if anywhere.
e
Consider without loss of generality the i-th row of L P(L)^ (3.11)
i+G -9 +h j • i j i+9 -9
i F j =0 h= 1 •" j =0 h =0
The most recent observation of the k-th production factor y that appears in
(3.11) is y^ , Q a • To show this we consider the following two cases.
equation with respect to ii for i=0 9 -9 does not yield a single
constraint.
This is in fact predicted by property (37) in the paper by Broze, Gourieroux
and Szafarz. However we believe that our proof, as it is confined to the
particular model above, is more revealing and complete than their proof.Ch. 3 THE SOLUTION OF THE LRE MODEL WITH GESTATION LAGS 63
If 0 > 9. + 1 the most recent observation of y in (3.11) is part of the
first double sum and corresponds to the smallest value of h for which
A *0 that is to h = 0 - 9 - 1. Note that in this case A = 0 for h e IN.
• h.ik k i h,ik
If 0 < 0 + 1 the most recent observation of y in (3.11) is part of the
k i k
second double sum and corresponds to the highest value of h for which A *0,
that is to h = 0 -0 + 1. Thus the revision processes with the most distant
0 '0 *
horizons are e , k = 1,...,F. But they are included in the set of those
mentioned below (3.4). This observation completes the first step.
The redundancy is easily demonstrated. Again we look at the i-th row of
0
L P(L) [£ - u ]. Since £ - u contains information only until time
l-J [-J t-J l-J rt
t-J, taking expectations of the i-th row of L 'P(L) [^ - u ] with respect
to Q Q Q is equivalent to taking expectations of the i-th row with
' * F
respect to Q Q Q for each j e IN. So at least (1-0 )F + X 9
•^ i -o +o - i+j F.I
i F i = l
restrictions are redundant. The remaining restrictions of (3.10) are included
in the following system
A, ...A,.,
A A A ... A A






w = 0 (3.12)
-0
which is obtained by taking expectations of the i-th row of L P(L) [^ ^-
u ] with respect to Q « Q for j = 1 J and taking differences of the
t-j ^ i-o +B -j
i F
adjacent expressions, for i = 1 F. Apart from the restrictions in (3.10),64
system (3.12) also includes -8F+ 19 incorrect equations, which however can
be ignored . They can easily be recognized by making use of the fact that the
true restrictions only involve the revision processes listed below (3.4). The
F
vector [(ej)'...(e"'')T in (3.12) also includes - G^F +19. other revision
i = 1
processes *, which are redundant as they enter only the false 'restrictions'.
In order to prove that the remaining restrictions from (3.10) are
effective, it will now be shown that generally the matrix at the LHS of (3.12)
has maximum rank. The Laplace development of the determinant of the matrix
that is obtained by leaving out the last F colums, includes the product of the
diagonal entries of that matrix, which are the diagonal entries of all A
matrices. Only the diagonal entries of A depend on the diagonal entries of E.
Since the sum of their powers in other terms of the Laplace development is
Q
lower, the determinant differs from zero in general . But if all rows in
F
(3.12) are independent, then the 9 F- I 8. true restrictions are also
i = 1
' Since the number of additional restrictions in (3.12) equals the number of
revision processes introduced in these restrictions, they do not constrain the
revision processes mentioned below (3.4).
* To discern the restrictions in (3.10) from the equations added in (3.12) we
look at the diagonal of the matrix at the LHS of (3.12) comprised of A
matrices. Note that all diagonal entries of A are different from zero since B
F
is positive definite. The fact that each of the -9 F + X 8 redundant revi-
i = I
sion processes is multiplied by such an entry, enables us to locate all the
restrictions, which do not emanate from (3.10). By premultiplying (3.12) by a
diagonal selection matrix we get the system of true restrictions. The diagonal
of the selection matrix is obtained by carrying out the following sub-
stitutions in [(e')'...(£•""')']': the revision processes mentioned below (3.4)
are replaced by 1 and the remaining revision processes are replaced by zero.
' One corollary to lemma 4 below would say that the set of values of the
diagonal of E for which the determinant is zero has Lebesgue measure zero.Ch. 3 THE SOLUTION OF THE LRE MODEL WITH GESTATION LAGS 65
independent. Finally, from the first step of the proof, where it was shown
that no revision processes are included in (3.10) other than those mentioned
below (3.4), it is immediately clear that taking expectations of (3.9) with
respect to £2 with j e IN one does introduce new revision processes but
also that the number of free revision processes remains constant: one can
derive a new restriction for each new revision processes that is introduced, D
So all the revision processes in (3.4) but F are subject to restrictions.
The space of candidate solutions to the optimal control problem that satisfy
the Euler-Lagrange conditions will be reduced even further by imposing the
tranversality condition or a stronger condition like stability . Generally
such conditions guarantee uniqueness of the solution just as they do when
there is no time-to-build. In the latter case FI(X) = Q(X). Recall the
decompositions in (3.5) and (3.6), then premultiplying both sides of equation
-6




By virtue of (3.10), the number of revision processes in (3.13) can be reduced
to F, say e° '". Making the assumption that a solution y belongs to the class
of ARIMA-processes we can parameterize e° as 0w . Then the RHS of (3.13) is a
distributed lag of w , R(L)w = (R + R L + ... + R L*)w with g = J+T.
1 t 0 1 g i
A solution of the stochastic optimal control problem must satisfy the
transversality condition too. Sufficient conditions for this condition to hold
are that the exogenous stochastic process w and a solution y are of
exponential order less than y""* (see Sargent (1987) pp. 200-201). The w
process has this property by assumption. To ascertain this property in the
case of y^ we investigate the LHS of (3.13). Let's define Q(X) H (I + (£')X +
(I/y)X* ). Denote the roots of the f-th equation in Q(l/X) = 0 by V and X*.
All pairs of roots (X, , X*) satisfy XX* = y"' Let X be the smaller
'" Generally the matrix that results from leaving out the first F columns from
the matrix at the LHS of (3.12) is nonsingular.66
modulus root of each pair. Then we have |X'J < y"* and |A*| > y"* . The
stability condition given in Kollintzas (1985) is necessary and sufficient for
| A,'| < y""* to hold. For instance this condition is satisfied when the ad-
justment costs are strongly separable (H=0). Notice that if |X"| < y'"* then
A.", X* e R. But in order that the solution y is of exponential order less
then y' "* we also need that R(L) can be factorized as (1-A*L)R(L), where A* =
diag(X*,.-.,X*) and R(L) is a lag polynomial of order g-1, for otherwise we
are not able to get rid of the part of the LHS of (3.13) that causes violation
of the condition, i.e. the factor corresponding to the larger roots (1-A*L).
The lemma below provides a condition that is equivalent to the existence
of the factorization but more easily verifiable.
Lemma 3
Let N(X)=N + N X + ... + N X" be a polynomial of order w. This polynomial can




Suppose this factorization is possible. Then N(X) = N + N X + ... + N X" =
o i w
0 II w-l 0 10 21
(-FN )X". Equating powers of X gives
N = N N = N -rN i=l,...,w-l N = -FN (3 15)
0 0 i i i - 1 w w- 1 v-»-*-v
it follows that z r-'N.= (r-r-'n^+(r-'-r-*r)N,+ ... + (r-ir)N, ,=o.
But condition (3.14) is also sufficient. We propose a factorization and next
verify its validity. Use the formulae for N through N in (3.15)
— — _ _ * • '
recursively to obtain N^,...,N^. Then N^ ^= I r""'"*N Multiplying both
i = 0
sides by -r and using condition (3.14) yields -fN = N which is in
w-l w
agreement with the last equality in (3.15). •Ch. 3 THE SOLUTION OF THE LRE MODEL WITH GESTATION LAGS 67
Substituting R(L) for N(X.) and A* for f gives the condition
I (A*)'"'R. = 0
i =0
(3.16)
The matrices R ,...,R depend on F x F unknown entries of 0. But (3.16)
imposes F x F restrictions on the 0 's. In general these restrictions




where e =(e°...e^"')' and R = (YS'C)"'[ , i=0,..J-l
the R 's are F x (J x F) matrices and the K 's are F x F matrices with
i 'j
K =0 j > i + 1 K ' 1 < j < i + 1
J .i
o ... o 7d_
0 ... 0 0
0 ... 0 0
J-1.1
0 ... 0 -C
0 ... 0 0




0 ... 0 0






yd o ... o
o" o ... o
0 0 ... 0
J .2
0 ... 0 0
0 ... 0
0 ... 0 0"
2F
0 ... 0 0
. A
J- 1 .2
0 ... 0 0
0 ... 0 C
2F
0 ... 0 0
0 ... 0 0
0 ... 0 0 0
0 ... 0 0 0
0 0 0 ... 0
o yd o ... o
0 0 0 ... 0
0 0 0 ... 0
A matrices with the same indices should be added.Lemma 4 "
Let p: R"-> R be a polynomial in n variables and let p z 0.
Then M(p) = -I x e R"| p(x) =0 I has Lebesgue measure zero defined on R".
Proof of lemma 4: by induction over the degree of p, see Appendix 3.C.
The determinant of a general matrix N is a polynomial, where the entries of
the matrix are the variables. From lemma 4 it follows that the space of values
of the entries of N for which det(N) = 0 has Lebesgue measure zero. The same
lemma can be invoked when the entries are linear functions of
(hyper-)parameters even if the number of parameters is smaller than the number
of entries.
Because the entries of the last F rows of W are nonlinear functions of
the entries of E,G, and H, theorem 1 has not been proved yet.
From (3.18) we know that the matrices B i = 0,...,J-l depend in a
nonlinear fashion on A*, S, and £. These matrices in turn depend on (C'')D
(see pages 5 and 10), where C and D are linear in (the entries of) E,G, and H,
given y (see page 4). Thus W depends on C and D. Define X s -(C"')D. The
conditions on page 2 imply that C = E + G - 2H + (l/y)G is PDS and D = G - H
is nonsingular and therefore X is nonsingular. By fixing two matrices from the
set (C, D, X) (without violating the conditions on page 2), for instance C and
X, we fix the third and we fix W.
By fixing X we impose restrictions on C and D (E,G, and H) as CX + D = 0
must hold. Substitute these restrictions in (3.20) by replacing D by -CX. Then
given X (and y), W is linear in C. According to lemma 4 M^ has Lebesgue
measure zero as long as det(W) is not trivially zero. This is indeed not the
case for almost all choices of X, as will be shown below.
To this end we will develop the determinant of W. Some terms in the
Laplace development consist of the product of the entries on the diagonal of
the A -matrices and F entries of B . The sum of all these particular terms
will be shown to be unique, that is its algebraic formula does not show up in
another term of the Laplace development (LD) of the determinant of W, and
therefore cannot cancel out. Furthermore this sum is different from zero in
" Lemma 4 and its proof were suggested to us by A. Perea y Monsuwe".Ch. 3 THE SOLUTION OF THE LRE MODEL WITH GESTATION LAGS 71
general. This can easily be checked in the special case where E = 0, G = G,
and H = 0. See appendix 3.D. From this simple example it follows that det(W)
is not (always) the null function. Now let us return to the case of general X.
So given X, det(W) is not the null function unless a particular choice
for X nullifies it to start with. Only for a very exceptional choice for X (a
choice from a set of measure zero within the space of all possible choices for
X) we might expect this to happen as will be shown now.
Notice again that when we fix X, C (or D) is still completely free; to be
able to apply lemma 4 given a particular value of X, it suffices to show that
det(W) * 0 for one particular choice of the value of C (or D). As already
indicated above, this will be done by looking for (algebraically) unique terms
in the Laplace development of det(W). We will focus on the case where C =
diag(c ,...,c ). Next we replace the c 's by entries from X and D. Note
that the entries from X and D have to satisfy the constraints X +
diag(c ,...,c )"'D = 0. Note further that X still can take any value by
choosing D appropriately and when the diagonal entries of C are free but those
of D are not, by choosing the c.'s and the nondiagonal entries of D
appropriately.
In the remainder of the proof we will also exploit the fact that the
d 's only show up in the diagonals of A , A , and of A , and in B but
not in B , i?O. As the latter is not obvious, we will prove that the d ,
f=l,...,F show up in B but not in B , i*0, in appendix 3.E. Specifying only
° ' F ,g-e*e , ,
terms that do involve ad, B equals X (A*) (VS'Q AQ Q . + ..
Now we will show that there exists a unique part in the Laplace
development of det(W), LD-part for short, which is the sum of all LD-terms
that include the factor [Id''' originating from the first (J-l)F rows of W,
and the factor n d from the last F rows. This LD-part is meant to be unique
in the sense that there are no other terms in the Laplace development of W
that include the factor lid' .If such a unique LD-part exists and if the
values of the d 's can be chosen freely given X, then det(W)*0.
Note that because the first F(J-l) rows only have J-l rows which involve
a specific d , i=l,...,F, the highest power of d lhat could be encountered
in the part of an LD-term that originates from the first F(J-l) rows, is J-l.
Furthermore the last F rows of W contribute F d. .'s at most to a LD-term,
which will all be different and originate form the first F columns (B ).72
Thus in order to obtain a LD-term that includes , Fid both parts of the
k = 1 kk
W matrix — the upper F(J-1) rows and the lower F rows — must contribute the
number of d 's that can be attained at best (the values J-l and 1 of the
i i
powers of d in the upper part and lower part of W respectively are in fact
upperbounds for the powers of d , which however are attainable as will become
clear). The rows in the upper part of W do not include different d 's, while
in B , d shows up in the i-th column in every row (entry), for i=l,...,F.
The d 's, that are contributed by the last F rows to the unique LD-part
i i
necessarily originate from the first F columns of W, that is from B . As a
consequence the J-l d ,'s, for i=l,...,F, all have to come from W , which is
a F(J-1) x F(J-l) matrix. This in turn uniquely determines the origin of the
d. .'s in the first F(J-1) rows as they all have to come from the diagonals of
the A matrices in W .
1 M
Given the unique origin of the d. . 's in the LD-part, that come from the
first F(J-l) rows, we are still left with many possible combinations of the
entries in B (which correspond to d.'s), as all possible combinations result
in FI d . Because we can not pursue our search for a unique LD-term further
at this point, we add up all LD-terms that involve n d . The next step is
to show that these terms almost always, that is for almost all X, do not
counterbalance each other. As the factor in these LD-terms that comes from the
first J(F-l) rows is always the same, namely y ' "" FJ d ', we focus on the
distinguishing factors in the LD-terms which originate from B . Define the
g-e.+e °
following matrix Y = [y..], y = [(yS'Q' ]..(X*) ^ . This matrix
includes the "coefficients" of the d 's in the LD-terms that originate from
F
B . The sum of all coefficients of the FI d factors in the LD-terms which
0 k = I kk
originate from B , equals det(Y). Thus a necessary and sufficient condition
for the existence of a unique LD-part that is characterized by FI d , i.e. a
condition for this part of the LD not to equal zero, is that det(Y)*O (apart
from the trivial condition that given X the d.'s do not equal zero). We will
now show that det(Y)*O for almost all X. Notice that Y is a function of X and
X alone.
For each matrix X we have a pair £, S~', the diagonal matrix with unique
eigenvalues and a matrix of eigenvectors of X respectively, and vice versa.
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values, £ and S can have all values and vice versa. If we have chosen the
values of the £ 's and thereby have fixed the X* 's, Y still can take on all
values by choosing S appropriately. In fact given (almost all) £, there is an
injective relation between Y and S. Thus given £=£ , for almost all X with
the eigenvalues equal to t , k=l,...,F, or equivalently for almost all S,
det(Y)*0. For almost all values of £ , k=l,...,F, this argument applies.
Furthermore by letting the £ take on all values in R, k=l,...,F, and by
choosing S given £ appropriately, all X's are covered (can be generated).
Thus for almost all X, the condition det(Y)?'O is satisfied. As a consequence
for almost all X there is a unique part in the Laplace development of W that
F
depends on FJ d . (Recall that it is unique because it is the only LD-part
that involves n d'' ). Because the d..'s can be chosen freely, we can choose
their values given X, in such a way that det(W)*0. So for almost all X, det(W)
is not trivially zero and by lemma 4, M has Lebesgue measure zero. Since
w,y
the space of values of entries of X, for which det(W) is the null function,
has Lebesque measure zero, M has Lebesgue measure zero unconditionally.
w,y
The uniqueness of the solution to the model warrants the existence of the
closed form solution (CFS)
x^= Ax_ | + R(L)L *\v_ with A = S 'A~S, A" = diag(V V) (3.22)
Notice that the autoregressive part of the closed form solution is invariant
with respect to the order of the gestation lags . Our strategy for deriving
the formulae of the MA parameters in the CFS entails the following steps
1. Obtain expressions for e ; from (3.21') e = - W* Zw
2. Substitute these expressions in the RHS of (3.13) and find formulae
for R up to R . g = J + x. Make use of (3.17).
3. Use the procedure in the proof of Lemma 3 to obtain the factorization
R(L) = (1-A*L)R(L). i.e. R^. R^ R74
Let M = I - A. If |M| * 0, then (3.22) admits the flexible accelerator form
e
x^- x^ = M (x* - x^ |) with x* = M"'R(L)L ^ (3.23)
This form is amenable to the estimation procedure first advanced by Epstein
and Yatchew (1985) and extended by Madan and Prucha (1989). They also discuss
an exhaustive set of properties of M that are implied by the structure of the
problem. By demanding that the estimates of M exhibit these properties, more
precise estimates can be obtained. Furthermore from (3.23) it is clear that
even in the presence of gestation lags it is possible to impose the
transversality condition on the equations to be estimated. However, since in
non trivial problems the MA parameters in x depend in an intricate manner on
the structural parameters due to the inversion of W , these restrictions have
to be ignored in those cases. Then we still have a semi closed form solution.
At the outset we assumed that u - MA(T). However, it is well-known that
prices follow more general ARIMA processes. In such cases the formula of the
solution should be amended by using the following procedure. The
autoregressive lag polynomial of the exogenous processes (u ) will be
factorized, where one factor is a diagonal matrix lag polynomial with common
roots on the diagonals : V(L). This factor includes for instance the unit
roots from the prices. Then the ARI lag polynomial of the solution becomes
V(L)(1-AL). The second factor can be replaced by a MA(°°) representation. The
stability condition can still be imposed. However the procedure to obtain
expressions for the MA parameters in the CFS in terms of the structural
parameters is no longer applicable. In practice the MA-part of the solution
will be approximated with a stationary ARM A model.
In the model without adjustment costs, the autoregressive part of the
solution equals the AR - part of the exogenous processes times the Hessian of
the production function. From this observation it can be concluded that one
does not need adjustment costs to explain autoregressive patterns in the
factor demand relations. We do not need to impose stability to obtain a unique
solution ; the restrictions in Lemma 1 are sufficient. However a necessary
second order condition for the solution to be a maximum is that E is positive
definite.
Finally the results that where derived above can also be obtained for
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lag polynomial can be found in Gassing and Kollintzas (1991). Kollintzas
(1986) gives a stability condition for such models.
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have shown that the LRE model which allows for both
adjustment cost considerations and gestation lags has a unique stable solution
and moreover that it admits a closed form representation. The solution to the
model differs from the solution to the model that only accounts for adjustment
costs with respect to the moving average part. In this manner it reconciles
more intricate dynamical patterns observed in the data. Although the
restrictions between the MA parameters of the CFS and the structural
parameters are often too complicated to be exploited, the restrictions on the
AR parameters can be imposed. Indeed, estimating demand equations along with
models for the price processes and the production function and imposing cross-
equation restrictions will yield more efficient estimates of the parameters.Appendix 3«A: Proof of equation (3.4)
(3.4) is the result of the following computations.
The system we are investigating is
£^L *n(L)y^+ u^ 0 (3.1)
substituting
HL)«X.^A.L'-* (3.3)
and lagging the system J periods gives
recalling that e^ = £ y - £ y , we
t i i+j i- I t+j
obtain
. 0
n(L)y + 1.' A.f-ir!e* \ + u =0
t j = l j ^ i=0 I -J+j- ij i-J
changing the order of summation yields
O^,A^-V-u_, (3.4)Ch. 3 THE SOLUTION OF THE LRE MODEL WITH GESTATION LAGS 77
Appendix 3.B: Proof of equation (3.7)
Starting with the result shown in appendix 1, we have
j=0 h=0 h I
which can be written as
where £ = -'x' XA L^"*
'•^ j=o h = i •"
(3.7)Appendix 3,C: Proof of Lemma 4
Induction over degree of p.
Let the degree of p equal 0. Then p is a constant. As p s 0, p has no roots.
Thus M(p) = 0, and has Lebesgue measure zero.
Induction step: Let the degree of p equal r > 1 and let the lemma be true for
p with degree < r-1.
Since the degree of p is at least 1, there is an i e (l,...,n) with J- a 0.
Assume w.l.o.g. that 7J— * 0.
n
["'
Define the function f(x) :=
x
Because p(x)=0 for all x € M(p), it follows that f(M(p)) c R*'\ ( 0 ).
If f is a differentiable function, which is locally invertible almost
everywhere, i.e. invertible for all x e R"\M where M is a set that has
measure zero, then f is a local diffeomorphism almost everywhere. As will be
shown below, we can cover M(p)\M by a countable union of open sets on each of
which f is a (global) diffeomorphism. The image of the intersection of each of
these open sets with M(p)\M under f is a subset of R"' x ( 0 ) , which has
measure zero in R". If f is a diffeomorphism on R"\M , it follows that the
intersection of each open set with M(p)\M has Lebesgue measure zero. Since
M(p)\M is a countable union of sets with Lebesgue measure zero, M(p)\M has
measure zero. From the fact that M has measure zero, it follows that M(p) has
measure zero.
Thus it remains to show that f is differentiable and locally invertible and
that M(p) c U B , where the B 's are open sets on which f is a global
, e I '
diffeomorphism and I is a countable set.
It is easy to verify that f is differentiable. Next we focus on the
property of local invertibility.
This proof was suggested to us by A. Perea y Monsuwe".Ch. 3 THE SOLUTION OF THE LRE MODEL WITH GESTATION LAGS 79

















Thus det(D^f) = • This is a function of x ,...,x . We know that is a
polynomial in R" of degree < r-1. From the induction assumption, it follows
that = | x | ||_ = 0 | has measure zero. Thus det(D^f) * 0 V x e R"\M^
Applying the implicit function theorem, it follows that f is locally
invertible on R"\M , where M has Lebesgue measure zero.To show that we can
cover M(p) by a countable union of open sets on which f is a global
diffeomorphism, we will first proof that M(p) is a closed set.
M(p) is a closed set iff every convergent sequence x* e M(p) converges to a
limit in M(p). Now let x* be a sequence in M(p) coverging to x. Thus f(x*) = 0
V k. From the fact that f is continuous, it follows that f(x) = 0.
We can always cover M(p) by the union of open sets on each of which f is a
diffeomorphism. We will show that we can find a countable number of such sets.
Define M* = M(p) n C* where C* = | x € R" | ||x|^ < k ) .
Since C* is compact and M(p) is closed, M* is compact.
Thus we can find a cover (B ) for M* , where I has a finite number of
elements. It follows that M(p) = U M* e U U B =
k k i e I,'
U B , where 1 = U I
el' k *
is a countable set.Appendix 3.D: Det(W) when E = 0, G = G, and H = 0.
In this case C = ^ G and D = (3. It follows that
and B = 0 for i = 1,...,J-1. Partition W as
W
r W ; W
1 n
By the theorem on the partitioned inverse, (the absolute value of) the
determinant of W equals
IWI = IW I IB - W W"'W I
' ' ' m' ' 0 2 m 1 '
Since B. = 0 for i = 1 J-1 we have W^ = 0. Thus |B^- W^WjWJ = |BJ =
FI B • • * 0 because D = G is nonsingular. It is easily seen from the defi-
. = I 0,11 " '
nitions that the product of the diagonal entries of W is a unique term in the
m
Laplace development of det(W ). Thus in general det(W ) 5* 0 as well. It
mm
follows that | W | # 0 for almost all choices of G when E = 0, G = G, and
H = 0.
Appendix 3.E: d , f=l F, show up in B but not in B , i^0.
The proof proceeds as follows:
The d 's (could only) enter the formulae of the B 's through K
j=i,...J-l, i=0,...,J-l, which are sums of A matrices. Now 7d only
appears as the (f,f)-entry of AA „ . . ,f=l,...,F . We will show that these
matrices are only part of B . Abstracting from factors that only depend on X,
j - I J • I f < j)
the B matrices equal S K = X S A
i ^ ji+l J+i-j.k
Suppose that AQ Q , • enters B , then J+i-j=J+6 -9 , k=f. It follows that
*^ H-o+1,1 i Ff
i=0 -0 +j and F(j)>f. From the latter we have j<0 -9 , and therefore i<0.
Thus d , f=l F, only show up in B aChapter 4
Consequences of Capital Market Imperfections
For the Adjustment of the Stocks of
Physical and Knowledge Capital
4.1 Introduction
In recent years there is revived academic interest in the linkages
between the firm's financial structure and its 'real-side' behavior. Tax
considerations and the presence of asymmetric information between
owners/management and outside investors or agency costs lead firms to prefer
internal capital over external capital. Starting with the article by Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen (1988), several empirical papers addressed the question
whether investments were hampered by liquidity constraints and in particular
which firms were most likely to face them. A growing literature stresses that
changes in the ability of the firm to acquire external funds (agency costs) —
due, for instance, to changing cash flows or prospects concerning future
profits — affect the production and factor demand decisions and thereby
amplify and propagate business cycle fluctuations. Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1993) presented several pieces of evidence, that taken, together
show that at the onset of a recession small firms that are bank dependent will
receive a lower share of credit extended, that is, there is a flight to
quality. As a consequence, some investment plans of such borrowers will be
postponed till better times.
In this chapter, the role of agency costs in the investment process of
firms is investigated once more. We study to what extent (differences in) the
speed of adjusting the stocks of physical and knowledge capital and the level
of investment and R&D expenditures are related to the height of the agency
costs. We follow both a structural "Euler equation" approach and a less struc-
tural "partial adjustment" approach. While others have used only firm size as
proxy for agency costs, e.g. Gilchrist (1990), or only financial variables
like leverage as Whited (1992) did, we will use both kinds of determinants.82
The models will be estimated using data pertaining to firms in the U.S.
scientific sector in the period 1978-1987. As these firms are among those with
the highest R&D intensity and therefore are likely to face relatively high
agency costs ceteris paribus, this sample is particularly suited for testing
theories that predict an effect of agency costs on investment behavior.
We find some evidence that smaller firms respond quicker to changing
market conditions as far as investment in plant and equipment is concerned.
This finding is consistent with a theory that says that firms that experience
relatively high opportunity costs of capital, e.g. small or highly leveraged
firms, will have less excess capacity in general. Although quicker adjustment
of quasi-fixed inputs is more expensive in itself, firms do not have to borrow
as much as they otherwise would have.
However, the interpretation of a relation between size and speed of
adjustment is subject to ambiguity. It might well be the case that smaller
firms are just more flexible and thus face lower adjustment costs. To
discriminate between alternative explanations of the effect of size on the
adjustment process special attention is paid to asymmetries in behavior at
different stages of the business cycle.
During the eighties the United States witnessed a dramatic rise of
corporate leverage. Many policymakers started to worry about the real effects
of this increase. If it is true that highly leveraged firms operate
differently because high cost of additional external capital render them
dependent on the cash flow they generate internally, this development has
implications for the shape of business cycles.
Highly leveraged firms that have invested considerably in R&D form a
class of firms that are especially sensitive to shocks. These firms have a
smaller so-called debt capacity since part of their assets are highly specific
and cannot be used as collateral. Opler and Titman (1993) present evidence
that during downturns sales drop dramatically in highly leveraged, R&D
intensive industries. Furthermore, as predicted by Shleifer and Vishny (1992),
stock returns decrease more, which also suggests that financial distress is
more costly for these firms.
In contrast to the results for plant and equipment (P&E), no noticeable
impact on the adjustment speed of R&D is found from factors that influence the
agency costs. Moreover, the results indicate that the negative (partial)
correlation between the level of R&D spending and leverage across firms, that
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asymmetrical effects are accounted for.
Finally, the results obtained for the Euler equations of both knowledge
and physical capital support the existence of asymmetries in adjustment
behavior over the business cycle.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In the next section, we discuss
recent developments in the financial position of firms in more detail and
summarize related papers. In section 3, we present the framework of our tests
and discuss methodological issues. Section 4 presents the empirical results
and section S concludes.
4.2 Agency Costs: recent Developments and Consequences
The impact of an adverse economic shock on the economy depends partly on
the vulnerability of firms. In addition to institutional, organizational and
technological factors, which determine how fast a firm can adjust to a
changing environment, the values of liquidity measures and of financial ratios
as leverage are important. In this study, we focus on the effect of agency
costs on the investment behavior of firms. Various aspects of the way firms
react to changing financial conditions have been the subject of previous
studies, which we will briefly review in this section.
The likelihood of financial distress has changed considerably over time.
After a period of steady decrease since the mid seventies, the leverage of
firms started to rise again in 1985 '. However the peak that was reached in
1974 is still far away. The recent increase in leverage is partly a
consequence of the major corporate restructuring that took place.
A number of recent theoretical and empirical papers have analyzed the
consequences of high leverage for real economic behavior of the firm. The
leveraged buyouts and acquisitions only had a small effect on spending on R&D
since they were concentrated in industries with low R&D intensities. There
also were a lot of companies that increased their leverage considerably
without change of owners. Among them were many firms from the so-called
scientific sector. Hall (1990b) found significant declines in investmeni in
R&D as a result of this type of restructuring.
See Bernanke and Campbell (1988) and Bernanke, Campbell and Whited
(1990).84
The literature offers several explanations for the negative correlation
between leverage and R&D intensity. Some theories explain why the cost of
external finance may be higher for R&D than for ordinary investment, which
leads managers to prefer internal funds as means of finance for R&D.
First R&D can hardly be used as collateral, since R&D is often a highly
firm specific investment. Second, firms have an incentive not to reveal any
information on R&D projects, which is valuable for competitors. This makes it
harder to assess their value and the risk involved. According to Leland and
Pyle (1977) asymmetric information problems can be severe in the case of risky
investments such as R&D projects. The lemons premium that a firm has to pay
when issuing new bonds or shares to finance an investment project can be so
high that the manager, who acts in the interest of existing shareholders,
forgoes the investment opportunity. This type of reasoning lead Myers and
Majluf (1984) to conclude that there is a financial hierarchy, in which
retained earnings are the cheapest source of funds. Third Jensen and Meckling
(1976) argue that when a firm is highly leveraged and performing badly, it is
tempting for managers who maximize the wealth of shareholders, to pursue a
gambling strategy by borrowing more money and investing the money in risky
projects, e.g. R&D. If they are successful bankruptcy may have been averted,
if not the costs are borne by the lender. As lenders are aware of this moral
hazard problem, they charge a higher interest rate and as a consequence the
costs that arise from this problem are ultimately born by the borrowers. On
the other hand, Myers (1977) pointed out that shareholders are not prepared to
invest additional funds in a new project when a firm is in financial distress,
as it is unlikely that they, as residual claimants, get a fair share of the
profits.
For these reasons, the costs of external finance is relatively high for
R&D intensive firms, that is when they are not subject to rationing. In
addition, the interest, which has to be paid on debt, reduces the amount of
internal finance which is available for R&D expenditure. Tables 6 to 8 in
Bernanke and Campbell (1988) show that the burden of interest payments has
increased considerably in the eighties. The ratio of interest expense to
cash flow rose sharply, particularly in the upper tail of the distribution .
* Obviously financial distress is a phenomenon that mostly happens to firms at
the high percentiles of the distributions of leverage and liquidity measures.
The interest expense as a ratio to a three-year moving average of the cashOi. 4 CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFBCTSQNS AND -n® AIMUSTMHTT PROCESS 85
Many papers have focused on the impact of agency costs on the demand for
other inputs ihan R&D. In Whited (1992) the failure of the standard Euler
equation to pass the Sargan test is found to be related to a binding debt
constraint. An extended model, that is obtained by parameterizing the
corresponding shadow price in the spirit of MaCurdy (1981) as a function of
factors that measure the likelihood of financial distress, is more capable of
explaining the data.
Sharpe (1994) examines the relationship between leverage and size and the
speed of adjustment of the labor force to new economic conditions in three
different ways. The empirical results indicate that employment growth is more
sensitive to demand and financial conditions at more highly leveraged and/or
smaller firms. Related evidence is provided by Cantor (1990). He reports a
greater average volatility of the employment growth rates of more highly
leveraged firms. Even after controlling for a variety of other firm
characteristics he finds a higher (partial) correlation between (the
volatility of) employment growth and (the volatility of) cash flows for more
highly leveraged firms. Similar results are documented for capital
expenditures. He interprets his findings as support for the view that highly
leveraged firms have to respond more quickly and more sharply to worsening
economic conditions by adjusting their factor demand in order to avoid default
as they have relatively large debt service obligations and often face credit
constraints at times they need extra funds most.
The so-called financial accelerator theory of the business cycle — which
was formally introduced by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) but is reminiscent of
the debt deflation theory of Fisher (1933)— offers a well-wrought explanation
for the results of Sharpe and Cantor as well. The agency cost of financing
depends on the quality of the firms balance sheet among other things. Since
the firms net worth is likely to be procyclical, agency costs are lower in a
business upturn and therefore investment is expected to increase. Gertler
(1990) develops a multi-period framework that allows borrowers and lenders to
have on-going relationships. As a consequence the agency costs of external
funds become dependent also on the present value of forecasted future cash
flows, as it can serve as collateral. Then small persistent changes in the
value of important macroeconomic variables can cause large fluctuations in
flow of COMPUSTAT firms rose from 0.44 in 1971 to 1.48 in 1986 at the 90th
percentile.86
the value of this part of the collateral and thereby induce large fluctuations
in production through the financial accelerator mechanism.
Several articles have tested the implications of the Bernanke-Gertler
framework. At the beginning of a recession or following a tightening of
monetary policy, there is a clear shift in the composition of external
finance. Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) present evidence that indicates that
following a tightening of monetary policy the issuance of commercial paper
increases, while bank loans fall. Although more firms would like to borrow in
an economic downturn as on average their cash flows fall and their financing
requirements increase (in particular the need to finance inventory stocks),
only large firms with reasonable looking balance sheets can resort to issuance
of commercial paper. Investment is affected by a shift in the loan supply,
even after controlling for output and interest rates. This shift also explains
why Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1993) find that firms that are bank dependent
(typically small firms) had to dispose of inventories more often than non bank
dependent firms. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) show that the situation for the
former categrory is even worse : when we restrict our attention to bank loans,
the credit extended to small firms after a tightening of monetary policy falls
relative to credit extended to large firms. Bemanke and Lown (1993) attribute
the slow recovery of the American economy after the 1990-1991 recession to the
low quality of borrowers, which is due to high debt and interest coverage and
resulted in a restrained lending policy of banks. Remelona et al. (1993) show
that in recent years firms have started to deleverage to reduce the debt
overhang problem.
The potential differences between the time-series behavior of P&E of a
low leverage firm and of a high leverage firm can be illustrated using figure
1. The dotted line represents the development of the optimal capital stock and
displays the pattern of a business cycle. When the real "user" cost of capital
are low and the net adjustment costs function has a large positive second
derivative, it is sensible to adjust the stock of capital at a constant pace
and to maintain overcapacity to accommodate peaks in demand (line 1) ceteris
paribus. If the user costs of capital rises due to a higher leverage, excess
capacity will decline and adjustments will take place in a more flexible
manner (line 2). When both changes of marginal adjustments and the use of
capital are very expensive, capacity is just enough to satisfy demand during
recessions (line 3). The investments of firms with these characteristics are
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As mentioned above there are several theories that can explain the
negative correlation between leverage and the average level of R&D we observe
in a cross-section of firms. However it is an open question whether spending
on R&D, like ordinary investments, could be expected to be more volatile for
highly leveraged firms. There are good reasons why this is not necessarily
true. It should be noted that although both types of capital are inherently
quasi-fixed they differ crucially in a number of respects. First R&D projects
are often longlasting and it often lakes years before they lead to an
innovation. Second R&D investments are to a large extent firm specific which
explains why there is no second hand market. Actually only a direct competitor
of the firm may be interested in buying blueprints or hiring its highly
qualified engineers. Many R&D investments are literally embodied in the
engineers and firing them in order to survive an economic downturn could lead
to an immense loss of knowledge, which is not easy to recover after the
recession. Third R&D efforts are not directly related to the current
production of goods and services. Therefore a temporary decline in sales does
not imply that the firm needs less R&D during that period although for
instance some of its blue collar workers will be laid off. The R&D efforts are
to a large extent aimed at enhancing future production / sales possibilities
and decreasing unit costs. That is, R&D is a strategic factor, that is also
used to protect market shares by deterring entrants.
In this chapter we investigate the consequences of capital market
imperfections for the (speed of) adjustment of capital and R&D in particular
to the target stocks in more depth.88 ,, -i ,.^,...
4.3 Methodology
In this section we introduce two models that can serve as a workhorse for
testing the hypothesis that the speed of adjustment of P&E and R&D is higher
for firms that face higher agency costs of borrowing. The inference will start
on the basis of a simple partial adjustment (cost) model for each type of
capital. In order to avoid extreme heteroskedasticity — due to size
differences between firms — the model has been formulated in terms of
logarithms.
lnX = -u A. t + u X lnS + (1-A )lnX + f + u (3.1)
it 'l il Oil i I i I ill i iI
where w is an innovation, f is the fixed effect, X is capital of firm i of
i I i i ^
whatever kind and S is sales. The parameter (i is a productivity trend and
l/(i. is a scale parameter. A. denotes the speed of adjustment of capital and
can vary over time and across firms. A firm is said to adjust the stock of
capital quickly when A., is close to 1. For the purpose of testing a natural
way to proceed is to write X. as a function * of factors that influence the
agency costs and to substitute that expression for A. in equation (3.1). To
keep things simple let the adjustment speed function read as
A.,t = A.0 + A^LEVerage.^ + A^SIZE__ (+ A-^R&D int.^) * (3.2)
Note that this adjustment speed function is not restricted to lie between 0
and 1. We will also consider a logistic specification for A, that guarantees
that these restrictions are satisfied. However attention is primarily focused
on the signs of the coefficients of leverage and size. According to our
hypothesis A, should be a positive function of leverage and R&D intensity and
a negative function of size.
The second model that we will consider consists of the Euler equations
corresponding to the value maximization problem of a firm with possibly non-
constant returns to scale and interactive adjustment costs. Furthermore we
allow for the possibility that the firm operates in an output market that is
Coen (1971) modified the standard partial adjustment model for investment in
a similar way by allowing the adjustment speed to depend on cash flow.
R&D intensity is included as a source of agency costs that affects the speed
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characterized by monopolistic competition. The first order condition will
reflect the fact that knowledge is accumulated according to another rule than
the linear schedule thai is often assumed for physical capital.
We will now develop the model in its mathematical details. Abstracting
from issuance of new equity and omitting the subscript i of the firm, the
entrepreneur is assumed to maximize the present value
£ (PV ) = £ ( I y (CF + AB - (l-x)r B )\
r r i| 'i.s^ i+s i+s ^ i+s t+s-i'l
(3.3)
where y = fj. * (1+p )"' is the discount factor between period t and s and
p is the after tax required rate of return in period t+j, CF is the
cash flow gross of interest payments, B is debt, T is the corporate tax rate
and r is the market rate of interest in period t.
Maximization is subject to constraints on the accumulation of the
quasi-fixed factors, i.e. physical capital K and knowledge capital G . The
restriction for the stock of productive physical capital is standard :
K^ = (1-8*)K_ ^ + 1^ (3.4)
where I is gross investment in physical capital and 8 is the depreciation
rate. Note that the investments become productive immediately. For R&D we
adopt the law of motion used by Hall and Hayashi (1989), using R for R&D
expenditures
G = cG'^R * (3.5)
I 111!
This model can be interpreted as a knowledge production function. The
parameter v represents technological opportunity. Unlike the linear
accumulation schedule, this specification does not imply that more investment
today leads to less investment next period ceteris paribus ; it is consistent
with the empirical observation made by Hall, Griliches and Hausman (1986) that
log(R ) displays positive autocorrelation . The constant c in (3.5) depends
Klette (1994) p. 7 shows thai if the value function is not too concave in
the factors of production, then the growth of R&D expenditures is positively
related to the growth of the stock of knowledge capital.
For log(R ), which is a very persistent series, they find that anon the parameter V, a depreciation parameter of R&D 6 and a growth parameter
of R&D expenditures g (see Appendix 4.A).
Gross cash flow is defined by the following equation
CF = (Y ,e°)Y - p AC (N ,AN ,K ,1 ,G ,R )
- p*I - p*Z
where p (Y ,e°) denotes the inverse demand function that reads as
(3.6)
P. = W-0 = <*/ (3.7)
where e° is a demand shock and vjr is the elasticity of demand with respect to
the firms output Y.
Apart from quasi-fixed inputs the production function depends on variable
inputs like energy, materials as well as the length of the workweek. They are
comprised in the vector Z. N denotes labor. The stocks and flows of the inputs
(and the output) are premultiplied by their prices. We assume that the firm
has a Cobb-Douglas technology
a a a a
Y = a K "G °N "Z ^
1 0,11 t t I
(3.8)
Finally AC (.) measures the adjustment costs and is parameterized as follows
(3.9) AC (N ,AN ,K ,1 ,G ,R ) =










Before we give the Euler equations let us introduce three more symbols: C is
the variable costs of goods sold, S is sales and will be used as a proxy for
output and r| H a + a + a + a is the degree of returns to scale. The first
order conditions for a solution to the firm's objective (3.3), up to second
















with 9 = (1/c) ' c = (1+g)
PHYSICAL CAPITAL:












1 - (1 + (l-T)r )/(l+p ) = 0
(3.10c)
1 IAssuming that the Firm's decisions are based on rational expectations as
far as future variables are concerned, the equations that will be estimated
are obtained by substituting realizations plus prediction errors for these
variables and by imposing a normalization rules. After fixing some parameters
like depreciation rates and adding time dummies to take care of macroeconomic
phenomena and after differencing to remove heterogeneity in the mean, the
model can be estimated by applying the Generalized Method of Moments ' *.
To test the central hypothesis of this paper we let the adjustment
parameters of the first model depend on factors that are believed to influence
the height of the agency costs. With respect to the second model we will
follow a different procedure. The sample is split in two subsamples according
to leverage '. If the firm's medium leverage is below a certain percentile in
the industry it belongs to, its observations are assigned to the low-leverage
subsample '°, if not they are assigned to the other subsample. Next the model
is estimated on the basis of the whole sample while allowing the adjustment
parameters to differ across subsamples. For that matter it is practical to
define a dummy that is one if an observation is from the high-leverage
subsample and to add the adjustment variables multiplied by that dummy. Then
evaluating the financial accelerator hypothesis boils down to testing
null-restrictions.
It cannot be ruled out a priori that the coefficient of C (cost of goods
sold) varies across subsamples. Some game theoretic models on market behavior
purport that oligopolistic firms with high leverage ratios can sustain tacit
collusion only at relatively low markups on prices, e.g. Stenbacka (1992).
So far firms are assumed to respond symmetrically to improving and
deteriorating market conditions. For several reasons it is doubtful that this
is true. First descriptive statistics and results using econometric models,
e.g. Neft?i (1984) reveal that business cycles are asymmetric. The duration of
The choice of the values of the parameters that will be fixed will be
discussed hereafter along with the estimation results.
* The regression equations that have been estimated can be found in
Appendix 4.B.
Gilchrist (1990) estimates an Euler equation for physical capital on the
basis of subsamples that correspond to different categories of firmsize.
'" Leverage is defined as the ratio of the book value of debt over the book
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a contraction is shorter than the duration of a spell of prosperity.
Nevertheless recessions often start with sharp declines of the production
volume . Although one could argue that firing is the mirrorimage of hiring,
this does not hold analogously for capital of whatever kind. Many investment
projects are irreversible or, put differently, the outlay for such projects
should be considered as sunk cost. Unlike the workforce, the capital stock is
owned by the firm. Selling part of it, for instance because the firm faces
overcapacity during a recession, does not look like a wise policy in many
instances. The prices on the second hand market are likely to be low as
redundancy of capital will be widespread in the economy. Therefore net
investment is bounded from below by depreciation.
The existence of agency costs or more generally liquidity constraints
might add to asymmetries in the adjustment process over the business cycle.
The threat of bankruptcy may force a highly leveraged firm to respond more
quickly to a worsening of economic conditions. Sharpe (1994) finds a
significantly negative effect of firm size on the adjustment speed of labor
during a recession but no effect during an expansion.
To allow for the possibility of asymmetry in speed of adjustment between
downturns and upturns, model (3.1) will be extended. The parameters of the
terms that have been added are deviations from the values that adjustment
parameters take on in good times. The structural models are modified for the
same reason by adding all regressors multiplied by a recession dummy . To
investigate whether differences in adjustment behavior between firms are
mainly due to the combination of contraction and high leverage, the Euler
equations will be estimated again on the basis of redefined subsamples, where
the second subsample contains the observations of highly leveraged firms
during the recession years only.
It could be argued that a positive correlation between leverage and speed
of adjustment is due to the fact that a firm can only finance quick expansion
by issuing a lot of debt. By using lagged values of leverage and size, this
interpretation of the results is no longer possible.
See the volume on business cycles edited by Gordon (1986).
Chevalier and Scharf stein (1994) present evidence that supermarkets that are
liquidity constrained during recessions boost their nominal sales by raising
the markups.94
Another endogeneity issue arises because of the technological
relationship between output and inputs. To elicit the effect of a change in
sales due to changes in demand, equation (3.1) is estimated with instrumental
variables. The set of instruments includes, apart from lagged firm variables,
series that are informative about the phase of the business cycle like volume
of industrial production in the manufacturing sector, CPI, rate of capacity
utilization and the official discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York.
The data that are used in this study for inference are recorded at the
end of the fiscal year of firms. For a better analyis of phenomena due to the
recession, we take advantage of the fact that the fiscal year-ends of firms
fall into different months. The observations of the business cycle variables,
which are available at a semiannual frequency, are matched to the firm data.
4.4 Empirical Results
The models (3.1) and (3.11) have been estimated with firm data from the
Manufacturing Sector Masterfile (MSMF) which was created by Hall (1990a) and
relies on information collected by Compustat. In this study, we focus on firms
with their main activities in one of the following industries: chemicals
(Pharmaceuticals excluded) (SIC 28), Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics (soap) and
medical instruments (SIC 283, 284, 384), computing and office machines, radio,
television and communication equipment (SIC 357, 365-367) and electric
machines, electronics and scientific instruments (SIC 36,38). These industries
constitute the so-called scientific sector and have high R&D intensities. Most
of these industries (except perhaps part of SIC 28) produce durable goods and
are likely to display more cyclical behavior than the nondurables sector.
Therefore the phenomena we are interested in are expected to reveal themselves
more clearly in the sample we have chosen. On the other hand as the shares of
all firms in the dataset are traded at the stock exchange, asymmetric
information problems will not add much to other market imperfections.
For cleaning of the dataset, we refer to chapter 2. Firms that went
through major restructurings, like mergers, were dropped from the dataset.
Because the panel was left unbalanced, biases due to attrition were not
exacerbated.
Producer price information was obtained at the 4 digit SIC level from the
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prices of fixed capital at the 3 digit level. For the construction of the
relative price of capital goods, the (replacement) value of the capital stock
and the measurement and sources of some other series we refer to Whited
(1992).
The R&D stock in the dataset has been constructed according to the rule
G = (1-8 ) G +R rather than to the version with a delivery lag of one
period (A.3), which underlies the derivation of the formula for the
accumulation constant c. Therefore G in the structural model will be measured
i
by the lagged series (G ) from the dataset. The R&D intensity is measured as
the ratio of the R&D stock to sales. This measure is more stable than the one
that is based on expenditures and therefore more likely to tell us something
about the long run R&D policy of the firm.
The sample period is 1978-1987. Waves preceding 1978 were used for the
calculation of instruments. The sample period includes the recession(s) in the
early eighties. They cover the period 1980-1982 almost entirely, except for a
few months in 1981. The recession of 1980 was preceded by a period of tight
money. Therefore observations of the fiscal years ending in 1980-1982 are
assigned to the recession subsample. The subsample of highly leveraged firms
has been constructed by comparing the firm's medium leverage to the medium
leverage of other firms in the industry it belongs to. Thirty percent of the
firms with the highest leverage are assigned to one subsample, the remainder
of the sample constitutes the other subsample.
Table 1 and figure 2 describe the cross-sectional distribution of the
main variables as well as the development of some series that are related to
agency costs over time. Note that also in our sample the interest coverage
rate increased considerably in the mid 1980s. Furthermore after the recession
of 1982 the medium leverage did not decrease, although the value of the
average firm rose sharply. The dramatic changes in the capital structures took
place in the second half of the 1980s, while our sample ends in 1987. However
as long as the financial-real interactions we are studying here are stable
across business cycles, the results obtained are informative with regard to
what happened after 1987.
The series of the sources of agency costs, viz, firm size, leverage,
interest coverage ratio and R&D intensity have been normalized so that the
average value for each characteristic in the relevant (sub-)sample is zero.




































































' The underlying sample has 1014 observations.
the medians have been computed for 211 firms.
LEV is the net leverage ratio, i.e. the book value
of total debt over assets, both net of short-term assets.
INTIR is the interest coverage ratio, that is
interest expense divided by income available for common.
* SIZE is logarithm of net value of plant adjusted for
for inflation.
' Std. dev. is standard deviation, which could be computed
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See Appendix 4.B for Regression Equations and Instruments.
#Obs. 1014, # Firms 211 Period 1978-1987, Time and Industry Dummies have been
added, HAC Standard Errors below Estimates, Distance Tests (D.T.) for p =1
and Joint Significance of Asymmetry Regressors. AP. are deviations from
values of parameters during expansion stage of the business cycle.Ch. 4 CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 99
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See Appendix 4.B for Regression Equations and Instruments.
#Obs. 1014, # Firms 211 Period 1978-1987, Time and Industry Dummies have been
added, HAC Standard Errors below Estimates, Distance Tests (D.T.) for Joint
Significance of Asymmetry Regressors, P = 1 et cetera are deviations
from values of parameters during expansion stage of the business cycle.100
The set of instruments used for estimating (3.1) consists of the second
lags of leverage and size and R&D intensity, their products with AS /S
I /K or R /G and second and third lags of I /K or R/G ,
l-2t-3 1-2 1-3 " 1 I - 1 111
AS /S and the business cycle indicators. When estimating the structural
equations only lagged series of the regressors and the dependent variable were
used as instruments. Both the regressors and the instruments were multiplied
by the regime dummies when testing for the constancy of parameters ' .
4.4.7 Eirimarion /?««/«/or ffe Fartta/ Arf/urfmen/
Tables 2A and 2B show GMM estimates for two versions of the partial
adjustment model (3.1). The first column is based on the original model, while
the second column corresponds to the model that allows for asymmetry between
expansions and contractions. Since leverage or size might affect the level of
investment directly, the restrictions from the adjustment speed function (3.2)
were not imposed on the coefficients of the sources of agency costs when they
enter separately. The results presented are obtained after first differencing
the original equation in (3.1) twice (table 2A) and only once (table 2B) to
deal with heterogeneity in the mean and depreciation rates. Furthermore the
nominal series were not deflated and capital is measured by the NPLANT series
from MSMF.
Before we discuss the coefficients of size and leverage, we note that the
elasticity of scale parameter, which would equal 1 under constant returns to
scale (CRS), is poorly estimated in table 2A. On the other hand the adjustment
speed of the average firm is highly significant but rather high again when the
estimates are obtained after taking first differences twice. Since both CRS
cannot be rejected and the implied adjustment speeds look more reasonble for
the once differenced version, we prefer the results in table 2B. The results
indicate that only ordinary investment depends on leverage. In table 2A the
adjustment speed of physical capital is higher for highly leveraged firms as
predicted by the theory. The relation between leverage and the adjustment
speed is constant across different phases of the business cycle. When looking
at table 2B, we find that leverage has a negative effect on the adjustment
speed, but if we allow for asymmetry the sign of the effect is reversed during
" The complete lists of instruments can be found in Appendix 4.B below the
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a recession. The size of the firm has an impact on boih ordinary and R&D
investment in a direct way and through the adjustment speed. The sign of the
effect is predominantly negative, with the exception of the adjustment speed
of R&D during the expansion (table 2A).
Now focusing on table 2B only, we conclude from the values of the test
statistics and the implied t-ratios that R&D is not affected by leverage and
size. There is evidence for asymmetry in ihe adjustment speed of R&D but this
is not related to size or leverage effects, which casts doubt on the financial
accelerator theory. The (symmetric) size effect that was found for physical
capital can be perfectly explained by the idea that smaller firms are just
more flexible.
The linear specification for the adjustment speed function may be
problematic when the implied speed is negative or higher than one for some
observations. To check the robustness of the results discussed above, we
reestimated the models in first differences, with a logistic specification for
the adjustment speed (3.2') . We also considered more parsimonious speci-
fications than the general symmetric and asymmetric models reported on in
table 2B. The most informative results are shown in table 2C for R&D and in
table 2D for physical capital. Looking at table 2C, we find that in the
symmetric case the scale parameter (3 is (still) close to zero, in fact even
negative, and very imprecisely estimated. The preferred, asymmetric, model is
shown in the last column, which confirms our conclusions based on table 2B:
there is a difference in the speed of adjustment across stages of the business
cycle, but that is not related to agency costs considerations. Interestingly,
the size effects and the direct leverage effect in the symmetric model —
indeed in agreement with what one might expect ' — are no longer significant
once asymmetry is allowed for. The story told by table 2B about physical
capital is supported by the results in table 2D ": smaller firms are more
flexible, and there is no evidence of asymmetrical effects.
The absense of an effect of leverage on R&D spending could be due to the
This specification can be found in appendix 4.B.
One might entertain the hypotheses that smaller firms are more flexible and
invest more because they are still growing, and that leverage has a depressing
effect on investment.
The iterations of the estimation procedure for the most general asymmetric
specification did not converge due to numerical problems.102
Table He
;:>• GMM Estimation Results model (3.1,3.2') *


















































































































See Appendix 4.B for Regression Equations and Instruments. Program: TSP
# Obs. 1014, # Firms 211 Period 1978-1987. See also notes to table lib.
Sargan-1 is based on optimal weighting matrix, Sargan-2 on other weighting ma-
trix which is held constant across different models tested in ASYM. columns.Ch. 4 CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFBCTIONS AND THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 103
Table lid
GMM Estimation Results model (3.1,3.20 "
























































See Appendix 4.B for








































































Equations and Instruments. Program: TSP
1978-1987. See also notes to table He.104
fact that leverage and debt capacity of a firm are likely to be positvely
correlated. In that case, omitting the latter would result in underestimating
the effect of leverage. However we will control for debt capacity to some
extent in the structural approach by splitting the sample on the basis of
thresholds for debt that are defined at the industrial level.
On the other hand it could well be true that leverage does not affect R&D
spending. As we argued above R&D doesn't contribute directly to production but
is a long term activity which takes place at a rather constant rate as changes
are costly. The marginal effectiveness of R&D will fluctuate less over the
business cycle than that of labor given the production capacity of the firm.
Therefore highly leveraged firms that face the threat of financial distress
during a recession are more likely to reduce spending on inputs such as labor.
The effect of firm size on the adjustment speed of the firm with respect
to R&D is somewhat puzzling. According to Jensen (1986) the executives of
large mature firms that have control over large free cash flows in some cases
waste them by investing in 'status symbols' like luxurious offices. Overly
large R&D departments also belong to this category.
The results that imply that smaller firms invest at a higher rate both in
R&D and physical capital could be attributed to the fact that they are still
growing.
After replacing leverage by the interest coverage ratio in the model, we
obtained results that were not very different. When this ratio takes on a high
value, firms adjust their stock of knowledge more rapidly according to the
version of the model that was differenced twice. In many cases the adjustment
speed is above one which casts doubts on these results. Furthermore the R&D
intensity of the firm did not affect the speed of adjustment of physical
capital.
Finally the adjustment speed to the optimal stocks has been calculated
for four typical firms with low/high leverage and firm size. Tables 3A and 3B
show the results.
4.4.2 /?citt/K O/jfai/iec/ /or /Ae £«/er
Although the results based on the simple model are informative we put
more faith in those obtained with a structural model. The estimates of the
Euler equations (3.10a,b) can be found in table 4. Since interacting
adjustment cost terms were found to be negligible, we maintained <(> =0. Since
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the firm data where recorded at the end of its fiscal year, which is chosen by
the firm, they could not be matched exactly with the price information. This
could spoil our estimates when we would take first differences to get rid of
fixed effects. On the other hand many observations will be lost when the
analysis is based on long differences of the series. Therefore we have decided
to estimate the model using second differences. The choice of the instruments
allows for a MA(1) error process due to measurement error. For the measurement
of the stock of physical capital we estimated its replacement value according
to the procedure given in Salinger and Summers (1981). Data requirements for
the measurement of depreciation rates and the capital stock as well as the
prices reduced the number of observations considerably.
Although we have paid much attention to measurement, specification and
timing issues, the results are rather weak. In the benchmark model for
ordinary investment the estimates have the right sign. The coefficient of the
variable costs has a plausible value but the adjustment cost parameter is
insignificant. The specification where the adjustment speed and the markup
depends on leverage yields a much higher value for the Wald statistic for
exclusion restrictions. This should be attributed to the fact that the
coefficient of the variable costs varies across leverage classes.
The model that assumes asymmetric effects across the different phases of
the business cycle fares much better. The results indicate that adjustment of
the capital stock is faster during a recession.
The model for R&D was multiplied by (R /G )'" before adding time
dummies. We fixed 5^ at 0.15, g at 0.05 and v at 0.20. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas
technology, the measurement of the marginal productivity of R&D boils down to
estimation of its elasticity w.r.t. output. Hall (1993) computed estimates of
this parameter using a production function approach and found for some
industries in the scientific sector in the 1981-1985 period values close to
zero and even negative values. This co«W be due to a variety of problems. Two
potential causes are negligence of dynamics and heterogeneity in the
elasticities w.r.t. output. The cost share of R&D differs considerably across
firms. Therefore the R&D model was also estimated with the R&D elasticity
replaced by its cost share. Because we wanted to allow for the possibility of
absense of adjustment costs, we used sales as LHS variable. The cost of goods
sold variable is likely to explain a large part of sales, leaving insufficient
information to identify the adjustment parameter of R&D. To circumvent this
problem, we decided to drop the cost of goods sold variable from the model.106
Table Ilia
Adjustment Speed based on model (3.1, 3.2)
(implied by estimates of 2 x differenced version)
A. = A. 4
i 1 0

















































The adjustment speed function is evaluated in ± 1
standard deviation of the leverage and firm size
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Table Illb
Adjustment Speed based on model (3.1, 3.2)




















































The adjustment speed function is evaluated in ± 1
standard deviation of the leverage and firm size
respectively. Note that the average values are 0.Since results didn't improve/change when the specification that takes the
heterogeneity of the R&D elasticity into account was used, we report in table
4 the results for the basic version. The estimates for the model without dummy
interaction are insignificant. Only the model that allows for asymmetrical
behavior across the business cycle performs better. The parameters have the
right sign and their order of magnitude seems plausible. Again we find that
the adjustment speed is significantly higher during a recession. Because the
instruments are based on observations from at least three periods (years) ago,
the high second order serial correlation does not lead to inconsistency of the
estimates.
Finally when estimating the model for two subsamples with one subsample
containing the highly leveraged firms during the recession and the other sub-
sample the remaining observations, the test statistics indicated that the
parameters we are interested in are far from significantly different from
zero.
4.5 Conclusions
In this paper we have put the financial accelerator hypothesis to the
test once more. However we hardly found evidence in support of this theory.
The finding that smaller firms adjust faster to new conditions could reflect
that their technology is more flexible. Moreover, leverage did not affect
ordinary investment and R&D at all, even when we made an attempt to control
for debt capacity. However, the results suggested that there are differences
in the adjustment processes of both ordinary and knowledge capital across
stages of the business cycle.
The absense of an (depressing) effect of leverage on investment should be
reassuring for the policymakers. However, most of the increase in corporate
leverage took place after 1987, the end of the sample period. A substantial
part of this increase was related to takeovers, buy-outs and other corporate
restructuring activities. This in turn suggests that many firms still could
afford to increase their leverage, without immediately getting into financial
distress after an adverse shock to the economy.
Some reservations concerning the conclusion that firms adjust their
stocks of capital faster during a recession are in place. One could argue that
in the structural models the true marginal productivity of capital will only
be measured correctly during an expansion, when the firm operates at fullCh. 4 CAPITAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 109
capacity. By adopting the Cobb-Douglas specification for the technology of the
firm, we measure the marginal productivity of an input by its average
productivity. This approach is likely to overestimate the marginal
productivity during a recession. Moreover, during a recession, the
Cobb-Douglas formula of the marginal productivity in a way already accounts
for (convex) adjustment costs: since the formula overestimates marginal pro-
ductivity, it implies that it is optimal to adjust the capital stock downward
to a lesser extent than the true marginal productivity would imply. In other
words, the 'smoothed' marginal productivity series induces the same behavior
in the series of the stock of capital. When the true adjustment cost function
is stable over time, the misspecification of marginal productivity leads to
overestimating the speed of adjustment during the recession. On the other
hand, not the actual marginal productivity, but the expected marginal
productivity of capital matters. Since it is difficult to predict the state of
the economy more than one year ahead, the average productivity series might
not be a bad proxy for the expected marginal productivity after all when there
is a considerable lag between the decision to invest and the time at which the
investment becomes productive.
The finding for the partial adjustment model for R&D that the adjustment
speed of R&D is higher during a recession, could also be interpreted in at
least one other way. It might just be a confirmation of the finding of Meyer
and Kuh (1957), that investment is more sensitive to liquidity during a
downturn of the economy.
We believe that the fragility of the results for the Euler equation for
R&D is partly related to the problems that exist with respect to the
measurement of the stock of R&D. The true stock of knowledge only includes
successful R&D. The way we constructed the stock of knowledge, namely by
applying the perpetual inventory method to the series of R&D expenditures,
assumes that all R&D activities have the same rate of success. In reality, the
invention process is of a highly stochastic nature. Furthermore, the stock
of knowledge should also include spillovers from other firms etcetera.
To get a better understanding of the dynamics of the R&D investment
decision, we should look for better measures of its productivity. Much is
still unkown about the lags between investment in R&D and the results.
Furthermore, although R&D activities are eventually aimed at increasing the
value (sales) of the firm, investment in R&D might be driven/better explained
by a short term measure of success of R&D, for instance patents.110
Table IV
































































































































































See Appendix 4.B for Regression Equations and Instruments.
# Obs.321, # Firms 55 Period 1978-1986, Time and Regime Dummies have been in-
cluded, HAC Standard Errors between parentheses, Wald Test for joint
significance of nontrivial regressors, Distance Test for Constancy of Para-
meters across Regimes, m is test for autocorrelation of i-th order - N(0,1).
A^ , S^ are deviations from values of parameters calculated for the
expansion stage of the business cycle and high leverage subsample
respectively.Appendix 4.A: Derivation of the formula of the constant c in (3.5) and (3.10a)
It is assumed in the model that R&D capital obeys the following transition
equation '*''* ' ' '*'•"
G = cG' ^R ^ (A.I)
i iiti
Now suppose that R&D expenditures grow at rate g
R^ = (l+g)'R,, (A.2)
and that the R&D stock series from the dataset has been constructed according
to
G^ = (1-8°) G^ ,+ R_ , (A.3)
Solving (A.3) recursively and using (A.2) yields
(l+g)'R for large t (A.4)
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Appendix 4.B: Regression Equations and Instruments
Model (after taking first differences):
AlnX = -(1 X + n X AlnS + (1-X )AlnX + Au
it "lit ^0 i I iI ^ i I' ill iI
(3.1)
X = X + X LEVerage + X SIZE
it 0 1 it 2 il
(3.2)
(3.2')
Define ML s Leverage, MS = Firmsize (deviations from the sample mean).


















1 - P - (3 ML - (3 MS
^4*2 t-2 ^3 t • 2
+ time and industry dummies = w + y w
(The error term of the twice differenced regression equation is
also assumed to follow a MA(1) process)
Instruments:
Define ML = Leverage, MS = Firmsize (deviations from the sample mean),
INDP = Industrial production, CAPUT = Capacity utilization,
FEDR s Discount rate of Federal Res. Bank of NY, CPI = Inflation rate.
R/G ^, R /G ^ , ML j, MS ^, AS ^/S ^, AS^ /S ^, ML^x (AS ^/S ^),
MS ^x (AS ^/S ^), INDP .,, CAPUT ^, FEDR ^, CPI ^, INDP ^, CAPUT ^
FEDR , CPI , same variables as above x recession dummy,







time dummies + regime dummy + firm dummies + w + y w
In the derivation of the estimating equation,




with 6 = (1/c)"^ c = (1+g)
Instruments :
8° = 0.15, v = 0.20, g = 0.05.
3,
same instruments as above x regime dummy,
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PHYSICAL CAPITAL: (3.10b')
d-5") p
•< (1-8^) K K 1
time dummies + regime dummy + firm dummy + w +yw + yw
* ..„ •„ ..„ " 1/d-x)
Instruments :
same instruments as above x regime dummy, regime dummy and time dummies.116Chapter 5
The Role of Working Capital in
the Investment Process
5.1 Introduction
For investment firms rely to a large extent on internal finance
especially those firms for which external finance is either too expensive or
just not available. By retaining cash flows, firms accumulate the financial
funds needed for investment. A considerable share of the financial assets that
firms hold takes the form of so-called working capital, which consists of
short term assets and short term liabilities. Working capital is needed for
the day-to-day financial operation of the firm and as such is an important
indicator of the liquidity of the firm.
In this chapter we investigate the sensitivity of investment in both
physical capital and R&D to the presence of liquidity constraints. We assess
the severity of underinvestment due to a lack of internal funds by looking at
(changes in) the stock of working capital.
We derive within a formal theoretical framework of a value maximizing
firm that is subject to financial constraints, the relationship between
working capital and the change in the shadow value of funds. When estimating
the Euler equations for investment and R&D we exploit this relationship to
allow for heterogeneity in behavior due to changes in liquidity over time.
Earlier papers, e.g. by Hall (1991) and Bond and Meghir (1994), have split the
sample on the basis of dividend payout ratios or information on share issues.
We see several advantages to our procedure for measuring (changes in) the
liquidity of the firm, which uses information on working capital, over other
criteria. First, working capital is a continuous indicator of liquidity while
share issues take place in a discrete fashion. Second dividends are not just
the residual of cash flow that remains after all other (financial) decisions
have been taken. Firms choose a dividend policy for a rather long period and
are reluctant to deviate from it; a cut in dividends is often interpreted as a118
bad signal about the prospects of the firm which in turn can result in a rise
in the cost of external finance. Thus dividends reflect the liquidity of the
firm only to a limited extent and are less variable than working capital.
However like dividends, the amount of working capital that a firm holds is
determined by several (firm and industry specific) considerations and not just
by investment plans. This reduces the quality of working capital as an
indicator of liquidity of the firm and has implications for the econometric
strategy that we employ. Moreover, working capital is the sum of various
components, some of which are more under control of the firm than others. The
various definitions of working capital that are encountered in the literature
actually give a different picture of the liquidity of the firm.
In addition to Euler equations we estimate a version of a Q model, that
allows for different investment behavior across financial regimes. By using a
different approach than others did, namely the endogenous switching regression
methodology, our results add to the existing small empirical literature that
focuses on the relationship between the accumulation of working capital and
investment and is based on the Q model: we will split the sample by the sign
of the change in working capital and test for differences between the
estimates of the parameters which are obtained for the subsamples.
The sample we employ for the inference consists of data from U.S. firms
in the scientific sector. This sample allows us to study investment in R&D.
Furthermore as the firms in the sample are R&D intensive, they face higher
cost of external finance and therefore will rely more heavily on internal
funds. This feature of the sample makes it especially suitable to investigate
the role of working capital in the investment process.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2 we discuss the role of
working capital within the firm and in particular in the investment process in
more detail. In section 3 we outline the econometric framework and specify the
hypotheses that we intend to test. Section 4 describes the sources of the data
we used and the properties of the data by means of simple statistics. Section
5 then presents the empirical results and discusses them. Section 6 concludes.
5.2 The Role of Working Capital in the Investment Process
For operating a firm working capital is as crucial as fixed capital. It
is the net amount of short term assets — current assets minus current
liabilities — of the firm which gives it some latitude at several activities.THE ROLE OF WORKING CAPITAL IN THE INVESTMENT PROCESS 119
For instance, by holding inventories at various stages of the production
process the firm can run larger batches and is less vulnerable to strikes, and
the presence of accounts receivable on the balance sheet reflects the fact
that the firm is willing to sell goods to customers that are solvent but short
of cash.
Working capital is a prime measure of liquidity of the firm. Current
assets include financial assets such as cash money and accounts receivable but
also real assets such as inventories since it is thought that they can
relatively easily be converted into cash. Current liabilities consist of
(accounts) payable(s) and short term debt.
The various parts of working capital display their own patterns over the
business cycle. When a firm is experiencing a negative shock to demand, its
inventories of final products will generally rise. Later on, when it becomes
clear that this demand shock was the beginning of a recession and the firm is
in financial distress, the firm will try to shed inventories of all kinds ',
to collect accounts receivable, and try to postpone payments of debts. That
is, as the recession gets worse, the liquidity of firms measured as working
capital decreases as does cash flow. At the aggregate level of the
manufacturing sector both in 1975 and in 1982 working capital declined
sharply; some components, such as accounts receivables and inventories even
fell considerably relative to sales.
The decline in working capital affects investment directly since it
implies a fall in internal funds, and indirectly by raising the cost of
external funds. Bemanke and Gertler (1988) and Gertler (1989) argue that the
agency cost of external finance depends on the quality of the balance sheet of
the firm. When its liquidity decreases or when prospects concerning future
sales deteriorate, the cost of external finance rises. Eckstein and Sinai
(1986) found that at the end of the recession and at the beginning of a
recovery firms try to rebuild their debt capacity by accumulating short term
financial assets in order to be able to borrow at acceptable rates when they
need funds for investment. According to them this reliquefication
characterizes a separate phase of the business cycle that precedes the period
in which firms start to invest again.
A firm will also reduce inventories of materials during the recession as it
will produce less.120
It is conceivable that firms also save working capital in order to make
sure that it can carry out an investment plan that takes years without
interruption due to lack of cash.
Depending on the structure of the adjustment costs, working capital has
still another effect on the investment process beyond those mentioned above.
It will be used to smooth investments in the case of convex adjustment costs.
If a fixed costs component dominates, investments decisions will seem
irreversible. As Whited (1991) points out the height of the opportunity costs
of reversing the investment decision varies with the cost of external finance
which in turn depends on the availability of working capital inter alia. From
the irreversability literature * we know that the higher the sunk costs, the
longer a firm will wait to execute its investment plan ceteris paribus. Thus
the size of the stock of working capital influences the timing (delay) of
investment. Notice that working capital can be used for smoothing investment
because it is in contrast to physical capital perfectly reversible.
The amount of working capital that firms will hold for instance in order
to make sure that investment plans don't have to be interrupted depends among
other things on their reputation in capital markets. For firms that are
regarded as being of both high long term and high short term credit quality,
Calomiris et al. (1994) find that they have lower stocks of inventories and
financial working capital and in addition that these stocks are less sensitive
to cash flow fluctuations. The latter finding is interpreted by them as
follows. Firms of higher credit quality don't need to accumulate working
capital as a buffer against fluctuations in cash flow as they can easily
obtain external funds at favorable terms. Furthermore they show that given a
high (long term) bond rating, only firms of large size, with low earnings
variance, high cash flows and/or large stocks of liquid assets have access to
the commercial paper market. The former characteristics however seem
sufficient for firms to be able to issue commercial paper successfully given
the fact that they have less working capital on average.
The firm controls the various components of working capital to a
different extent. In general it will have more control over inventories of
materials than over inventories of finished products or accounts receivable.
Moreover, the bank might set a limit to short term debt or demand a minimum
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level of cash. As a consequence the interpretation of working capital as a
measure of liquidity depends crucially on its definition. For instance high
working capital defined as cash minus short term debt, might actually be a
sign of low liquidity when it reflects restrictions imposed by the bank.
The empirical literature on the interaction between investment and
decisions on working capital we are aware of is very limited. Whited (1991)
put the reliquefication theory of Eckstein and Sinai to a test. Allowing
coefficients to vary over time and controlling for demand by including output,
she found that lags of working capital contributed significantly to a Q
regression of investment and that in accordance with the theory investment was
especially sensitive to the level of working capital just after the trough
of the business cycle (in 1983). Moreover when she split the sample using the
criterion of whether firms have a bond rating from Moody's or not, this
particular pattern in the coefficient of working capital was only found for
firms of low credit quality. Fazzari and Petersen (1994) view working capital
as a use of funds which is competing with fixed investment but also as a means
(source) to smooth investment such that fluctuations in cash flow will not be
transmitted fully to investment. Their empirical results indicate that when in
addition to cash flow, the (simultaneous) change in working capital enters a Q
regression model of ordinary investment, the coefficient of cash flow rises
while the sign of the coefficient of the investment in working capital is
negative. This should not be interpreted as evidence that investment and the
change in working capital are negatively correlated. Their findings are
consistent with the following interpretation. The change in working capital
takes out (part of) the transitory component of cash flow such that the
permanent component remains which determines investment primarily (through the
liquidity effect).
In fact, if a firm is liquidity constrained, a positive (negative) shock
to cash flow will increase (decrease) both the stock of working capital and
investment. If the shock is transitory, the extent of investment smoothing
determines the actual size of the change in working capital. If the shock was
negative (and transitory), the firm will not reduce working capital when it
has reached some minimum level necessary for operating the firm but instead
reduce investment more.
Whited measures working capital as current assets minus inventories, re-
ceivables and short term debt including the current portion of long term debt.122 .^.,,»M I,-;,,.,- • •
5.3 The Econometric Framework
To study the role of working capital in the investment process, we
calculate the correlations between financial working capital and ordinary
investment as well as R&D, and estimate reduced form and structural models to
test specific theoretical assumptions concerning their interrelation. More in
particular we are interested in the signs of the simple correlations between
some key variables of the firm and their patterns over time. That information
can throw some light on questions as to whether working capital is a
(temporary) depository of funds kept to obtain external finance at lower rates
or to smooth investment, that is to act as a buffer to smooth out fluctuations
in cash flow (or other sources of funds), or merely a use of funds competing
with investment. In the former case we expect a positive correlation between
changes in working capital and changes in sales and a (slightly) positive
correlation between investment and changes in working capital, while in the
latter case the negative correlation that is inherent in competition (for
funds in this case) dominates the relation between working capital and
investment. If working capital is held for precautionary reasons, for instance
in order to make sure that investment projects can be completed, changes in
sales and working capital might be negatively correlated, especially when
changes in sales persist over time.
The relationships between ordinary investment, R&D and changes in
financial working capital are further investigated on the basis of two models
that are widely used in empirical economics to explain investment: the Q model
and "the Euler equation" model. They are related to each other as the first is
obtained by solving the Euler equation forward. However, the way in which the
expected present value of the discounted stream of marginal profits (marginal
Q) is measured distinguishes the models from each other: by using information
from the financial markets, expectations are measured directly rather than
dealt with in an econometric way.
In sub-section 5.3.1 we derive a version of the Euler equations for phy-
sical capital and R&D that allows for changes in liquidity over time. In the
next sub-section we outline an estimation strategy for Q models of investment
that involves a split of the sample according to whether the liquidity of the
Below by working capital we mean financial working capital as it was
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firm improves or not. In both models, liquidity is measured by the shadow
value of funds, which is unobservable. However, in sub-section 5.3.1 we will
establish a link between the changes in liquidity and working capital, which
is instrumental for estimating both types of models. The exposition of the
models, that will be used to investigate the role of working capital in the
investment process, is followed by a discussion of econometric problems that
have to be dealt with at the estimation stage. First we give our definition of
financial working capital
W^ = CASH - STDEBT^ (3.1)
that is, financial working capital equals cash, short term investments, and
prepaid expenses less short term debt and the current portion of long term
debt. Like Whited (1991), we exclude both receivables and payables from the
definition. Financial working capital, as we define it, is a better variable
to stratify by, because changes in inventories are determined by many
(nonfinancial) considerations, such as optimization of the production process
by producing in bunches for instance, and unexpected shocks in demand.
Furthermore to the extent that the firm controls net receivables, they are not
only used as a financial buffer but also to further sales.
5.J.7
In this subsection we derive the Euler equation models for investment and
R&D and we explicitly establish their relation with working capital. The firm
is assumed to maximize the expected value of the discounted stream of
dividends subject to accumulation constraints on the stocks of capital and
financial constraints. One constraint demands that working capital does not
get below some minimum level W . This value can be thought of as the minimum
amount that is necessary to run the firm or a lower bound that is stipulated
in the debt contract with the bank. The dividends D are given by
D = (l-x)(ri(K ,G ) - AC (I ,K ,G ,R ) - AGC(B ,K ,G )B - p R ) + (3.2)
t it t i t i t t t t i t i
AB + V" - AW - p*I + A(PAYOTH - RECEIV - INV )
ii I'll i ti
where Fl (.) is the long run revenue function, AC (.) the adjustment cost















stock of knowledge (R&D) capital at the end of period t
stock of physical capital at the end of period t
R&D expenditure during period t
ordinary investment during period t
sales at the end of period t
outstanding long term debt at the end of period t
dividends paid during period t
new shares during period t
(financial) working capital at the end of period t
(total) inventories at the end of period t
cash at the end of period t
accounts receivable at the end of period t
short term debt at the end of period t
accounts payable and other short term liabilities (t)
function and AGC (.) the interest rate schedule. They will be specified below.
T is the corporate tax rate. Table 1 gives a list of definitions of the varia-
bles used, p° and p* are the real costs of knowledge and physical capital. The
last term in the flow of funds constraint (3.2) containts the variables that
we left out from our definition of working capital. We will assume that they
do not affect the value of the firm and can be ignored in the analysis.
The firm's maximization problem can now be stated as follows




subject to (3.2) and the following constraints
I_ = K_-(l-5*) K^, ,
R_ = G_- (1-8°) G^ ,
B = AB + B
t i i-i
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where p is the investor's required after-tax rate of return, co is the capital
gains tax rate and q is the personal income tax rate. This maximization
problem assumes that when the shareholders issue new shares to the company,
they must pay a premium H in the form of a decrease in value of their existing
shares, because of the existence of 'lemons' in the equity market (see
Akerlof, 1970). The first column of (3.4) shows the current value Langrange or
Kuhn-Tucker multipliers corresponding to the constraints. |i is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with (3.2). The transition equations for B and W hold
trivially but are included for the sake of completeness. Before we give the
first order conditions, we specify the revenue function, the adjustment cost
function and the interest rate schedule.
The long run revenue function is given by
it tt 0, i t t
Adjustment cost function
AC(I ,K ,1 ,R ) = i <(> (I /K - c )* K + - <|> (R /G - c )* G (3.6)
till 2KttK t 2G ttG l
Interest rate schedule (agency cost function)
AOUb ,K ,u I = L + - Is + s K /O I n /IN. (J./J
i t i 0 2 TC ^G i i t t
The long run revenue function corresponds to a Cobb-Douglas technology. As the
revenue elasticities do not have to add up to one, it allows for nonconstant
returns to scale and the possibility that the firm has some market power in
the output market. The specification that we choose to measure the adjustment
costs is ubiquitously in the literature. In the interest rate schedule the
cost of debt is assumed to depend on the importance of agency costs
considerations. The higher the debt, the more likely that a firm defaults.
Therefore bondholders will demand a higher risk premium as debt increases.
Furthermore when most of the firm's assets are intangible, it will have less
collateral to offer to the bank or any other creditor that can be sold in case
of a bankruptcy. Thus we expect that £ is negative and that the other
coefficients in AGC(.) are positive and also that [£ + £ K /G ] is positive.
K G t t
The first order conditions for the control variables we are interested in I ,
R , V", D , AB , and AW are the following
tiii i °yaI^) + p* ] = 0 (3.8a)
° = 0 (3.8b)
° (3.8c)
*•>>,= ° *.•. =*,•.<* +T?S>' (3.8d)
= 0 (3.8e)
= 0 (3.8Q
The first order conditions for the state variables K , G , B , and W are
t t i t
(after eliminating X* , A. , ^ , and £* using equations (3.8a,b,e,f) )
+ s = w
I i t
(1 - (1-x) [^ + [^ + ^ K/G_] B^/KJ ) (l + jL ) Jj- = l (3.9c)
t+i
or
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= -1/ji^ < 0 (3.10)
To understand the implications of the model, we will give an interpretation of
some of the first order conditions, notably those pertaining to the financial
variables (3.8c,d) and (3.9c,d).
When W equals the lowerbound W , the shadow value of working capital is
negative. The more the operation of the firm is hampered by the constraint on
working capital, the lower T) becomes. It follows from (3.10) that when T)
decreases, next year's investment becomes more sensitive to the marginal
profit of last year (the term between brackets in 3.9a,b).
Equations (3.8c) and (3.8d) give rise to (at most) four financial regimes:
1 d > 0 and v = 0 : no dividends and issue of new shares
2 d > 0 and v > 0 : no dividends and no new shares
3 d = 0 and v > 0 : dividends and no new shares
4 d = 0 and v = 0 : dividends and issue of new shares
The fourth regime is not feasible as long as q > (0 and E > 0 which was the
case in the period in which the observations were collected that will be used
for the inference.
Note that (l-q)/(l-co) < p < 1 + H . When a firm ceases to pay dividends
or starts to issue new shares, p /p. drops below one and investment becomes
less sensitive to last period's marginal profit. Also when the firm is in the
second regime in two adjacent periods, ji /fa can fall below one : when the
liquidity of the firm decreases, p. increases.
According to (3.8d) the value of a dollar inside dividend paying firms is
less than a dollar, that is p. is at its minimum level (1 -q)/( 1 -(0) < 1. Due to
tax laws, which say that the rate of personal income taxes is higher than the
capital gains tax rate, funds are trapped within the firm when (l-q)/(l-co) < p.
< 1 (see Auerbach, 1984): it is not in the interest of the shareholders to pay
dividends, although the firm does not have good investment opportunities.
According to Jensen (1986) the availability of these so-called free cash flows
(funds for which p. < 1 holds) might lead to overinvestment. Only in case p > 1
the firm is liquidity constrained: a dollar invested in the firm would yield
more than a dollar.128
Equation (3.9d') suggests that the shadow price of the flow of funds
constraint (3.2) (p.) remains constant (thus )i /(I < 1) when the working
capital constraint was easily satisfied in period t-1. Since working capital
above the minimum level W hardly yields any income to the firm (in fact not
at all according to our model), it will be used to lower the debt burden. Even
if the firm has no debt, as long as £ the intercept in the interest rate
schedule is positive, r) will be negative and W equals W . In other words
changes in W reflect changes in W .
The Euler equations (3.9a) and (3.9b) cannot be estimated as they contain
the unobserved ratio of shadow values p. /ji . However the other restrictions
provide some information on their probable value. For example the first order
condition for debt (3.9c) was exploited by Whited (1992) '. We will focus on
(3.9d). However the shadow value of working capital constraint is also
unobservable. It will be related to observables in the spirit of MaCurdy's
(1981) approach '. We hypothesize that T) depends on the value of W * . The
sign of this relationship is ultimately an empirical matter, but we expect it
to be negative. An (forced) increase in working capital — for example
demanded by the bank — hurts more when a firm already holds a large stock of
working capital (relative to its other assets) on which it earns no return,
than when the initial level of working capital is relatively low. Or put
differently: a dollar invested in working capital cannot be invested in, say,
physical capital. As investment projects are chosen in order of their expected
returns, a firm with relatively much working capital is likely to forgo a
Her approach to incorporating agency costs of debt in the model differs from
our treatment. She specifies an inequality constraint on debt B < B and then
obtains a first order condition for debt that includes the Kuhn-Tucker
multiplier. To measure the unobservable KT multiplier she relates it to
factors that are assumed to influence the cost of debt.
In his pioneering paper he related the unobservable shadow value of the
wealth constraint in a life-cycle model of consumption and labor supply to
observables such as lifetime wage, initial assets et cetera.
Of course it also depends on variables of which we know that they determine
H and n . However our objective is to identify additional variables that
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project with a higher return than the firm with less working capital. Or from
still another perspective, the firm with much working capital has to make a
profit with less physical and knowledge capital. Thus we expect that
dr|/d(W_/K^) < 0 (3.11)
As we noted above, an entrepreneur that maximizes the value of the firm
will set W equal to W . By combining (3.10) and (3.11) we have found another
way to measure the ratio of the shadow values of funds in two consecutive
periods that can be exploited in order to estimate the Euler equations. To
this end we could add the following equation to the model that can be sub-
stituted in the Euler equations for physical and knowledge capital (3.9a,b)
5(W, ^ j- wy^7K~) " (3.12)
Note that according to the theory outlined above, p. /p. is positively
related to the level of W /K . We included deviations from the mean in
ii ii
(3.12) to deal with heterogeneity among firms: for some firms (industries) the
average value of W /K will be lower, for other firms (industries) it will
be higher. The time dummies track aggregate changes in the liquidity of firms
as far as they are not reflected in working capital.
Before we estimate the models we must deal with the individual effects.
If they are correlated with RHS variables, they cause biases in the estimates.
To avoid this, the individual effects (f ) will be removed by taking
differences of the equations. Since the coefficients in the Euler equations
are varying over time because of the p /p. factor, this is not equivalent to
taking differences of the variables (see also Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen
(1988) ).
Both in the Euler equations and in the Q model, current investment I /K
(R /G ) is the dependent variable. Some of the RHS variables, notably lagged
investment, Q, sales and debt, are endogenous though predetermined. However
after taking differences of the equations — whether they be taken vis-a-vis
the first lagged equation or the most distant lagged equation or the mean of
lagged equations,— the lags of these variables will be correlated with the
error term. Therefore we have to rely on an instrumental variable type130
estimator or a Generalized Method of Moments estimator. In order to exploit as
many orthogonality conditions as possible, we take first differences.
Furthermore, our choice of the instruments will allow for measurement errors
that follow a low order moving average process. Due to the panel structure of
the data we are able to impose separate moment conditions for each period. As
was pointed out by Arrelano and Bond (1991), in this manner we avoid problems
due to nonstationarity of the data generating processes. Finally given the set
of the instruments, the optimal weighting matrix that is used by GMM takes
heteroskedasticity — both across firms and time — and the correlation
structure of the errors over time into account. Since most of the correlation
between errors corresponding to different firms is likely to be due to
aggregate effects, we deal with this by including fixed time effects into the
regression equations.
The specifcation for p /p in (3.12) has two drawbacks. First, for
large changes in working capital, the value of p /p can become negative.
This is conflicting with the theory. Second, the model is perhaps too
parsimonious. Apart from working capital, other (unobserved) factors might
affect p /p . Therefore we will also use an alternative specification
A, ,
—— = exp (tf^ + 5 W^/K^ + c_) (3.13)
After inserting (3.13) in the Euler equations, we have to deal with both a
multiplicative ( exp(c ) ) and an additive individual effect f . While this
estimation problem can be solved in principle, we will concentrate on the case
of the multiplicative effect. Chamberlain (1993) suggested a transformation of
the model that yields orthogonality conditions that can be exploited by a GMM
estimator. To explain his idea, we write our model succinctly as
d^(y.^x.^;8) - r^(x.^;8) C. = u.^ t=l T (3.14)
where y comprises current endogenous variables (e.g. I /K ) and x includes
predetermined variables. The vector 8 comprises the parameters. T is the last
year of the sample. Let z denote the vector of instruments that are
orthogonal to the disturbance u . Now consider the following transformation
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This is equivalent to •*•
By the fact that £(u z ) = 0 it follows that E(p (y ,x ;0) z ) = 0.
' i I i t vr,w it it it
However the latter moment condition does not include the unobservable
individual effect C and therefore can be used for estimation. Notice from
i
(3.17) that the GMM estimator that results, is actually based on
quasi-differencing the model. As long as r (x. ;9) does not change much over
time, this procedure will remove most of the additive individual effect
(included in u ) as well.
We conclude this sub-section by giving the estimating equations. We have
assumed that the long run revenue is proportional to the sales of the firm,
that is n « S .
t t . .
(1-8") I_/K_ = - b* |^ p* + (1 + ^) -^ [ b* S^/K^ (3.17a)
- - (I /K )* + I /K + b* (B /K )* + b* -pi- p* 1 + f + s + w
2 i-1 1-1 i-l 11 3^1-1 l-l 2 1-T I -lj i t il
(1-8°)R_/G_ =- b° J^|-p° + (i +^£_)_Li Tb°S_ _/G_ , (3.17b)
where -!-i = exp (fl + 8 W /K + c )
fi ' •' ''
't
When the transformation due to Chamberlain is not applied, we replace c by
- W 7K
t • i t - I
The following restrictions between the reduced form parameters and the Euler
equation parameters hold
b^= -dp/4>p,b^= l/((>p.and b^= -y^, F = G,K. (3.17c)132 •>>?.«,.*< :••*:: •,; - , .,.-. . .••..-•.
5.5.2 A 2 Aforfc/ o/ /nverfmenf w/f/i £ndogc/iou5 Financia/
The Q type regression models that will be developed in this sub-section are
based on the following relations
B*S /A +f + s + w (3.18a)
*S I • 1 t - I i I it
-A -,
where Q = V /A is "Tobin's Q" , V is the market value of the firm net of
short term assets, and A is "total assets", f and s are firm and time
I i 1
effects, while w is an error term. The exact definitions of V and A are
it t t
given by
V = E + TB - ADJ (3.19a)
t t t t
A = K + G (in constant prices of 1987) (3.19b)
tit *^
where TB = B + STDEBT is total debt
itt
E = ValueCOMmonShares + PREFerredSTock is the value of shares
ADJ = CASH + RECEIV - PAYOTH
t i t i
The Q models for investment are in reduced form. A lag of investment is
added to capture the dynamics of investment. Inventories are included to
accommodate different measures of marginal Q that are used in the literature.
Debt over assets is included as a measure of agency/bankruptcy costs. Like
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1993), we think that it may be more reasonable to
assume that the investment decision is made on the basis of an information set
that only includes lagged values of the RHS variables (Q, S etcetera).
Using the switching regression methodology of Lee, Maddala and Trost
(1979), we will test for differences in investment behavior across two
subsamples (regimes) that correspond to increases in financial working
' The capitals in the names of the variables form the names used in the
description of the dataset that we exploited, see Hall (1990a).THE ROLE OF WORKING CAPITAL IN THE INVESTMENT PROCESS 133
capital and decreases (A(W/A) < 0) respectively. A close examination of the Q
model suggests that this approach to testing for differences in investment
behavior due to financial considerations is more appropriate than that of
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, FHP for short, (1988), who classified firms as
either liquidity constrained, moderately liquidity constrained, or not
liquidity constrained for the whole sample period according to their dividend
payout ratio '". However, the level of investment is determined by the change
in liquidity over time rather than by the average liquidity position of a
firm. In the language of our models, the ratios of the current shadow value of
funds of a firm to the /ufwre shadow values of funds of that particular firm,
rather than to the shadow values of funds of o/Aer firms, matter for its
investment decision. From the derivation of the Q model ' , we know that the
shadow value of capital equals a discounted sum of marginal profits
premultiplied by the shadow values of funds (j. . The first order condition for
investment equates the shadow value of capital X to the marginal cost of
investment |i [(l-x)(aAC /Si ) - p /p ]. Given A. , investment is determined by
H , p , p* and K ". We expect that the value of |! in proportion to |i
p. ,... varies with (W/A) , just as in the Euler equation model derived in
sub-section 5.3.1. Consequently, the coefficient of Q varies across the
regimes and is lower when A(W/A) > 0. Since (dis-)investment decisions with
respect to working capital are taken frequently, probably several times within
a year, the approach followed by FHP seems to be too rough
'" Each category contained the same number of firms.
See also chapter 1.
12 °o j. s i a(FI -AC)
The shadow value of capital ^= £,U-T)^Z [T+P7?FCOTJ ".P. 3^ ' •
This follows from solving the Euler equation for the stock of capital forward.
' When the future shadow value of funds |i is not constant across time, the
practice of substituting average Q for average Q is no longer valid. Thus the
fluctuations in liquidity are a source of errors in the measurement of
marginal Q.
By splitting the sample by the dividend payout ratio, FHP actually divide
the sample into a part for which the Q model might be valid, because the
shadow value of funds is likely to be constant over time (the dividend paying134
The decision to adjust the stock of working capital could be influenced
by the same considerations or changes in economic circumstances as the real
investment decisions. Therefore we have to consider the possibility of
endogenous regime switches, which means that the error term of the model for
the indicator of the regime (the sign of the change in working capital) and
the error terms of the models for the decision variable of interest (e.g. R&D)
that hold under the various regimes are correlated. To complete the system of
equations, we have to specify a model for the change in working capital. Being
without a real theory about working capital investment, we will specify a
reduced form model that includes variables that are likely to be related to
the change in working capital
A(W/A)_=
Y,,A(S/A)^+ u^ (3.20)
where CSFL denotes cash flows. This model can also be used to predict the
regime by replacing A(W/A) by a dichotomous variable that equals one when
A(W/A) > 0 and zero elsewhere.
The endogenous switching regression model for investment that combines
the specifications that hold under the two regimes reads as
£ (I,A\) = £^(WA | A(W/A)_< 0) Pr(A(W/A) < 0) + (3.21)
£,(I/AJ A(W/A)_> 0) Pr(A(W/A)_> 0) =
where X includes the explanatory variables for investment and Z those for the
change in working capital; P and 7t are the vectors comprising the
corresponding coefficients. The subscripts indicate the regime, o denotes
the correlation between the error under regime j and the error of trie working
capital equation. Following common practice, we assumed that the error term of
the model for the regime dummy, u , follows a standard normal distribution
<J>(u ). This yields the probit factors <t(7l'Z ) in equation (3.21). (|>(u ) is the
standard normal density function.
firms), and two other parts for which the Q model is misspecified, because the
equality between marginal Q and average Q (adjusted for the current shadow
value of funds) fails to hold. Adding a measure of liquidity to the Q equation
does not fix the specification.THE ROLE OF WORKING CAPITAL IN THE INVESTMENT PROCESS 135
Although the framework in (3.21), that combines the specifications for
the various regimes, facilitates estimation, it does not allow us to test for
endogeneity of the regime switches; only the hypothesis a = o can be
tested.
Also note that even in the absense of correlation between the error
terms, that is o = a =0 (which is known in the literature as the case of
lu 2u
exogenous regime switches), the regressors in the switching regression model
(3.21) include the probit factors. The difference between the switching model
and the naive model that just allows the coefficients to differ across regimes
depends on the ability to predict the working capital regime; when one can
perfectly discriminate between both regimes, the two models coincide. It
should also be bome in mind that there is possibly a great difference between
the ability of the econometrician to predict changes in working capital and
the extent to which a financial manager can look ahead. Moreover, it is not
clear whether a model for working capital observed at the frequency of a year
makes sense. For these reasons we will consider both the (endogenous)
switching regression model and the simple model that assumes perfect
predictability of the regimes in the empirical section.
5.4 Sample Selection and Properties of the Data
The models outlined in section 3 will be estimated and tested with data
from the Manufacturing Sector Master File from Hall (1988), which contains a
subset of the Compustat data. Since our interest in working capital is mainly
based on its relation to ordinary investment and R&D investment in particular,
we will limit the sample to firms that have a high R&D intensity. These can be
found in the scientific sector, which comprises the chemical industry, SIC 28,
the computer industry, SIC 357, the electrical equipment/electronics industry,
SIC 36, and the instruments industry, SIC 38. The theories discussed above
identified several motives to hold working capital, some of which were
connected to the financing of investment. The predictions of most of these
theories can be tested best in a period that includes a recession. For
instance, the reliquefication theory of Eckstein and Sinai refers to the
period at the end of the recession. Therefore our investigations are based on
the 1979-1984 period, although the sample we used starts earlier (in 1973) for
the construction of lags and instruments.136
The empirical investigation starts with an analysis of simple corre-
lations between investment in physical and knowledge capital and financial
working capital over time. Table 1 shows the development of the means of
several series over time and table 2 displays the simple correlations between
important variables both over time and for the whole period 1979-1984. The
important facts that emerge from these tables can be summarized as follows.
Ordinary investment decreases from 1979 to 1983 significantly and then
one year after the trough of the recession, it rises considerably. R&D
expenditure rises over the period, although when 1979 is considered as an
exception, it is nearly flat. Sales decrease during the 1980-1982 recession



































































































* : (x 10"*)
ST.DEV. is average standard deviation of the means, which are computed for
each period.
WK= CURRentASSeTs - ShortTermLIABilities
W = CURRentASSeTs - INV - RECEIV - STDEBT = CASH - STDEBTTHE ROLE OF WORKING CAPITAL IN THE INVESTMENT PROCESS 137












































































































79-84 0.0024 0.2601 0.1666 -0.1000 -0.0486 0.3739
For correlations calculated for separate years:
Critical values: 0.2089 (5%), 0.1754 (10%), based on 84 observations.
For correlations calculated over 1979-1984 period (506 obs.):
• : significant at 5% level,
•• : significant at 10% level
Tests are heteroskedastic-consistent T-tests based on Seemingly Unrelated
Regressions (with identity weighting) which takes the correlations between
observations over time into account.138
capital (W/K) actually increases during the recession years: the sharpest
changes (in opposite directions) of these ratios take place just after the
recession in 1983. This is followed by a movement in the opposite direction in
1984. Although this evidence already gives a clue about the possible motives
for holding working capital, we will also look at table 2 with the
correlations.
Changes in working capital and investment are negatively correlated with
the exception of 1983. For R&D the absence of correlation with working capital
could not be rejected. From the second column of table 2 we learn that both
types of investment are positively correlated with an increase in sales. This
could reflect a liquidity or a productivity effect. The fourth column is
especially interesting for us as it displays the correlation between changes
in working capital and changes in sales. In most years, with the exception of
1982 and (again) 1983, the sign is negative.
All the evidence from table 1 and 2 on the development of investment,
R&D, working capital and their correlation patterns over time taken together,
the following conclusions seem warranted. First ordinary investment and
working capital 'compete' for the available funds. Second working capital is
not a temporary depository of funds, used to smooth investment, but seems to
be held for precautionary reasons: both in the cross section and in the time
dimension working capital and sales are negatively correlated. Third the value
of the statistics support the reliquefication theory. In 1983, the first year
after the recession, the ratio of working capital to physical capital reaches
its maximum, while debt to capital (B/K) drops to a minimum. Furthermore 1983
is the only year in which investment (R&D), the change in sales and the change
in working capital are positively correlated. This could be interpreted as
follows: the increase in funds is used for investment as usual and to improve
the balance sheet, in particular the liquidity of the firm. The more the
working capital of the firm rises, the cheaper financing (both internal and
external) will be in the near future. This in turn makes investment tomorrow
as well as today more likely. In general however (with the exception of the
reliquefication period) an increase in working capital is associated with a
deterioration of the (financial) condition of the firm.THE ROLE OF WORKING CAPITAL IN THE INVESTMENT PROCESS 139
5.5 Empirical Results
5.5.7 /?«M/W o/wam«/ /or f/ie
Tables 3a-3c show the regression results for Q models for ordinary
investment and R&D. The instruments that were used are listed in appendix 5.A.
In table 3a we included sales as a regressor to control for profitability and
liquidity. Many empirical studies found that sales has explanatory power
beyond Q. Some empirical studies, e.g. Chirinko and Schaller (1993), attribute
this to the fact that Q as it is usually measured, namely as the stock market
value of the firm over the replacement value of capital, is an imperfect
indicator of profitability, which does not fully reflect fundamentals. Table
3c reports the estimates of the switching regression version of the Q model,
while table 3d gives various estimation and test results for models of the
regime indicator and the 'latent' variable, viz, the change in working capital
A(W/A). First we discuss the results for the naive models shown in tables 3a
and 3b.
The test results show that in most cases there is no need to include a
lag of investment to capture the dynamics. Furthermore most estimates have the
right sign or when not are insignificant; we will indicate the exceptions in
the discussion of the results. Q does not enter the model of ordinary
investment that assumes homogeneity of the parameters significantly, but sales
does. However when we dropped sales from the equation, the t-value for Q rose
to 2. In the case of R&D, Q performs well as an explanatory variable, while
sales has nothing to add or enters with the wrong sign. The preferred measure
of Q leaves out the value of the inventories from the numerator, which is
plausible since it has not been included in the denominator either. Another
interpretation of the results for inventories is provided by Chirinko (1994).
He derives a model where Q is related to a weighted sum of various types of
investment, like for instance investment in inventories and physical capital
as in our model (for ordinary investment). If the gross change in inventories
is proportional to its level, which seems plausible, then inventories would
enter with a negative sign as they do. Debt over 'total assets', which we
measured as the sum of the stocks of physical and knowledge capital, is
negatively related to investment, which is in accordance with the presumption
that it measures the height of marginal agency costs. The negative relation
between debt and investment was also found by Long and Malitz (1985).140
Table Ilia
















































































































423 obs., 90 firms, period 1979-1983. Models have been estimated in first
differences. HOMOGEN. means parameter homogeneity. W« : coefficients for
subsample where A(W/A) > 0. Time dummies have been included. Heterosked.
consistent standard errors are reported below estimates; optimal weighting
matrix has been used. Sargan Test and Distance Test ~ x (D.F.).
* (**) : significantly different across regimes at 5 % (10%) levelTHE ROLE OF WORKING CAPITAL IN THE INVESTMENT PROCESS 141
Table Illb
































































































423 obs., 90 firms, period 1979-1983. Models have been estimated in first
differences. HOMOGEN. means parameter homogeneity. W- : coefficients for
subsample where A(W/A) > 0. Time dummies have been included. Heterosked.
consistent standard errors are reported below estimates; optimal weighting
matrix has been used. Sargan Test and Distance Test - x (D.F.).
* (**) : significantly different across regimes at 5 % (10%) level142
To test for differences in investment behavior between periods in which
A(W/A) is positive or negative respectively, we employed a distance test (see
for instance Newey and West, 1987). At the 10% significance level, homogeneous
behavior could not be rejected both for R&D and for ordinary investment. The
estimation results for the subsamples indicate that during periods in which
W/A increases, investment is less sensitive to Q as expected, but not
significantly so. The significantly positive estimates obtained for the
coefficients of inventories and the real investment price in the A(W/A) > 0
subsample might be an indication of misspecification or, in the latter case,
mismeasurement of the effective capital prices, because we ignored taxes and
depreciation allowances.
As we discussed earlier, the endogeneity of the determinant of the regime
will result in inconsistent estimates, when the estimation strategy ignores
this feature of the model. Therefore we applied the switching regression
methodolgy. The estimation results that we obtained for the system that
includes the Q models without sales (cf. table 3b) are reported in tables 3c
and 3d. First we discuss table 3d, which contains the results obtained for the
models for A(W/A) and the corresponding dummy.
Although the explanatory variables are jointly significant according to
the value of the likelihood ratio test, our probit model for the sign of
A(W/A) is only a slight improvement over a model that only contains a constant
from a prediction perspective. This finding should moderate expectations
regarding the performance of the switching regression model.
Since we are using panel data, a natural question to ask is whether an
individual effect should have been taken into account. However, pooling the
data seems justified, as the variables are in first differences. On the other
hand, this may cause the error to follow a MA(1) process. Since we actually
can observe the 'latent' variable that underlies the regime dummy, we can
easily test both hypotheses concerning the nature of the error term after
running some simple regressions. We scaled the dependent variable and its lag,
so that it looks like a continuous counterpart of the regime dummy variable
and the variance of the disturbance is close to one. Note that the 2SLS and
OLS estimates are similar to the ML estimates of the probit model, which
already suggests that we can treat the error as a white noise process. Next we
performed a test due to Godfrey (1978) for the presence of AR(1) behavior (the
individual effect) or MA(1) behavior in the error term, which is valid whenTHE ROLE OF WORKING CAPITAL IN THE INVESTMENT PROCESS 143
the regressors contain a lag of the dependent variable. The absence of serial
correlation could not be rejected.
After computing the probability that W/A increases for each observation,
we estimated (3.21). Table 3c shows the results. The reported standard errors
are lowerbounds for the true standard errors. The error term of model (3.21)
is v + (p - p )Z(4> - 4> ) + (a -a )($-<>). Our formula for the covariance
matrix of the estimators ignores the last two terms ' . However, joint tests
that use the 'wrong' covariance matrix cannot reject the equality of the b's
and the a's across regimes, even though the alternative hypotheses are
favored. Therefore we can conclude that our estimates of the standard errors
are in most cases not significantly different from the true standard errors.
Most parameter estimates that were significantly different from zero in
the naive regressions (table 3b), have become insignificant now. In the case
of R&D, the coefficient of Q in the subsample where A(W/A) > 0 is higher than
in the other subsample, but not significantly. In the case of ordinary
investment we find a lower coefficient of Q in the subsample where A(W/A) > 0.
Summarizing, we can say that the evidence is in agreement with the theory of
sub-section 5.3.2. but it is not convincing.
" One can show along the lines of Maddala (1983, appendix to chapter 8) that
the difference between the true covariance matrix and the naive covariance
matrix, which is based on the assumption that the error term equals v, is a
positive definite matrix.144
Table IIIc





































































































423 obs., 90 firms, period 1979-1983.
HOMOGEN. means parameter homogeneity. W*: coefficients for subsample where
A(W/A) > 0. The probits are based on estimation results reported in table
Hid. o -o is the coefficient of (MTI'Z), where <t>(.) is the standard normal
2u 1 u
density function and n is the vector of estimates of the coefficients of the
regressors Z used in the probit model. See also the notes to table Illb.THE ROLE OF WORKING CAPITAL IN THE INVESTMENT PROCESS 145
Table Hid


































































423 obs., 90 firms, period 1979-1983. Models have been estimated in levels.
The dependent (latent) variable is A(W/K). The dependent variable and its lags
are normalized by the firm's average of the absolute value of A(W/K). The set
of instruments includes most RHS variables and the second lag of A(W/K) in-
stead of the first lag of A(W/K). pos. obs. are observations where A(W/K) > 0
(regime dummy equals one). Correct pred. means that regime is predicted
correctly. The likelihood ratio test statistic for joint significance of slope
parameters ~ X~(5). The LM test for the presence of MA(1) or AR(1) errors when
the regressors include a lagged dep. var. is from Godfrey (1978):
T u'u (u 'u -u 'Z(Z'Z) 'Z'u ^) 'u'u ^/u'u. This LM test statistic ~ x(0-
Heterosked. consistent standard errors are reported below 2SLS/OLS estimates.146
5.5.2
Complementary evidence on (financial) working capital as indicator of
liquidity and its effects on the investment process is given by table 4, which
contains the results for various versions of the Euler equations for ordinary
investment and R&D. For the set of instruments used by the GMM estimator we
refer again to appendix 5.A. The upper panel of table 4 shows the estimates
that are valid under the assumption that no individual effects are present,
and the results in the lower panel were obtained after removing the individual
effects by first differencing the models. Furthermore the right (even) columns
correspond to a specification for (I /ji that is only based on lags of W/K,
while the model underlying the left (uneven) columns also included the mean of
W/K. The third panel of table 4 shows the estimation results after applying
Chamberlain's transformation to get rid of a multiplicative individual effect.
All the results in table 4 correspond to the exponential specification for
£ /ji (3.14) without separate time effects (# =$). Results based on (3.13)
were similar and therefore are not reported. The values for (1-8 )/(l+p/(l-o>))
and (l-8°)/(l+p/(l-(0)) were fixed at 0.78 and 0.88 respectively.
We will first discuss the estimates computed by using the nontransformed
models. The results in columns (2) and (4) — which are only based on levels
of W/K — are very similar to results for the models that also include the
mean of W/K. In general the estimates of the 8.'s were imprecise. The value of
the constant in the exponential model for (i /fl is close to zero, which was
our prior, and the estimates for 8 have the right sign. Furthermore the
results in columns (1) - (4) suggest that the ratio of shadow values depends
negatively on the current cfta/ige in W/K. One interpretation is that W /K (and /
W/K ) control for an individual effect. Note that the estimates for 8 and 8^
are about the same in the Euler equations for ordinary investment and R&D.
This is in agreement with rational behavior which implies that marginal
investment projects of different types should earn the same return (after
correcting for risk) and are undertaken by using the funds from the same
source(s). In other words there is only one shadow value of funds which
depends on the most profitable investment opportunity that the firm faces.
Assuming convexity of the adjustment cost schedule, the estimates of the
'productivity parameter' (b ) have the wrong sign.THE ROLE OF WORKING CAPITAL IN THE INVESTMENT PROCESS 147
We have performed tests from Keane and Runkle (1992) to ascertain whether
individual effects — whether additive or multiplicative — are present. As
the RHS variables are endogenous, their presence would destroy the consistency
of the estimators used for the upper panel of table 4. The values of various
test statistics on the presence of individual effects are shown in table 5.
They indicate that it is important to remove additive individual effects in
order to obtain consistent estimates of the technology and debt parameters.
However no differences are detected between estimates based on the original
model in levels and those obtained after applying Chamberlain's
transformation. On the other hand the estimates obtained for the first
differenced model, FD estimates for short, and Chamberlain's version of the
model are different in the case of R&D. Since FD estimates are preferred over
the 'levels estimates' and the 'Chamberlain estimates' are not significantly
different from the latter, and moreover since the 'Chamberlain estimates' are
very imprecise, we will focus in the remainder of this section on the
estimates obtained after removing additive individual effects.
The estimate of the intercept 8 in the model for u. /jl in the Euler
•^ o ' i - I * t
equation for physical capital is significantly less than zero. This implies
that the shadow value of funds increased during the recession or in other
words that the firm became more liquidity constrained. The estimates of the
coefficients of W/K are individually not significantly different from zero ".
A joint test of significance yielded the same conclusion. Since we suspected
that this might be due to multicollinearity we reestimated the model after
dropping W /K but 8 (and 8 ) remained insignificant. We also tested whether
multiplicative time dummies should be included. The values for this test sta-
tistic are reported at the bottom of the second panel in table 4. They
suggests that the multiplicative time dummies are missing from the model for
R&D. After including the multiplicative time dummies we obtained an estimate
for 8 (not reported here) that is significantly negative. However our model
predicts that 8^ should enter with a positive sign. In sum the evidence on the
effects of working capital on investment provided by the Euler equations is
rather weak.
When we used specification (3.13) for ji /ji we found that 8 was
significantly positive at the 10% level.148
Table IV
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421 obs., 90 firms, period: 1980-1984; Optimal HAC weighting matrix used.
Additive time dummies have been included, but multiplicative t.d. have not.
b,= -ap/4>p,b^= l/4>p.and b^= .y^, F = G.K.
/A =exp[fl + 8 (W /K ) +
=exp[d + 8 (W /K ) +
^ /K ) + 8 (W7KT")] in left (uneven) col.
^ /K )] in right (even) column.
HAC standard errors below estimates; Wald tests on joint significance of
nonlrivial regressors and time dummies - x (•); Distance tests for 8^= 0, and
# =d; m i=l,2,3 tests on i-th order autocorrelation - N(0,l);
When 8 is not restricted to zero, then Sargan test ~ X (39), Liq. Wald test
for 8 = 0 ~ x*O), and Liq.+d Wald test for i3 = 8 = 0 ~ x^(4).150
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Optimal HAC weighting used; p-values below values of test statistics.
The degrees of freedom of the x -distribution of the test statistics shown
at the intersection of columns 1 and 3, and rows 1 and 3 is one higher than
indicated (4 and 7 respectively).
L is levels version of the model, FD is first differenced version and Ch.T.
means that Chamberlain's transformation has been used to get rid of































421 obs., 90 firms, period: 1980-1984; HAC standard errors below estimates;
Exploited restrictions: b^= -a/<)> ,b^= 1/0 .and b^= -^/<|> . F = G,K. The esti-
mates of the reduced form par. are shown in columns 2FD and 4FD of table IV.THE ROLE OF WORKING CAPITAL IN THB INVESTMENT PROCESS 151
The estimates of the coefficients of the productivity tenn have the wrong
sign. However, in the case of R&D they are insignificant. Furthermore they are
in line with the estimates of the rate of return of R&D found by Hall (1993)
for two important industries within the scientific sector, i.e. the chemicals
industry and the electrical industry, for the 1971-1980 and 1981-1985 periods
(see also table 6 below). The significantly positive estimates for the
coefficients of the productivity of physical capital are clearly conflicting
with the structural model. Since we are using a instrumental variable
approach, the coefficients measure the effect of forecastable sales. Therefore
we interpreted this finding as a liquidity effect, rather than a demand shock
effect. Another problem with the results for physical capital is that the
errors (after first differencing) seem to display third order autocorrelation.
This finding casts doubt on the validity of the instruments although the
Sargan test does not lead to rejection. The R&D equation passes the
specification tests.
According to the results in table 4, debt depresses investment in
physical capital and R&D. The estimates of the coefficients of debt are
relatively precise. In the case of R&D, we expected that the sign of the
coefficient would be determined by the 'intangibility' effect, which says that
the larger the share of R&D in total assets, the higher the cost of debt
finance. However, the stock of R&D in the denominator of the debi ierm seems
to act as a proxy for total assets, or at least the part that can serve as
collateral, which results in the same (negative) sign for the debl term in
the R&D equation as has been found in the case of physical capilal.
Finally we have calculated the values of the structural parameters that
are implied by the estimates in the second panel of table 4. They can be found
in table 6. The low precision of the estimates of the adjustment cost
parameters spills over into the (high) standard errors of the other estimates.
Although our estimates of the liquidity parameters (5 's and fl "s) are
rather imprecise, we have also computed some statistics that desribe the
development of the cross-sectionsal distribution of |i /|i over lime. The
means obtained in the case of physical capital, are considerably lower than
those in the case of R&D. This could partly reflect differences in the
expected rate of return.152
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PHY is physical capital; calculations based on estimates of first-
differenced versions of models that include 8».•••.§ and separate time
dummies in submodel for ji /ji (d ,...,$).
t • 1 I 7 8 84
5.6 Conclusions
The research documented in this chapter has been aimed at measuring the
effects of liquidity on investment decisions with respect to both ordinary
capital and R&D. To this end we derived versions of the Q model and the Euler
equation model, where the perfect capital market assumptions of Modigliani and
Miller (1958) are relaxed. The models that we obtained could not be estimated
right away as they contained unobservable shadow values of funds. The way we
solved this problem distinguishes our research from that of others in this
field: exploiting one of the other first order conditions of the value
maximization problem of the firm, we established a link between the change in
the shadow value of funds and the stock of working capital (relative to the
size of the firm). With regard to the sign of this relationship we argued that
an increase in working capital may be a measure of precaution (asked for by
the bank) and therefore actually reflects a deterioration of the financial
position of the firm. When estimating the Q model, we distinguished between
two investment regimes defined by the sign of the change in working capital,
while we inserted the relationship between the change in the shadow value of
funds and working capital in the Euler equation.
The estimation results obtained for the parameters in both models were
imprecise in many cases. However some findings do stand out from the tables.
First Q significantly explains ordinary investment and R&D, although in the
former case it does not capture the marginal profitability of capitalTHE ROLE OF WORKING CAPITAL JN THE INVESTMENT PROCESS 153
completely since saies enters a regression significantly as weil. Second, in
both the Q models and the Euler equations, there is a strong negative
relationship between the debt term and investment and R&D, which justifies the
interpretation that it measures (part of) the marginal (agency) costs of
funds. On the other hand, the coefficients of the real cost of capital are
poorly estimated, although the sign is correct in most cases. This is perhaps
attributable to the fact that the prices in our dataset do not vary across
firms but at best across industries defined at the four digit SIC level. Among
other things, this means that the prices we used in the analysis do not
reflect (differences in) the effective tax rate that firms face. Furthermore
the prices will more or less display the same pattern at the industry level,
which rises the problem of multicollinearity, given the use of time dummies.
With respect to the main focus of this chapter, measurement of liquidity
effects, the evidence does not allow us to draw firm conclusions. Although the
estimates of the coefficients of working capital and the differences between
the regime specific coefficients of the Q's were in agreement with the
predictions from the theory, they were not significant in most cases. Moreover
in the Euler equations, the coefficients of the marginal productivity of
capital, that is sales over the stock of capital, had the wrong sign. In fact,
the Euler equation results resemble those reported in Hall (1991), where the
coefficients were allowed to differ across financial regimes defined by the
occurrence of dividend payments and the issue of new shares . In that paper,
the positive effect of sales on investment and R&D is interpreted as a
liquidity effect; the fact that an instrumental variable type estimator has
been used, based on instruments lagged two years, makes it unlikely that it is
mainly a demand effect, since changes in demand are hardly forecastable two
years ahead.
In general, we believe that the results obtained for the Euler equations
are more sensitive to timing issues, mismeasurement and misspecification than
the results obtained for the Q models, because the Euler equations are first
order di/ference e^uar/oru in de shadow value of capital X , while the Q
models are based on the solution of the Euler equation for 1 , which can be
obtained by adding up successive Euler equations. Drawing an analogy between
the investment models and panel data methods, we know that going from 'levels'
See the regimes defined on page 12.154
(the Q model), to 'first differences' (the Euler equations), aggravates the
effects of specification errors.
We close this chapter with some suggestions for obtaining better results
for both models. First we could model the change in the shadow value of funds
as a joint function of working capital, change in dividend payout, and a dummy
variable for the issue of new shares, and perhaps also the variables that were
used by Whited (1992) to measure the height of agency costs. Second, since the
Euler equations for the various stocks of capital contain the same shadow
values of funds, cross equation restrictions can be imposed. Third, one could
just concentrate on the Euler equation for physical capital, because that
would allow one to use of a much larger sample. Fourth, the strength of the
relationship between the change in the shadow value of funds and the change in
financial variables, such as dividend payments, depends on the severity of
agency problems and problems due to the existence of asymmetric information.
In the absence of such problems, this relationship does not even exist. Thus,
existing models for the change in the shadow value of funds could be improved
by multiplying the proxies for liquidity, e.g. dividend payout ratios, by
proxies for agency costs etcetera. Fifth, as mentioned above, the use of firm
specific information on prices, which includes effective tax rates, seems
desirable. Finally, the switching regression version of the Q model lacks a
good equation for the change in working capital. Using quarterly data and
adding more lags of the explanatory variables as well as more variables that
are informative about the financial position of the firm might help to obtain
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Appendix 5.A: sets of instruments
Instruments used for estimation of Q equations:
WV3' *\W,' »,.A-,' Q..A-3
p /p , and time dummies
5 /p , and time dummies
Instruments used for estimation of Euler equations:
S /K ,1 /K .INTeReST /K , DEPREC /K , p" /p , p" /p ,
1-3 t-3 1-3 1-3 t-3 t-3 1-3 1-3 *l -3^1-3 ^1 - 4 *i-4
B /K , V /K , W /K , and time dummies.
B /G , V /G , W /K , and time dummies.
t-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3
V is defined in (3.19a) as E + TB - ADJ (net value of the firm)156Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we summarize the findings of the research reported on in
this thesis and conclude with a discussion of some remaining problems/issues.
This thesis investigated the investment decisions concerning physical
capital and R&D, and focused on the role of financial considerations in these
decisions. For this purpose, we developed new models, that were estimated and
tested using American firm data from Compustat. The models were used to
examine the importance of the respective mechanism through which the financial
factors affect investment, i.e. liquidity constraints, the curve of the supply
of funds and the adjustment mechanism. We paid special attention to modeling
the dynamical aspects of the capital accumulation process, i.e. the
specification of the accumulation constraints, the adjustment cost function
and gestation lags or more generally the timing of variables, and to the usual
econometric concerns, such as heterogeneity, simultaneity, and measurement
errors.
We will first summarize the main findings of each chapter, than compare
our findings with those of others and at the end discuss some remaining,
unresolved issues.
6.1 The main theoretical and empirical results
Chapter 1 provided a selective survey of the theoretical and empirical
literature on investment and financial decisions made by firms. Special
attention was paid to the current modeling practice and strategies that
researchers have followed to test for the effects of capital market
imperfections on investment, although we mentioned the older, classic
contributions to the respective parts of the literature too. The arguments and
the evidence for the proposition put forward by Schumpeter that R&D intensive
firms rely more heavily on internal finance because external finance is more
expensive for them ceteris paribus have been summarized. With respect to the
empirical literature, we indicated the main findings but also some drawbacks
of the approaches that have been used.158
In the old literature, it was widely believed that liquidity was an
important determinant of investment. However, after the publication of the
Modigliani-Miller result in 1958, this belief rapidly vanished. The develop-
ment of the principal-agent literature and the emergence of the economics of
information as well as the unsatisfactory empirical performance of models of
investment, both Q models and Euler models, lead to reconsideration of the
role of financial factors in the investment decision of the firm. They entered
the models by assuming the presence of liquidity constraints or an upward
sloping supply of funds curve.
A major problem that researchers in this field face is to discriminate
between various interpretations of results, for instance between a liquidity
effect or a demand effect interpretation of the effect of sales on investment.
Anolher problem is to find a good indicator of the (change in) liquidity of a
firm. In some articles, samples were split by the change in the dividend
payout ratio or by the issue of new shares. Since these events take place
rather infrequently, they do not perform very well as indicators. To measure
the costs of funds, several proxies have been proposed in the literature for
the height of agency costs and the severity of the asymmetric information
problem. Finally, the fact that outsiders of the firm are less informed than
insiders not only affects the costs of funds but also leads to a distinction
between the usual Q that is measured using stock market data and the
fundamental Q that is based on the insider's (manager's) assessment of the
value of the assets within the firm. When the manager follows his own assess-
ment, estimation of the standard Q model is subject to measurement error.
Chapter 2 was devoted to the specification and estimation of Euler
equation models for physical (ordinary) capital, knowledge capital and labor
that are quite flexible but do not take financial considerations into account
yet. The proposed specifications were intended to capture the dynamics, due to
net adjustment costs and gestation lags, and interrelations of factor demands
and to allow for heterogeneity at the same time. In particular, it allowed for
differences in firm size and factor elasticities across firms. The model was
based on a generalization of the linear rational expectations model of factor
demand discussed in Kollintzas (1985), that allows for gestation lags. The
parameters of this model were replaced by functions of firm characteristics,
e.g. firm size and factor intensities, which contain hyperparameters.
The set of solutions to the linear rational expectations model withSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 159
gestation lags was investigated in chapter 3. By using a convenient
decomposition of the matrix lag polynomial of the Euler-Lagrange conditions,
that encompasses that of the model without gestation lags, we showed that the
extended model admits a unique stable solution. The stability condition
derived by Kollintzas turned out to be valid for this more general model as
well. Moreover a procedure was given to obtain a closed form solution or at
least a semi-closed form solution with restrictions on the AR paramelers.
It was not feasible though to obtain a closed form solution of the model
of chapter 2, since the parameters were firm specific. Therefore the Euler
equations themselves were estimated using a two stage procedure. At the first
stage the parameters of the Euler equations were estimated by applying GMM, in
the second stage the structural (hyper-)parameters were estimated by applying
a minimum distance estimator that exploited the restrictions between the
structural parameters and the Euler equation parameters.
In order to obtain as precise estimates as possible, we tried to select
relevant moment conditions, that is moment conditions where the instruments
are significantly correlated with the RHS variables of the Euler equations.
For this purpose, the time series properties of the inputs were investigated.
For all series, the stocks of knowledge and physical capital and employment at
the firm, we found that a model that describes the series well contains a unit
root. The first differenced series follows nearly a random walk in the case of
R&D capital, but displays only moderate autocorrelation in the case of the
other two series. This finding was a clear warning that we might need many
observations in order to obtain significant estimates of the adjustment cost
parameters, especially, if we would first difference the Euler equations to
control for individual effects. The problem is aggravated by the presence of
gestation lags that rules out the use of low lags of some of the inputs and of
output as instruments. Therefore, we differenced the instruments instead in
the case of R&D capital. In addition to the problem just mentioned, the
information on real factor prices that we had was only at the '3.5' digit
industry level and was not corrected for the effective tax rate that applies
to the firms. For the identification of the parameters, variation across firms
due to cost shifters, such as differences in tax rates and the costs of funds,
and demand shifters would be instrumental as well.
The estimation and test results that we obtained in chapter 2 can be
summarized as follows. First, the net adjustment costs were found to be160
strongly separable from the levels of the inputs, which however should not be
interpreted as evidence that they are external, because the adjustment cost
specification is in relative changes and proportional to the firm size.
Second, joint convexity of the net adjustment cost function was rejected. The
own adjustment cost parameter of labor on the one hand and those of the stocks
of capital on the other hand were of opposite sign. Third, the estimates of
the adjustment parameters were on the verge of being significant. The time
discount parameter was precisely estimated at a reasonable value.
In chapter 4, we tested the financial accelerator theory. According to
this theory, fluctuations in the (agency) costs of funds over the business
cycle cause firms to arf/urf their stocks of quasi-fixed inputs /asfer to the
optimal levels. The fluctuations in the costs of funds are related to changes
in the quality of the balance sheet of a firm over the business cycle. In a
downturn, when cash flows drop, smaller and/or bank-dependent firms, either
become liquidity constrained or face a big increase in the costs of funds.
Therefore these firms reduce (over-)capacity and inventories in order to save
working capital. In the upturn, funds are relatively cheap and firms try to
adjust their stocks of inputs as much as possible. The influence of the
financial factors on the adjustment process is not necessarily symmetric: it
is very likely that they are more important during a downturn. The amplitude
of the fluctuations of the costs of funds and thereby the speed of adjustment
is related to the average height of the agency costs, which is determined by
characteristics of the firm, such as its size, leverage and R&D intensity.
The theory was tested in the cases of the accumulation of physical
capital and knowledge capital using two types of models: a simple partial
adjustment model and an Euler equation model. In the first specification, the
adjustment speed was modeled as a function of leverage and firm size, while
the sample was split before estimating the second model on the basis of the
medium leverage of the firm into two subsamples: one containing the
observations of the highly leveraged firms and one containing the observations
of the other firms. In the case of the second model, the predicted effects of
agency costs on the adjustment behavior of firms were tested by comparing the
estimates obtained for the subsamples. Furthermore, in both models we allowed
for different behavior across the stages of the business cycle.
The estimates of the parameters in the first model indicated that smaller
firms adjust their stocks of physical capital faster than other firms do, andSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 161
that the stock of knowledge capital is adjusted more quickly during a
recession. The estimation results obtained for the Euler equations confirmed
that the adjustment speed of R&D is higher during a downturn, and yielded the
same conclusion with respect to the accumulation of ordinary capital.
The symmetric firm size effect in the partial adjustment model of
physical capital could well be explained by the notion that smaller firms are
more flexible. In sum, the findings indicate that the speeds 0/ adyusfwiem of
knowledge and physical capital are not constant across the business cycle, but
are not affected by financial factors. In other words, the evidence for the
financial accelerator theory is rather slim.
Both in chapter 4 and in Chapter 5, we adopted a version of the quadratic
adjustment cost function used by Poterba and Summers (1983). This function
depends on gross investment, whereas the function in chapter 2 was a net
adjustment cost function. Furthermore, we did not allow for gestation lags in
chapters 4 and 5 except for the gestation lag of R&D in chapter 4.
Chapter 5 addressed the question to what extent financial constraints and
the costs of external finance directly affect the vo/u/ne of investment in
ordinary capital and R&D. A theoretical link was established between the
change in the tightness of the financial constraints, i.e. change in the
shadow value of funds, and the change in working capital over time. This
relationship was exploited in the estimation of Euler equation models and Q
models of investment that take financial considerations into account.
Estimation results and simple correlations supported the view that
working capital is accumulated for precautionary reasons. The change in
working capital is negatively correlated with a change in sales. In addition,
it is positively correlated with a change in the shadow value of funds, though
not significantly so in many cases.
The costs of external funds was measured by leverage. We found that both
ordinary investment and R&D expenditures are signifcanlly negatively related
to debt.
Since the sample used in chapter 5 covered the 1979-1984 period, we were
able to test the reliquefication theory. The sample year means showed that an
increase in investment at the beginning of an upturn of the economy was
preceded by a rise in the stock of working capital and a decrease in leverage.
Thus at the end of a recession, firms first improve their balance sheets in
order to acquire external funds on more favorable terms, before they start to
invest again.162 •
6.2 A Comparison of our Results with the Findings of Others
Focussing on the three channels through which the financial factors
affect R&D and investment spending, viz., cost of funds, adjustment speed and
liquidity constraints, we can briefly summarize our results as follows. Agency
cost problems do reduce investment spending by raising the costs of external
funds. Second, they do not influence the speed of adjustment of physical and
knowledge capital. Third, we found some weak evidence that liquidity
constraints are present and influence investment. After incorporating that
mechanism in the model by modeling (the change in) the shadow values of funds,
the (wrong) positive sign of the coefficient of sales in the Euler equations
for the stocks of capital, that was found before and which could be
interpreted as evidence for the presence of liquidity constraints, did not
reverse. We have indicated several econometric problems that make it rather
difficult to measure the change in the shadow value of liquidity. Bearing
these problems in mind and knowing that there is other evidence ' that
indicates that smaller, bank dependent firms face credit rationing or at least
receive a smaller part of credit extended during economic downturns than other
firms, while presumably they have the same financial needs as these firms, we
believe that the third channel does exist.
The negative relation between debt and investment spending has been found
by others, namely Long and Malitz (1985), Hall (1991, 1992), and Bond and
Meghir (1994).
In the case of labor demand, Sharpe (1994) found that leverage and firm
size had an asymmetric effect on the adjustment speed across the business
cycle, whereas we did not find any effects in the case of R&D and a symmetric
size effect in the case of physical capital. Calomiris et al. (1994)
investigated whether and how leverage and size affect the responses of
employment, ordinary investment and inventory demand to changes in sales,
allowing for different effects across the business cycle. On the one hand, the
leverage effects were strongly significant for inventory demand, notably
during the recession periods, but on the other hand statistically rather weak
in the case of ordinary investment. The differences in these findings may be
explained by the fact that adjustment costs are much higher for the stock of
' This evidence is cited in Bemanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993).r
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capital than for inventories. If firms decide to cut spending because of
declining cash flows and rising cost of external finance, they are likely to
begin by reducing inventories. Most other studies, that tested the financial
accelerator theory, compared the behavior of inventories and sales over the
business cycle at small and large firms and some of these, e.g. Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994), examined whether nonfinancial explanations for the observed
differences can be ruled out. These studies presented several pieces of
evidence in support of the financial accelerator theory.
With respect to the effects of liquidity constraints on investment
decisions, the evidence obtained by most others is just as weak as our
results. Bond and Meghir (1994) only obtained results that are consistent with
the Euler equation model for a subsample containing data from firms with a
high dividend payout ratio. An exception in the literature is Whited (1992),
who found evidence for a positive shadow value of debt in part of the sample,
which implies the presence of liquidity constraints. When she modeled the
shadow value of debt as a function of factors that affect the height of the
agency cost of borrowing, e.g. leverage and the interest coverage ratio, the
Euler equation for ordinary investment was no longer rejected.
6.3 General Problems
In carrying out this research we encountered several problems that could
not be adressed in this thesis because the analysis of these problems was
beyond the scope of this thesis or simply because of practical limitations.
However we would like to mention some of these problems to put the results in
perspective.
A number of problems are related to the use of Generalized Method of
Moments estimators. Various papers have examined the small sample properties
of the GMM estimators. Tauchen (1986) conducted a simulation study and found
that there is a bias/variance trade-off regarding the number of lags used to
form the instruments. Kocherlakota (1990) reached the more general conclusion
that the use of many instruments could lead to badly biased and inconsistent
estimates. This could be explained as follows. As the number of instruments
increases the relevance of each additional instrument, as measured by the
first-stage (partial) R*, is likely to become lower. The lower the relevance
of instruments, the higher the bias of the estimate. In Euler equation models.164
it is often difficult to find enough relevant instruments, as lags of the
variables are sometimes the only candidates. With weakly correlated
instruments, the inference can also be very misleading. Nelson and Startz
(1990) showed that estimates may appear highly significant, when the true
population values of the parameters equal zero. However Hall, Rudebusch and
Wilcox (1994) warned us that choosing instruments on the basis of relevance
criteria, such as partial R or canonical correlations, may actually
exacerbate the poor finite-sample properties of estimators. Finally, GMM based
Wald tests and the Sargan test for overidentifying moment restrictions are
based on the objective function for the GMM estimator. The finite sample
distribution of this statistic can differ considerably from its standard
asymptotic x distribution, because the latter does not take the sampling
variation of the weighting matrix into account.
A second important problem is the measurement of the stock of knowledge.
In theory, it includes all sorts of knowledge that the firm possesses or taps
from, e.g. spillovers. In practice, unless one studies these spillovers, the
stock of knowledge is usually approximated by a lag function of past own R&D
expenditures. However the R&D expenditures measure the in/wr to the process of
creating knowledge rather than the effective stock that results from R&D
efforts. The latter could in principle be measured by patent counts. The
relation between the oi/fpw/ of the knowledge production process and the ;>ipuf
is subject to some randomness, although in general more R&D efforts are
expected to lead to more knowledge. This randomness might lead to measurement
errors which, when serially correlated, invalidate lags of the inputs as
instruments.
Empirically the weights in the lag polynomial of R&D are hard to iden-
tify, because the R&D expenditures series is quite smooth. As a consequence,
the effects of the (small) changes in R&D expenditures are swamped by the
stochastic 'luck' factor in the production of knowledge. The weights in the
lag polynomial of R&D are determined by two kind of factors. First, factors
that influence the rate at which the stock of knowledge depreciates and
becomes obsolete. Second, factors that determine the time that elapses between
R&D investment and the moment at which it becomes productive or starts to
contribute to the revenues of the firm. Some have used patent citation data to
infer the rate of obsolescence of R&D, e.g. Caballero and Jaffe (1993). The
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estimating a model. The identification of the gestation lag is also hampered
by the smoothness of the R&D series.
In Chapter 4, we let the accumulation constraint for R&D take the form of
a Cobb-Douglas knowledge production function with constant returns to scale.
Klette (1994) argued that the properties implied by this function are more
consistent with the observed empirical facts, than those implied by the
'perpetual inventory' accumulation rule for R&D. This function can be
generalized by allowing for non constant returns to scale and a stochastic
'luck' factor. It is worth noting that the Cobb-Douglas specification for the
accumulation of knowledge includes an adjustment cost mechanism that works in
a symmetric way. Thus, in contrast to the usual adjustment cost specifications
that only result in a reduction of output, this mechanism affects the size of
the stock of input, e.g. the stock of knowlege G , and eventually output. In
the case of R&D, this property seems very realistic.
Finally as stressed before, we need better price information. We made an
effort in this thesis to measure changes in/differences in costs of funds, but
we could also use data on the effects of tax rules to obtain better factor
cost variables.166Bibliography
Abel, A., 1983, "Optimal Investment under Uncertainty," American Economic
fleview 73, 228-233.
Abel, A., and O. Blanchard, 1986, "The Present Value of Profits and Cyclical
Movements in Investment," Econome/nca 54, 249-273.
Abel, A., and J. Eberly, 1994, "A Unified Model of Investment under
Uncertainty," American Economic Review 84, 1369-1384.
Akerlof, G.A., 1970, "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality, Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism," Quarfer/>> /ou/via/ o/ Eco/iornicr 84, 488-500.
Arrow, K.J., 1962, "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention," in 77ie flafe and" Direction o/ /nven/ive Acm'/ry: Economic ana"
Soda/ Factors, edited by R.R. Nelson, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey.
Arrelano, M., and S. Bond, 1988, "Dynamic Panel Data Estimation using DPD:
A Guide for users," Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.
Arrelano, M., and S. Bond, 1991, "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data:
Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," /?evi'ew o/
Economic S/uaVes 58, 277-297.
Arrelano, M., and O. Bover, 1990, "Another Look at the Instrumental-Variable
Estimation of Error-Components Models," Discussion Paper No. 7, Centre for
Economic Performance, LSE, London.
Auerbach, A.J., 1979, "Wealth Maximization and the Cost of Capital,"
Quarterly Journa/ o/ Economics 93, 433-446.
Auerbach, A.J., 1984, "Taxes, Firm Financial Policy and the Cost of Capital:
an Empirical Analysis," 7o«rna/ o/ PuWi'c Economics 23, 27-57.
Bartelsman, E.J., and W.B. Gray, 1994, "Productivity Database," preliminary
document, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Bemanke, B., and J. Campbell, 1988, "Is there a Corporate Debt Crisis? ,"
BroofaVi^s Papers on Economic Acft'v/Ty, 83-125.
Bemanke, B., and M. Gertler, 1989, "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business
Fluctuations," American Economic Review 79, 14-31.168
Bemanke, B., J. Campbell, and T. Whited, 1990, "U.S. Corporate Leverage:
Developments in 1987 and 1988," Broo/fcingj Papers o« £co«omi'c Acfivify,
255-278.
Bernanke, B., and C. Lown, 1992, "The Credit Crunch," flroofa'/igs Papers on
Economic /4cfivj'ry, 205-239.
Bemanke, B., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist, 1993, "The Financial Accelerator
and the Flight to Quality," paper presented at NBER Meeting on
Developments in Business Cycle Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Bernstein, J.I., and M.I. Nadiri, 1988, "Rates of Return on Physical and R&D
Capital and Structure of the Production Process: Cross Section and Time
Series Evidence," in Advances in £conome/rics ana" A/ode/ing, edited by
B. Raj, Kluwer Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 169-187.
Blanchard, O., C. Rhee, and L. Summers, 1990, " The Stock Market, Profit and
Investment," Wor&ing Paper No. 3370, NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Bond, S., and C. Meghir, 1994, "Dynamic Investment Models and the Firm's
Financial Policy," /?eview o/ Economic Srufl7e.s 61, 197-222.
Brealey, R., and S. Myers, 1991, Prinap/es o/Corporate Finance, McGraw-Hill,
New York.
Breitung, J., and W. Meyer, 1991, "Testing for Unit Roots in Panel Data,"
paper presented at the ESEM 1991, Cambridge, England.
Broze, L., C. Gourie"roux and A. Szafarz, 1991, "Computation of Multipliers in
Multivariate Rational Expectations Models," Discussion Paper 9116, CORE,
Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.
Caballero, R., and A. Jaffe, 1993, "How High are the Giants' Shoulders: an
Empirical Assessment of Knowledge Spillovers and Creative Destruction in
a Model of Economic Growth," /VB£Pi Afacroeconomic Annwa/, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 15-86.
Caballero, R., and E. Engel, 1994, "Explaining Investment Dynamics in U.S.
Manufacturing: a Generalized (S,s) Approach," m//?ieo., M.I.T., Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Calomiris, C.W., A. Orphanides, and S.A. Sharpe, "Leverage as a State Variable
for Employment, Inventory Accumulation, and Fixed Investment," IVorfo'ng
Paper No. 4800, NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Calomiris, C.W., C.P. Himmelberg, and P. Wachtel, 1994, "Commercial Paper,
Corporate Finance, and the Business Cycle: a Microeconomic Perspective,"
Paper No. 4848, NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts.BIBLIOGRAPHY 169
Cantor, R., 1990, "Effects of Leverage on Corporate Investment and Hiring
Decisions," Feo". #«. San* t>//V«v >'<?r& QHarft>r/y flevraw, 31-41,
Cassing, S., and T. Kollintzas, 1991, "Recursive Factor of Production Interre-
lations and Endogenous Cycling," /n/er?w«(>rttf/ Economic /?<?vi*nv 32,
417-440.
Chamberlain, G., 1984, "Panel Data," in //and/xwit <?/ £co/KMn«n<\? Vol. II,
edited by Z. Griliches and M.D. Intriligator, Elsevier Publishers,
Amsterdam, 1247-1318.
Chamberlain, G., 1993, "Feedback in Panel Data Models," paper presented at
the Econometric Society Summer Meeting, Boston, Massachusetts.
Chevalier, J., and D. Scharfstein, 1994, "Capital Market Imperfections and
Countercyclical Markups: Theory and Evidence," Wonting Paper No. 4614,
NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Chevalier, J., and D. Scharfstein, 1995, "Capital Market Imperfections and
Countercyclical Markups," Amenconfcorto/m'c/JevieH'85, 390-396.
Chirinko, R., 1987, "Tobin's Q and Financial Policy," yourna/ o/ Monetary
Economics 19, 69-87.
Chirinko, R., 1993, "Business Fixed Investment Spending: Modelling Strategies,
Empirical Results and Policy Implications," yowna/ of Economic' LiVerefare
31, 1875-1911.
Chirinko, R., 1993, "Investment, Tobin's Q, and Multiple Capilal Inputs,"
yowrna/ o/ £cono/wic Dynamic a/w/ Confro/ 17, 907-928.
Chirinko, R., and H. Schaller, 1993, "Bubbles, Fundamentals, and Investment: a
Multiple Equation Testing Strategy," "/orfa'«£ Paper, Fed. Res. Bank of
Kansas.
Coen, R., 1971, "The Effect of Cash Flow on the Speed of Adjustment." in
To* /ncenrives and Capita/ Spending, edited by G. Fromm, The Blockings
Institution, Washington D.C., 131-1%.
Corres S., V. Hajivassiliou, and Y. loannides, 1993, "An Empirical
Investigation on the Dynamics of Qualitative Decisions of Firms," Wording
Paper, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
DeAngelo, H., and R. Masulis, 1980, "Optimal Capilal Structure under Corporate
and Personal Taxation," yourna/ o/ Fma/icia/ fcwiomicr 7, 3-29.
Eckstein, O., and A. Sinai, 1986, "The Mechanism of the Business Cycle in the
Postwar Era," in 77ie American fluj7/ie5.y Cyc/<?, edited by R.J. Gordon,
University of Chicago Press for NBER, 39-122.170
Eichenbaum, M., L.P. Hansen, and K. Singleton, 1988, "A Time Series Analysis
of Representative Agent Models of Consumption and Leisure Choice under
Uncertainty," Quarre/7y 7o«r/ia/ 0/ Economics 103, 51-78.
Eisner, R., 1978, Factors /n fiuji'nws /nvetfmen/, Ballinger, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Eisner, R., and R. Strotz, 1963, "Determinants in Business Investment," in
/wipac/ 0/ A/onefary Po/iry, Commission on Money and Credit, Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 59-233.
Epstein, L.G., and M.G.S. Denny, 1983, "The Multivariate Flexible Accelerator
Model : its Empirical restrictions and an Application to U.S.
Manufacturing," Econome/rica 51, 647-674.
Epstein, L., and A. Yatchew, 1985, "The Empirical Determination of Technology
and Expectations," ./01/rna/ 0/ Econome/rics 27, 235-258.
Fazzari, S., R.G. Hubbard, and B. Petersen, 1988, "Financing Constraints and
Corporate Investment," with comments, Brooding.? Papers on Economic
Acrivify, 141-205.
Fazzari, S.M., and B.C. Petersen, 1993, "Investment Smoothing with Working
Capital: New Evidence on Financing Constraints," /?and ./owrrca/ 0/
Economics 24, 328-342.
Feldstein, M., and J. Jun, 1987, "The Effects of Tax Rules on Nonresidential
Fixed Investment: Some Preliminary Evidence from the 1980s," in 77ie
£//i?cfs 0/ 7axa/ion on Capi/a/ Accumu/arion, edited by M. Feldstein,
University of Chicago Press for NBER, 101-156.
Fisher, I., 1933, "The Debt-deflation Theory of Great Depressions,"
Economefn'ca 1, 337-357.
Galeotti, M., and F. Schiantarelli, 1991, "Generalized Q Models for
Investment," /?eview 0/ Economics and Sfafisfics 73, 383-392.
Gale, D., and M. Hellwig, 1985, "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts 1: the
One-Period Problem," Review 0/ Economic SfudVes 52, 647-664.
Gertler, M., 1988, "Financial Structure and Aggregate Economic Activity: an
Overview," with comments, /ourna/ 0/ Money, Crec/i/, and flanAing 20,
559-596.
Gertler, M., 1992, "Financial Capacity and Output Fluctuations in an Economy
with Multi-Period Financial Relationships," Review 0/ Economic Sfudies 59,
455-472.BIBLIOGRAPHY 171
Gertler, M., and S. Gilchrist, 1993, "The Role of Credit Market Imperfections
in the Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Arguments and Evidence,"
.Sra/u/mavian /ourna/ o/ fcortom/cj 95, 43-64.
Gertler, M., and S. Gilchrist, 1994, "Monetary Policy, Business Cycles, and
the Behaviour of Small Manufacturing Firms, £)uarteW;y 7o«r«a/ o/
Economics 108, 309-340.
Gilchrist, S., 1990, "An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Investment and
Financing Hierarchies Using Firm-Level Panel Data," mi'meo.. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington D.C. .
Gilchrist, S., and C. Himmelberg, 1991, "Tobin's Q, Fundamental Q, and
Corporate Investment: A Comparison Using Panel Data," mimeo.. Fed. Res.
Board, Washington D.C. .
Gilchrist, S., and C. Himmelberg, 1993, "Evidence on the Role of Cash Row for
Investment," FEDS Wor/ting Pa/w 93-7, Fed. Res. Board, Washington D.C.
Godfrey, L.G., 1978, "Testing against General Autoregressive and Moving
Average Error Models when the Regressors Include Lagged Dependent
Variables," Economefnca 46, 1293-1302.
Gordon, R.J., 1986, editor of 77ie American Su.rine.r.y Cyc/e: Confi/iuify anrf
Change, University of Chicago Press for NBER.
Gordon, S., 1992, "Costs of Adjustment, the Aggregation Problem and
Investment," 77ie fteview o/ Economics and" Stafiswcs 74, 422-429.
Griliches, Z., 1984, editor of /?<£D, Patente ami Prodwcriviry, University of
Chicago Press for NBER.
Griliches, Z., and J. Mairesse, 1983, "Comparing Productivity Growth: an
Exploration of French and U.S. Industrial and Firm Data," £i/ropean Economic
/?evi>w 21, 89-119.
Griliches, Z., and J. Mairesse, 1984, "Productivity and R&D at the Firm
Level," in /?<£D, Fa/en/s and /VoducHviry, edited by Z. Griliches,
University of Chicago Press for NBER, 339-374.
Griliches, Z., and j. Mairesse, 1995, "Production Functions: the Search for
Identification," Worfa'/ig Paper No. 5067, NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Gross, D., 1994, "The Investment and Financing Decisions of Liquidity
Constrained Firms," mi'meo., M.I.T., Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Grossman, G., and O. Hart, 1982, "Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial
Incentives," in 7«e Economics o/ /n/orma«'on and l/nc«7ai7i/y, edited by
J. McCall, University of Chicago Press.172
Grunfeld, Y., 1960, "The Determinants of Corporate Investment," in T«e
/or DwraWe Gocxif, edited by A. Harberger, University of Chicago Press,
211-266.
Haley, C. and L. Schall, 1979, 77i<? 77ieory o/Fiminria/ Decisions, McGraw-Hill,
New York.
Hall, A.R., G.D. Rudebusch, and D.W. Wilcox, 1994, "Judging Instrument
Relevance in Instrumental Variables Estimation," ww'wieo., North Carolina
State University, Raleigh, North Carolina.
Hall, B.H., 1990a, "The Manufacturing Sector Master File: 1959-1987,"
Worit/ng Paper No. 3366, NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Hall, B.H., 1990b, "The Impact of Corporate Restructuring on Industrial
Research and Development," BrooAj/igi Papers on £cono/nic Ac/iviry,
85-135.
Hall, B.H., 1991, "Firm-Level Investment and Liquidity Constraints: What can
the Euler equations tell us? ," mimeo., University of California at
Berkeley.
Hall, B.H., 1992, "Investment and Research and Development at the Firm Level:
Does the Source of Financing matter? ," Wontmg Paper No. 92-194,
University of California at Berkeley.
Hall, B.H., 1993, "Industrial Research during the 1980s: Did the Rate of
Return Fall? ," firooAi/igi Papers on £cwjo/nic Acr/viry, 289-343.
Hall, B.H., Z. Griliches, and J. Hausman, 1986, "Patents and R&D: is there a
Lag? ," /nfernariona/ Economic Review 27, 265-283.
Hall, B.H., and F. Hayashi, 1989, "Research and Development as an Investment,"
Wording Paper No. 2973, NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Hall, R., and D. Jorgenson, 1971, "Application of the Theory of Optimum
Capital Accumulation," in 7a* /ncen/ives ana" Capi/a/ Spending, edited by
G. Fromm, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. .
Hamermesh, D.S., 1989, "Labor Demand and the Structure of Adjustment Costs,"
jAmer/can Economic /?e\'iew 79, 674-689.
Hamermesh, D.S., 1993, "Labor Demand and the Source of Adjustment Costs,"
Wonting Paper No. 4394, NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Hansen, L.P., 1982," Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments
Estimators," Econome/ri'ca 50, 1029-1054.
Hansen, L.P., and T. Sargent, 1980a, "Formulating and Estimating Dynamic
Linear Rational Expectations Models," Journa/ o/ Economic Dynamics ana"
Comro/ 2, 7-46.BIBLIOGRAPHY 17$
Hansen, L.P., and T, Sargeni, 1980b, "Linear Rational Expectations Models for
Dynamically Inserrelated Variables," in Rd/wno/ Ex/wcrafjonj anrf
£o»K»?K-?rie: Prscftte, edited by R. Lucas and T. Sargent, University of
Minnesota Press, 127-136.
Harris, M., and A. Raviv, 1990, "Financial Contracting Theory," Woribng
Paper 82, Kellogg School, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.
Harris, M., and A. Raviv, 1991, "The Theory of Capital Structure," ,/<Wflo{ of
Financ* 46, 297-355.
Hart, O,, 1991, "Theories of Optimal Capital Structure: a Principal-Agent
Perspective," m/meo., M.I.T., Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Hayashi, F., 1982, "Tobin's Marginal Q and Average Q: a Neoclassical
Interpretation," Economefrica 50, 213-224.
Hayashi, F., 1985, "Corporate Finance Side of the Q Theory of Investment,"
/oar/ia/ o/PuMe Economics 27, 261-280.
Hayashi, F., and T. Inoue, 1991, "The Finn Growth - Q Relationship with
Multiple Capital Goods: Theory and Evidence from Panel Data on Japanese
Firms," fcwjomefrica 59, 731-754.
Himmelberg, C.P., and B.C. Petersen, 1994, "R&D and Internal Finance: a Panel
Data Study of Small Firms in High-Tech Industries," fleview o/Economics ana"
•Star/srics 76, 38-51.
Holtz-Eakin, D., W. Newey, and H. Rosen, 1988, "Estimating Vector
Autoregressions with Panel Data," EconomeWica 56, 1371-1395.
Ioannides, Y.M., and B. Taub, 1992, "On Dynamics with Time-to-Build Investment
Technology and Non-Time-Separable Leisure," Journa/ o/Economic Dynamics
and Conrro/ 16, 225-241.
Jensen, M., 1986, "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and
Takeovers," American Economic /teviw 76, 323-339.
Jensen, M., and W. Meckling, 1976, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour,
Agency Costs, and Capital Structure," /ourna/ o/ Financi'a/ Economics 3,
305-360.
Jorgenson, D.W., 1963, "Capital Theory and Investment Behavior," American
Economic flevi'ew 53, 247-259.
Jorgenson, D.W., 1967, "The Theory of Investment Behaviour," in Determinant
o/ /nveifmenf flenaviour, Universities-National Bureau Conference Series
No. 18, edited by R. Ferber, Columbia University Press, New York,
129-155.174
Jtfrgenson, S., P.M. Kon, and G.-J.C.Th. van Schijndel, 1989, "Optimal
Investment, Financing, and Dividends: a Stackelberg Differential Game,"
,/cnirna/ <?/ Econo/nic Dynamics anc/ Confro/ 13, 339-377.
Kamien, M. and L. Schwartz, 1982, Marker Sfrucfure and /wiovatt'on, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Kashyap, A., O. Lamont, and J. Stein, 1993, "Credit Conditions and the
Cyclicals Behavior of Inventories: A case Study of the 1981-1982
Recession," Wording Paper 93-07, Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago.
Kashyap, A., J. Stein, and D. Wilcox, 1993, "Monetary Policy and Credit
Conditions: Evidence from the Composition of External Finance," American
fcono/m'c fleview 83, 78-98.
Kashyap, A., and J. Stein, 1993, "Monetary Policy and Bank Lending," Worfan^
Paper No. 4317, NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Keane, M.P., and D.E. Runkle, 1992, "On the Estimation of Panel-Data Models
with Serial Correlation when Instruments are not Strictly Exogenous,"
with comments and reply, ./our/ia/ o/ Business <£ £CO/IOOT/C Sfa/isricj 10,
1-29.
Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore, "Credit Cycles," Wording Paper No. 5083, NBER,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Klette, T. J., 1994, "R&D, Scope Economics and Company Structure: a 'not so
Fixed Effect' Model of Plant Performance," mimeo., Research Department of
Statistics Norway.
Kocherlakota, N., 1990, "On Tests of Representative Consumer Asset Pricing
Models," /ourna/ o/ Mo«efar>' fconewiics 26, 285-304.
Kodde, D.A., and F.C. Palm, 1986, "Wald Criteria for Jointly Testing equality
and Inequality Restrictions," £cwio/ne/r/ca 54, 1243-1248.
Kollintzas, T., 1985, "The Symmetric Linear Rational Expectations Model,"
ficono/nern'ca 53, 963-976.
Kollintzas, T., 1986, "A Non-Recursive Solution for the Linear Rational
Expectations Model," ./our/ia/ o/ £co/jomic Dynamics ana" Con/ro/ 10,
327-332.
Korajczyk, R., D. Lucas, and R. McDonald, 1990, "Understanding Stock Price
Behaviour around the Time of Equity Issues," in Asjmme/ric /n/ormaft'on,
Corpora/e Finance, and /nves/men/, edited by G. Hubbard, University of
Chicago Press, 257-277.
Kydland, F.E., and E.C. Prescott, 1982, "Time-to-Build and Aggregate
Fluctuations," £conome/rica 50, 1345-1370.BIBLIOGRAPHY 175
Lee, L.F., G.S. Maddala. and R.P. Trost, 1979, "Testing for Structural Change
by D-Methods in Switching Simultaneous Equation Models," in Proceedings 0/
/ne fiz«ine,s.s an<i Economic Secrt'on, American Statistical Association,
Washington D.C., 461-466.
Lee, L.F., G.S. Maddala. and R.P. Trost, 1980, "Asymptotic Covariance Matrices
of Two-Stage Probit and Two-Stage Tobit Methods for Simultaneous Equations
Models with Selectivity," Economefrica 48, 491-503.
Leland, H., and D. Pyle, 1977, "Information Assymetries, Financial Structure,
and Financial Intermediation," ./onma/ o/Finance 32, 371-388.
Long, M., and I. Malitz, 1985, "Investment Patterns and Financial Leverage,"
in Corporate Capifa/ S/ruc/ures in r/ie t/ni7e<i Stato, edited by
B.M. Friedman, University of Chicago Press, 325-352.
Lucas, R., 1976, "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique," in Carneg/e-
flocnes/er Con/erence 5en'« o/ fuMc Po/icy, North-Holland, Amsterdam,
19-46.
MaCurdy, T., 1981, "An Empirical Model of Labor Supply in a Life-cycle
Setting," yourna/ o/Po/m'ca/ Economy 89, 1059-1085.
Madan, D.B., and I.R. Prucha, 1989, "A Note on the Estimation of Nonsymmelric
Dynamic Factor Demand Models," /ourna/ o/ £to/io»iern« 42, 275-283.
Maddala, G.S., 1983, Li'mired DepenoWif and ^ua//7a«'ve Variao/es in
Economerrici, Econometric Society Monographs No. 3, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, England.
Mairesse, J., and A.K. Siu, "An Extended Accelerator Model of R&D and Physical
Investment," in /?<£D, Parente and ProdWm'iTy, edited by Z. Griliches, The
University of Chicago Press for NBER, 209-232.
Mairesse, J., and Z. Griliches, 1990, "Heterogeneity in Panel Data: are there
Stable Production Functions? ," in £iia>'s in Wonor o/ £dVnond Ma//nvaud\
Vo/. 3, Empin'ca/ Economics, edited by P. Champsaur et al., M.I.T. Press,
192-231.
Mayer, Th., 1960, "Plant and Equipment Lead Times," 77ie yowrna/ o/Bwi/neM,
33, 127-132.
Meyer, J., and E. Kuh, 1957, 77ie /nverf/nenf Dediion, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Miller, M., 1977, "Debt and Taxes," yourna/ o/F/nunte 32, 261-275.
Miller, M., and F. Modigliani, 1961, "Dividend Policy, Growth and the
Valuation of Shares," yourna/ o/fiui/ntii 34, 411-432.176
Modigliani, F., and M. Miller, 1958, "The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance,
and the Theory of Investment," A/werica/i Econo/H/c /teview 48, 261-297.
Modigliani, F., and M. Miller, 1959, "The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance,
and the Theory of Investment: Reply," /4»icrica« Economic /Jcview 49,
655-669.
Modigliani, F., and M. Miller, 1963, "Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of
Capital," /imencan Economic Review 53, 433-443.
Modigliani, F., and M. Miller, 1969, "Reply to Heins and Sprenkle," American
Economic flevi'ew 59, 592-595.
Mohnen, P.A., M.I. Nadiri, and I.R. Prucha, 1986, "R&D, Production Structure
and Rates of Return in the Japanese and German Manufacturing Sectors,"
£i/ropean Economic Review 30, 749-771.
Mussa, M., 1977, "External and Internal Adjustment Costs and the Theory of
Aggregate and Firm Investment," Economica 44, 163-178.
Myers, S., 1977, "Determinants of Corporate Borrowing," 7ourna/ o/Fina/ic/a/
Economics 5, 147-175.
Myers, S., 1984, "The Capital Structure Puzzle," /ourna/ o/ Finance 39,
575-592.
Myers, S., and N. Majluf, 1984, "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
when Firms have Information that Investors don't have," /ourna/ o/
Financia/ Economics 13, 187-221.
Nadiri, M.I., and G.C. Bitros, 1980, "Research and Development Expenditures
and Labor Productivity at the Firm Level," in New Dei'e/opmen/5 in
Prot/uc/ivi/j Measurement and .Analysis, edited by J.W. Kendrick and
B.N. Vaccara, University of Chicago Press for NBER, 387-416.
Neftci, S., 1984, "Are Economic Time-Series Asymmetric over the Business
Cycle? ," ./ourna/ o/Po/ifica/ Economy 92, 1984, 307-328.
Nelson, C. and R. Startz, 1990, "The Distribution of the Instrumental
Variables Estimator and its t-ratio When the Instrument is a Poor One,"
Jottrna/ o/Business 63, 125-140.
Newey, W.K., 1985, "Generalized Method of Moments Specification Testing,"
/owrna/ o/ Econometrics 29, 229-256.
Newey, W.K., and K.D. West, 1987, "A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite,
Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix,"
Economefn'ca 55, 703-708.
Newey, W.K., and K.D., West, 1988, "Hypothesis testing with Efficient Method
of Moments Estimation," /nternafiona/ Economic /?ei7ew 28, 777-787.BIBLIOGRAPHY J77
Oliner, S., and G. Rudebusch, 1992, "Sources of the Financing Hierarchy for
Business Investment," /Jeviw o/ Ecomwiit\s ana" 5/arfj/io- 74, 643-654.
Opler, T., and S., Titman, "Financial Distress and Corporate Performance,"
/ottrna/#/Finance 49, 1015-1040.
Pakes, A., and M. Schankerman, 1978, The Rate of Obselescence of Patents,
Research Gestation Lags, and the Private Rate of Return to Research
Resources," D/som/on Paper No. 659, Harvard Institute of Economic
Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Pakes, A., and M. Schankerman, 1984, "An Exploration into the Determinants of
Research Intensity," in /?<££>, Pa/enw and ProaW/iviTy, edited by
Z. Griliches, University of Chicago Press for NBER, 209-232.
Palm, F.C, H.M.M. Peelers, and G.A. Piann, 1993, "Adjustment Costs and
Time-to-build in Factor Demand in the U.S. Manufacturing Industry,"
£mpin'ca/ Economics 18, 639-671.
Pindyck, R.S., 1991, "Irreversibility, uncertainty, and investment," JOH/TW/
o/ Economic L/ferarure 29, 1110-1148.
Pindyck, R.S., and J.J. Rotemberg, 1983, "Dynamic Factor Demand under Rational
Expectations," Scandinavian 7ourna/ o/" Economics 85, 223-238.
Poterba, J., and L. Summers, 1983, "Dividend Taxes, Corporate Investment,
and Q," /owrna/ O/PMD/IC Economics 22, 135-167.
Remolona, E., R. McCauley, J. Ruud, and F. Iacono, 1993, "Corporate
Refinancing in the 1990s," Fee/, /?es. Ban/: o/ New Kor/I: Qnar/er/> /Jeview
(Winter), 1-27.
Ross, S., 1977, "The Determination of Financial Structure," Be// 7ourna/ o/
Economics 8, 23-40.
Rothschild, M., 1971, "On the Cost of Adjustment," £?«ar/er/y 7o«rna/ o/
fconomic-5 85, 605-622.
Salinger, M, and L. Summers, 1983, "Tax reform and corporate investment:
A microeconomic simulation study," in flenaviora/ Si'mw/arion Me/noas /«
Tax Po/icy Ana/yjw, edited by Martin Feldstein, University of Chicago
Press for NBER, 247-288.
Sargent, T.J., 1987, Macroeconomic 7neor>>, 2nd edition. Academic Press,
San Diego, California.
Schumpeter, J.A., 1942, Capifa/ii/n, Socia/iMn ana* Democracy, Harper and Row,
New York.
Shapiro, M.D., 1986a, "The Dynamic Demand for Capital and Labour," (?uarfer/;y
o/ Economics 101, 513-542.178
Shapiro, M.D., 1986b, "Investment, Output and the Cost of Capital,"
Papers o/i Economic Acftvi/y, 111-152.
Sharpe, S., 1994, "Financial Market Imperfections, Firm Leverage, and the
Cyclically of Employment," Awier/ca/i Economic /?eview 84, 1060-1074.
Shea, J., 1993, "Instrumental Relevance in Linear Models: A Simple Measure,"
Dijcuijion Paper, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 1992, "Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity:
A Market Equilibrium Approach," /owna/ o/Fina/jce 47, 1343-1366.
Stenbacka, R., 1992, "Financial Structure and Tacit Collusion with Repeated
Oligopoly Competition," Wor/ti/ig Paper, Abo Akademi University, Finland.
Stiglitz, J. and A. Weiss, 1981, "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information," American Economic Review 71, 393-440.
Stulz, R., 1990, "Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies,"
7o«rna/ o/ F/nancia/ Economics 26, 3-27.
Szroeter, J., 1983, "Generalized Wald methods for testing nonlinear implicit
and overidentifying restrictions," Economefrica 51, 335-353.
Tauchen, G., 1986, "Statistical Properties of Generalized Method of Moment
Estimators of Structural Parameters Obtained from Financial Market Data,"
•/ourna/ o/ flwsiness <£ Economic Sfafisrics 4, 397-425.
Tinbergen, J., 1939, "A Method and its Application to Investment Activity," in
Sfaft'sfica/ 7es/in£ o/ 5u.sine.H C>r/e 77ieories, Vol. 1, League of Nations
Economic Intelligence Service, Geneva.
Tobin, J., 1969, "A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory," 7o«rna/
o/Afone.y, CrediV, ana" fian/ting 1, 15-29.
Townsend, R., 1979, "Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly
State Verification," /onrna/ o/Economic T/ieorv 21, 265-293.
Wagner, L.U., 1968, "Problems in Estimating Research and Development as a
Stock," in Proceedings o/ /ne Business and Economic Sec/ion, American
Statistical Association, Washington D.C., 189-198.
Whited, T.M., 1991, "Investment and Financial Asset Accumulation," 7onrna/
o/Financia/ /nfermediarion 1, 307-334.
Whited, T.M., 1992, "Debt, Liquidity Constraints, and Corporate Investment:
Evidence from Panel Data," /ourna/ o/Finance 47, 1425-1460.
Williamson, O., 1988, "Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance," /owrna/o/
Finance 43, 567-591.
Wolfson, P., 1993, "Compositional change, aggregation, and dynamic factor
demand," /oi/rna/ o/App/ied Econome/rics 8, 129-148.List of Symbols
A production function parameters in Ch. 2; total assets in Ch. 5
A matrices of coefficients in I~I(L) in Ch. 3
A" matrices in Ch. 3
B matrix of adjustment cost parameters in Ch. 2; debt (stock) in Ch. 1,4,5
B ,B matrices in Ch. 3
B,D adj. cost function parameters
C matrix of parameters in Ch. 3
D matrix of adjustment cost parameters in Ch. 2;
matrix of parameters in Ch. 3; dividends in Ch. 1,5
E matrix of production function par. in Ch. 2; value of shares in Ch. 5
£ conditional expectation operator w.r.t. Q
F type of input; production function in Ch. 1; number of inputs in Ch. 3
G R&D stock; matrix of adjustment cost parameters in Ch. 3
H weekly hours of work in Ch. 2; matrix of adjustment cost par. in Ch. 3
I investment in capital of type F
K physical capital (stock)
K matrices in Ch. 3
L number of employees in Ch. 2; Lag operator in Ch. 3




R matrices in Ch. 3
S sales; inverse matrix of eigenvectors of -(C~')D in Ch. 3
T last year of sample
V value of the firm
V^ new shares issue
W matrix in Ch. 3; financial working capital (stock) in Ch. 5
W lower bound of financial working capital
W matrix in Ch. 3; mean of financial working capital in Ch. 5
X vector of inputs (stock) in Ch. 2,4;
equals -(C ')D in Ch. 3; explanatory variables in Ch. 5
Y output
Z matrix in Ch. 3; variable inputs in Ch. 4; explanatory variable in Ch. 5180
AC adjustment cost function
ADJ Adj. term for short term assets
AGC agency cost function




CFS Closed Form Solution
CPI inflation rate
CSFL real cash flow
ELC Euler Lagrange Conditions
FEDR discount rate
GMM Generalized Method of Moments
INDP industrial production




LRE Linear Rational Expectations
ML;MS lev-lev; size-size
PAYOTHaccounts payable







WK working capital (current assets minus short term liabilities)
P(L) matrix lag polynomial corresponding to gestation lags
Q(L) matrix lag polynomial corresponding to adjustment cost function
R(L) matrix lag polynomial of order g
U(L) matrix lag polynomial of order x
V(L) matrix lag polynomial
a prod. fct. par. in Ch. 2
b multiplier in Ch. 1; adj. cost par. in Ch. 2; red. form par. in Ch. 5
6,3 adjustment cost parametersLIST OF SYMBOLS 181
c constant in knowledge production function
c adjustment cost parameters
c ,C multiplicative firm effects
i i
d adjustment cost parameters in Ch. 2; multiplier in Ch. 1,5
d deterministic part of u in Ch. 3
d(.) functions of regressors (submodel) in Ch. 5
f type of input
f additive firm effect
f(j) function with integer argument defined in Ch. 3
g J + x in Ch. 3; growth rate of R&D expenditures in Ch. 4
g(.) technology function
i firm index
m tests for autocorrelation of order i
i
p nominal output price
p^ real price of input F
p ;j> nominal price of input F; nominal prices of variable inputs (vector)
q personal income tax rate
r nominal interest rate
s^ gross change in stock of capital of type f (j periods from completion)





u error; driving processes in Ch. 3
v multiplier in Ch. 1,5
w error
i
y,x variables (endogenous/predetermined); inputs (stock) in Ch. 3
z instruments
o point of approximation
A difference operator
0 matrix of parameters of e" process in Ch. 3
A*,A"diagonal matrix containing A/\ X"
A;M equals S'AS in Ch. 3; M equals I - A in Ch. 3
H lemon's premium
n long run revenue function
I1(L) matrix lag polynomial in Ch. 3
M**" investment parameters (type F)
£2 set containing information until time t182
a Cobb-Douglas constant •••• ••••••
a Cobb-Douglas input F elasticities of output
& Cobb-Douglas input F elasticities of revenue
P reduced form parameters in Ch. 4,5
Y discount factor; MA parameters in Ch. 2,4; reduced form par. in Ch. 5
5 Dirac function
8 reduced form parameters in Ch. 2; structural parameters in Ch. 5
S*' depreciation rate of capital of type F
e° demand shock
e^ revision process
£ reduced form parameters in Ch. 2,4; agency cost parameters in Ch. 5;
diagonal matrix containing eigenvalues of -(C )D in Ch. 3
T) elasticity of scale in Ch. 4; multiplier in Ch. 5
i3 parameters in cost share function in Ch. 2;
0 multiplicative time effect
9 gestation lag in Ch. 2; constant in Ch. 4; parameter vector in Ch. 5
8 gestation lags of quasi-fixed input (of type F)
X (parameters in) adjustment speed (fct.) in Ch. 4; multiplier in Ch. 1,5
X*,X." roots of f-th equation of Q(X) = 0
f f
H parameters in partial adj. mechanism in Ch. 4; multiplier in Ch. 1,5
H technological shock (affecting input of type F)
v elasticity in knowledge production function
^ ^multipliers in Ch. 5
^ a particular function of revision processes in Ch. 3
n inflation rate in Ch. 2; reduced form parameters in Ch. 5
p required rate of return
p,r functions of regressors (submodels) in Ch. 5
O correlation parameter
x corporate lax rate; order of MA process in Ch. 3
«)) adjustment cost parameters
<j);<l> standard normal density function; standard normal distribution function
X* chi-squared distribution
m^ mixed chi-squares distribution
\(/° elasticity of demand
V(/^ building scheme parameters (type F)
CO capital gains tax rate
(0,Q parameter spaces corresponding to null and alternative hypothesis resp.Samenvatting - Summary in Dutch
De onderlinge samenhang tussen investeringen in fysiek kapitaal en R&D, en de
financieringsbeslissingen van bedrijven.
Doelstelling
Een beroemde stelling in de leer der bedrijfsfinanciering zegt dat onder
bepaalde onrealistische aannames financieringsbeslissingen en investerings-
beslissingen van bedrijven onafhankelijk van elkaar kunnen worden genomen. Het
nut van deze stelling van Modigliani en Miller (1958) is gelegen in het feit
dat zij duidelijk maakl dat in werkelijkheid deze beslissingen niet los van
elkaar kunnen worden gezien en vooral ook waarom dat niet kan.
In dit proefschrift wordt onderzocht hoe en in welke mate het
financieringsprobleem van invloed is op de omvang en de 'timing' van de
investeringen in fysiek kapitaal en onderzoek en ontwikkeling (R&D). Wij
onderscheiden daarbij drie mechanismen waardoor de financiele omstandigheden
van een bedrijf zijn investeringen mogelijk beinvloeden. Allereerst veronder-
stellen wij een (positief) verband tussen de verhouding tussen de schulden en
het onderpand van het bedrijf enerzijds en de kosten van externe financiering
anderzijds. Als tweede mechanisme dat het niveau van de investeringen kan
beinvloeden beschouwen wij financieringsrestricties, zoals de liquiditeits-
restricties, een bovengrens op schuldfinanciering en/of een ondergrens voor
(financieel) werkkapitaal. Tenslotte is hel denkbaar dat financiele factoren
via het aanpassingsmechanisme niet zozeer het volume van de investeringen
bepalen als wel het moment waarop zij plaatsvinden binnen de conjunctuur-
cyclus.
Alvorens de financieringsaspecten in de modellering van bedrijfsinvesteringen
te betrekken, wordt de dynamiek van deze processen onderzocht. Hierbij worden
twee bronnen van dynamiek beschouwd: aanpassingskosten en bouwtijden. In een
afzonderlijk theoretisch hoofdstuk worden de eigenschappen van de oplossing
van een lineair rationele verwachtingen model met aanpassingskosten en
bouwtijden bestudeerd.
Door het hele proefschrift heen wordt aandacht geschonken aan econometrische
problemen zoals de enorme heterogeniteit in de gegevens, meetfouten,
simultaniteit en timing van variabelen en de formulering van momentencondities184
voor de constructie van schatters.
Hieronder volgen de samenvattingen van de afzonderlijke hoofdstukken.
In //oo/jfMJfc 7 wordt een literatuuroverzicht gegeven van de neoklassieke
investeringsmodellen en de theorieen over de financieringsbeslissingen van
bedrijven. Vervolgens wordl de empirische literatuur over de gevolgen van
onvolkomenheden in het functioneren van de kapitaalmarkten voor investeringen
in fysiek kapitaal en R&D besproken. Daarbij wordt ook aandacht besteed aan de
problemen die men tegenkomt bij dit onderzoeksterrein en de tekortkomingen van
de strategieen die in het verleden gebruikt zijn om de effecten te
onderzoeken.
//00/y.yMfc 2 is gewijd aan de specificatie en schatting van Euler verge-
lijkingen voor de vraag naar kapitaal, R&D en arbeid. De model len zijn flexi-
bel gespecificeerd, zodat ze de dynamiek van de produktiefactoren, die
voortvloeit uit aanpassingskosten en bouwtijd, en hun wederzijdse beinvloeding
als ook de heterogeniteit van bedrijven, waar het hun grootte en
factorintensiteiten betreft, zo goed mogelijk kunnen beschrijven: de modellen
zijn een variant op het lineaire 'rationele verwachtingen' model van
Kollintzas (1985). In deze modellen worden de financieringsaspecten van de
factorvraag echter buiten beschouwing gelaten.
Omdat het factorvraag-model geen zogenaamde 'gesloten vorm' oplossing heeft,
is het volgens de methode van gegeneraliseerde momenten (GMM) geschal. Om
betrekkelijk precieze schattingen te verkrijgen, vereist deze schattings-
methode de specificatie van 'relevante' momentencondities. Hiertoe werden de
tijdreekseigenschappen van de produktiefactoren onderzocht. De reeksen van
alle drie de produktiefactoren blijken minimaal een eenheidswortel te hebben
en R&D kapitaal blijkt er zelfs twee te hebben. Daarom was het wenselijk het
model voor R&D, dat heterogeniteit in het intercept toelaat, in niveaus te
schatten met instrumenten in eerste verschillen. Afgezien van de
eenheidswortels is de autocorrelatie die de reeksen van de produkliefactoren
vertonen laag. Daarom en ook vanwege de bouwtijden is een groot aantal
waamemingen nodig om de parameters enigermate precies te kunnen schatten.
De schattings- en toetsresultaten van hoofstuk 2 laten zich als volgt
samenvatten. Op de eerste plaats zijn de re/a«eve aanpassingskosten sterk
separabel van de niveaus van de produktiefactoren, wat overigens niel betekent
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verworpen. In de derde plaats vinden we dat de parameterschatlingen maar nel
significant zijn maar ook dat de schaller van de tijdsvoorkeurparaineter een
zeer redelijke waarde heeft. . •
In Aoo/tfafMA: ^ worden de eigenschappen van de oplossingen van een lineair
rationele verwachtingen model met zowel aanpassingskosten als bouwtijden
bestudeerd. Met behulp van een handige decompositie van bet matrix
vertragingspolynoom van de Euler-Lagrange voorwaarden, die dat van het model
zonder bouwtijden omvat, is aangetoond dat het model een unieke, stabiele
oplossing heeft. De stabiliteitsvoorwaarde die door Kollintzas (1985) was
afgeleid is in het uitgebreide model nog steeds van toepassing. Er wordt ook
een procedure aangegeven om een 'zoveel als mogelijk gesloten' oplossing van
het model af te leiden. Voor het autoregressieve gedeelte van de formulering
van de oplossing wordt in ieder geval een expliciete formule afgeleid.
In /ioo/ifafu/t 4 wordt de financiele accelerator theorie aan een toets
onderworpen. Volgens deze theorie verhogen de fluctuaties in de 'agency'
kosten van exteme financiering, die zich binnen een conjunctuurcyclus
voordoen, de snelheden waarmee de hoeveelheden van de quasi-vaste produklie-
middelen worden aangepast in de richting van de optimale hoeveelheden. De
amplitude van de fluctuaties in de 'agency' kosten wordt in verband gebracht
met enige factoren die eveneens het gemiddelde van die kosten beinvloeden: de
bedrijfsgrootte, de verhouding tussen de schulden en de bezittingen (de
'leverage') en de R&D-intensiteit van het bedrijf.
De financiele accelerator theorie wordt getoetst met behulp van twee
soorten modellen: een eenvoudig partiele aanpassingen model, waarbij de
aanpassingssnelheid afhangt van bovengenoemde determinanten van de 'agency'
kosten, en een structured 'Euler vergelijking' model dat voor verschillende
'leverage' categorieen binnen de steekproef wordt geschat, waama de
schattingen worden vergeleken. Voor beide soorten modellen gaan we na of er
sprake is van asymmetrie tussen de effecten op het aanpassingsgedrag in de
herstelfase en in de recessiefase van de conjunctuurcyclus respectievelijk.
Allereerst blijkt uit de statislische analyses dat de aanpassingssnelheid
van fysiek kapitaal hoger is naarmate een bedrijf kleiner is maar dat zij niet
gevoelig is voor de verhouding tussen de schulden en de bezittingen van het
bedrijf noch voor zijn R&D-intensiteit. Op de tweede plaats vinden we dat
zowel het niveau van de R&D investeringen als de aanpassingssnelheid van R&D
hoger zijn bij bedrijven die kleiner zijn dan wel een lagere 'leverage'186
hebben, althans wanneer we constantheid van de coefficienten veronderstellen.
Doen we dit niet, dan blijkt er nog slechts sprake te zijn van een hogere
aanpassingssnelheid van R&D tijdens de recessie, die niet samenhangt met de
bedrijfsgrootte noch met de 'leverage' van het bedrijf. Ook voor fysiek
kapitaal vinden we een hogere gemiddelde aanpassingssnelheid in de recessie,
dus ongeacht de karakteristieken van het bedrijf. De verklaring van het
(symmetrische) negatieve effect van de bedrijfsgrootte op de aanpassings-
snelheid van fysiek kapitaal zou gelegen kunnen zijn in het feit dat kleinere
bedrijven doorgaans flexibeler zijn in technisch en organisatorisch opzicht.
In /i00/<fcru& 5 worden Q modellen en Euler vergelijkingen voor
investeringen geschat, die rekening houden met liquiditeitsrestricties via de
schaduwprijzen van financienngsmiddelen en ook met een elastisch aanbod van
exteme middelen. De Euler vergelijkingen corresponderen met het waarde
maximalisatie probleem van een bedrijf met een Cobb-Douglas technologie met
kwadratische bruto aanpassingskosten. Omdat de schaduwprijzen niet
waameembaar zijn, zijn deze modellen niet zonder meer geschikt voor een
empirische analyse. Door een eerste orde voorwaarde voor een andere
beslissingsvariabele in de doelstellingsfunctie van het bedrijf, namelijk voor
werkkapitaal, af te leiden en een veronderstelling te maken over het gedrag
van de schaduwprijs van deze variabele, zijn wij in staat een verband te
leggen tussen de schaduwprijzen van de financienngsmiddelen en het
werkkapitaal van een bedrijf, dat we wel kunnen waamemen. Werkkapitaal lijkt
een geschiktere variabele om veranderingen in de liquiditeit van bedrijven te
meten dan sommige andere variabelen, die in het verleden gebruikt zijn, zoals
dividenden en aandelen-emissies, omdat deze variabele beweeglijker en ook
continu is. Wij geven argumenten waarom een stijging van werkkapitaal,
gedefinieerd als het verschil tussen cash en de korte termijn schulden,
ge'interpreteerd kan worden als een verslechtering van de liquiditeitspositie
van een bedrijf.
Onze variant van het Q model met liquiditeitsrestricties komt tegemoet
aan de kritiek op benaderingen die in het verleden gevolgd zijn. Ten eerste
laten wij de coefficient van Q varieren met de verandering in de
liquiditeitspositie van het bedrijf. Daarmee wordt ook de ad hoc toevoeging
van een term die de verandering van de liquiditeitspositie zou moeten
weergeven, zoals cash flow, overbodig. Ten tweede wordt er rekening gehouden
met de endogeniteit van de veranderingen in de liquiditeitspositie van eenSUMMARY IN DUTCH 187
bedrijf door de Q vergelijking te schatten als een model met endogene
regimes.
In beide modellen worden de kosten van exteme financiering gemodelleerd
als functie van de verhouding tussen schuld en de kapitaalvoorraad.
De resultaten die zijn verkregen voor de Euler vergelijkingen voor fysiek
kapitaal en R&D zijn net zo zwak als die in andere studies, ondanks de nieuwe
modelleerstrategie. Hoewel de schattingen van de coefficienten van
werkkapitaal wel de juiste tekens hebben, zijn zij vaak niet significant. Ook
de coefficienten van de productiviteitstermen hebben nog steeds het verkeerde
teken. Daarom kunnen zij misschien beter geihterpreteerd worden als variabelen
die de verandering in de liquiditeit weergeven. Zowel in de Euler verge-
lijkingen als in de Q modellen zijn investeringen en de (vertraagde) waarde
van schuld negatief gecorreleerd.
De negatieve correlatie tussen de veranderingen in de omzet en het
werkkapitaal van een bedrijf en de positieve correlatie van werkkapitaal met
de schaduwprijs van financieringsmiddelen suggereren dat werkkapitaal mede uit
voorzorg wordt aangehouden. Verder ondersteunen de patronen in de
jaargemiddeldes van werkkapitaal en 'leverage' de 'reliqueficatie'-theorie:
aan het eind van de recessie en in het begin van een periode van herstel van
de economie verbeteren bedrijven eerst hun financiele positie door een deel
van hun schuld af te lossen en hun werkkapitaal te vergroten alvorens weer te
investeren.
Hoofdstuk 6 vergelijkt tenslotte de bevindingen omtrent de invloed van de
verschillende financiele mechanismes op de investeringen, d.w.z. de invloed
van de liquiditeitsrestricties, de financiele accelerator en de elastische
aanbodcurve van externe fiancieringsmiddelen op de investeringen, met die van
andere studies en sluit af met de bespreking van een aantal methodologische
problemen bij het schatten en toetsen van de modellen en het meten van de R&D
kapitaalvoorraad.
De belangrijkste indruk die naar voren komt bij de empirische
investeringsstudies in dit proefschrift maar ook bij die van anderen is dat
ondanks de grote hoeveelheid micro-data de schattingsresultaten vaak maar net
significant zijn. Zoals elders in dit proefschrift al is opgemerki, zijn daar
vele verschillende oorzaken voor aan te geven, zoals bijvoorbeeld de enorme
heterogeniteit van bedrijven, meetfouten of gewoon gebrek aan bepaalde
informatie. Door modellen flexibeler te specificeren en/of te transformeren,188
kan men het risico dat een geschat model een sterk vertekend beeld geeft
verkleinen. Dit gaat echter ten koste van informatie en dus ten koste van de
precisie van de schattingen. Om dit te voorkomen is het wenselijk om de
verschillen tussen de bedrijven beter te modelleren. Daarvoor hebben wij goede
theorieen en ook betere data nodig.
De rol die de beschikbaarheid en de kosten van financiele middelen spelen
bij investeringsbeslissingen kan niet genegeerd worden. Zij vonmen een
belangrijke bron van verschillen tussen de condities waaronder bedrijven
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